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I. FOREIGN TRADE 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
In the first half of 1955, Latin American foreign trade 
was characterized by a sharp decrease in the credit balance 
of the region as a whole, as well as by greater discrepancies 
between individual economies. Some—although very few 
—managed to improve their net income, but the majority 
experienced increasing difficulties with regard to their ex-
ternal payments problem. 
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Although the decline in net income from foreign trade 
is not yet reflected, except in certain countries and to a 
comparatively limited degree, in a reduction of the Central 
Bank's gross reserves of gold and foreign exchange, this is 
due to growing short-term liabilities, in the form either of 
increased credit or of heavier arrears in payment for goods 
and services received. The combination of several differ-
ent factors reduced credit balances to a level which—given 
Latin America's other permanent commitments on its ex-
ternal current account—at present implies rapidly increas-
ing debts and a further immediate curtailment of foreign 
purchases over the short term. Statistics for the first six 
months of 1955 do not yet reveal this contraction of im-
ports, especially if they are compared with the figures 
for the same period of the preceding year. In fact, almost 
all the Latin American countries made heavier purchases 
abroad, as an inevitably belated outcome of the increased 
value of exports during early 1954. Undoubtedly, herein 
lies the first determinant of the 1955 foreign trade deficit. 
The second is the fall in the prices of most of the Latin 
American exports. The impact varied considerably, accord-
ing to the staple exports of each country. The coffee and 
cacao producers were, of course, the worst affected, while 
exporters of agricultural products also suffered, but to a 
lesser extent. 
These negative factors were somewhat offset by two posi-
tive elements: a very slight reduction in average import 
prices and a small increase in the volume of exports. In 
brief, the region's collective trade balance (exports f.o.b.; 
imports c.i.f.) fell from 564 million dollars in the first half 
of 1954 to 130 millions in the same period of 1955. Part 
of this reduction—51 per cent—was due to a discrepancy 
between the import and export volumes, and the remaining 
49 per cent to the fact that export prices dropped much 
more sharply than those of imports—in other words, to a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
Another notable feature of Latin American trade in the 
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period under review is that capital goods imports were 
unaffected by the reduction in export earnings. In this 
respect, the foreign sector does not appear to have preju-
diced economic development. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the present disequilibrium in the balance of payments can-
not be allowed to continue much longer, and that the con-
traction of imports, which must inevitably take place unless 
the export situation changes substantially in the very near 
future, will constitute a potential threat. The situation thus 
described is in contrast with the exceptional prosperity 
of the large industrial countries of Europe and North 
America. The high index of economic activity and the in-
crease in per capita income in these countries do not appear 
to have had the beneficial effects on the Latin American 
raw material and foodstuffs producers that might have 
been expected. 
Neither are these favourable influences reflected, accord-
ing to the incomplete information available, in trade trends 
for the third quarter of the year—at least, not to the extent 
required. A preliminary estimate, computed on the basis 
of data for eight countries, which together account for more 
than 60 per cent of the region's total trade, reveals a con-
siderable expansion of exports—11 per cent more than the 
average for the two preceding quarters—which, however, 
is still insufficient to match the figures for the third quarter 
of 1954. The main reason for this partial recovery lies in 
the increase in Brazilian and Colombian sales abroad. 
Export prices also registered a slight improvement. Al-
though coffee, fine wool and, above all, cacao fell still 
lower, the trend for wheat and tin underwent a complete 
reversal, while prices for coarse wool, zinc and especially 
copper continued to rise substantially. Nevertheless, it 
would seem strange that total imports do not appear to 
have diminished. It is true that they are at a lower level 
than in 1954, but the slow decline which began at the end 
of that year seems to have been interrupted notwithstand-
ing the measures designed to restrict purchases abroad. 
Only in Colombia has such action proved effective, with 
the result that an appreciable reduction (16 per cent) of 
the volume registered in the first six months of the year 
was witnessed in the third quarter of 1955, when Colom-
bia's trade balance, like that of Brazil, was on the credit 
side. On the other hand, Argentina's deficit continued to 
grow, and the situation in Uruguay appears to have reached 
a critical point, owing to the still more serious falling-off 
in its exports. In only two months—July and August—the 
latter country lost 8 per cent of the gold and foreign ex-
change reserves it was holding in mid-1955. Lastly, al-
Table I 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars, current f.o.b. values) 
Countries and 
groups of countries'^ 
19 5Ü 19 55 Variation (B) to U ) 
Ist half 
U) 










Grand total 3,932.7 3,857.4 3,744.5 1,840.8 1,903.7 -188.2 -4.8 
Coffee and cacao 
Total 1,481.9 1,355.6 1,221.0 604.7 616.4 -260.9 -17.6 
Brazil 730.2 831.5 612.3 297.6 314.8 - 1 1 7 . 9 - 1 6 . 1 
Colombia 357.9 299.2 252.1 125.9 126.2 - 1 0 5 . 8 - 2 9 . 6 
Costa Rica 46.0 36.5 49.6 24.4 25.2 3.6 7.8 
Dominican Republic. . . . 73.4 45.4 58.1 25.2 32.9 - 1 5 . 3 - 2 0 . 8 
Ecuador 40.3 59.3 40.6 19.2 21.5 0.3 0.7 
El Salvador 79.1 25.9 83.0 40.8 34.2 3.9 4.9 
Guatemala 78.4 24.3 62.5 33.3 29.2 - 1 5 . 9 - 2 0 . 3 
Haiti 35.3 20.2 22.6 11.1 , 11.4 - 1 2 . 7 - 3 6 . 0 
Nicaragua 41.3 13.3 40.2 19.2 21.0 - 1 . 1 - 2 . 7 
Agricultural products 
Total 993.1 878.9 917.2 443.2 474.2 - 7 5 . 9 -7.6 
Argentina 52L3 528.7 464.8 228.7 236.2 - 5 6 . 5 - 1 0 . 8 
Cuba 315.5 223.5 345.4 157.3 188.1 29.9 9.5 
Paraguay 15.3 18.7 17.6 7.4 10.3 2.3 15.0 
Uruguay 141.0 108.0 89.4 49.8 39.6 - 5 1 . 6 - 3 6 . 6 
Metallic ores 
Total 225.2 269.0 259.0 123.1 135.9 33.8 15.0 
Bolivia 42.9 47.1 41.2 20.5 20.7 - 1 . 7 - 4 . 0 
Cbile 182.3 221.9 217.8 102.6 115.2 35.5 19.5 
Miscellaneous products 
Total 131.8 172.7 132.8 68.2 64.6 1.0 0.8 
Honduras 30.9 36.0 23.3 16.4 6.9 -7.6 - 2 4 . 6 
Peru 100.9 136.7 109.5 51.8 57.7 8.6 8.5 
Total 17 countries 2,832.0 2,676.2 2,530.0 1,239.2 1,291.1 -301.8 -10.7 
Remaining countries 1,100.7 1,181.2 1,214.3 601.6 612.6 113.6 10.3 
Mexico 250.8 314.3 293.9 145.2 148.7 43.1 17.2 
Panama 12.8 14.3 12.9 6.4 6.4 0.1 0.8 
Venezuela 837.1 852.6 907.5 450.0 457.5 70.4 8.4 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of national statistics. 
« Countries grouped according to staple exports. 
Table II 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS 
(Millions of dollars, current c.i.f. values) 
Countries and 
groups of countries 
19 5'! 1955 Variation (B) to (A) 
ÍSÍ half 
(A) 










Grand total . . 3,369.2 3,770.7 3,614.1 1,819.5 1,794.6 244.9 7.3 
Coffee and cacao 
Total . . 1,333.4 1,551.4 1,310.0 678.7 631.3 -234.0 -18.0 
Brazil 746.5 882.7 659.9 350.4 309.5 - 8 6 . 6 - 1 1 . 6 
Colombia 306.2 365.5 350.1 179.5 170.6 43.9 14.3 
Costa Rica 41.3 39.3 38.8 16.4 22.4 - 2 . 5 - 6 . 0 
Dominican Republic. . . . 45.4 49.0 53.7» 29.0» 24.7» 8.3 18.3 
Ecuador 55.5 65.2 55.8 26.5 29.3 0.3 0.5 
42.3 44.4 46.7" 23.6 23.1» 4.4 10.4 
Guatemala 42.3 44.0 47.0'> 23.5 23.5» 4.7 11.1 
Haiti 24.0 23.6 21.6 11.6 10.0 - 2 . 4 - 1 0 . 0 
Nicaragua 29.9 37.7 36.4» 18.2» 18.2» 6.5 21.7 
Agricultural products 
Total 827.5 987.1 1,002.7 511.5 491.2 175.2 21.2 
Argentina 433.3 535.2 589.2 299.3 289.9 155.9 36.0 
Cuba 262.6 270.9 287.4» 152.9» 134.5» 24.8 9.4 
Paraguay 19.8 18.3 16.9 7.7 9.2 - 2 . 9 - 1 4 . 6 
Uruguay 111.8 162.7 109.2 51.6 57.6 - 2 . 6 - 2 . 3 
Metallic ores 
Total 214.4 204.9 232.6 113.7 118.9 18.2 8.5 
Bolivia 32.5 42.8 40.0» 20.0 20.0» 7.5 23.1 
Chile 181.9 162.1 192.6 93.7 98.9 10.7 5.9 
Miscellaneous products 
9.5 Total 152.4 154.3 166.9 78.5 88.4 14.5 
Honduras 29.9 27.1 32.2 15.5 16.7 2.3 7.7 
Peru 122.5 127.2 134.7 63.0 71.7 12.2 10.0 
Total 17 countries 2,527.7 2,897.7 2,712.2 1,382.4 1,329.8 184.5 7.3 
Remaining countries 841.5 873.0 901.9 437.1 464.8 60.4 7.2 
Mexico 365.9 347.5 375.9 184.4 191.5 10.0 2.7 
Panama 41.1 41.9 44.1» 22.0» 22.1» 3.0 7.3 
Venezuela 434.5 483.6 481.9 230.7 251.2 47.4 10.9 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of national statistics. 
» ProvisionaL 
though data on Latin America as a whole are as yet incom-
plete, it would seem that the losses incurred in gold and 
foreign exchange far outstrip the small increment regis-
tered during the first six months of the year. 
2 . T H E GREATER VOLUME AND SMALLER VALUE OF EXPORTS 
Latin America's export situation during the first half of 
1955 cannot be considered satisfactory. In comparison with 
the same period of 1954, current values declined by 4.8 per 
cent; thus ground was lost in relation to 1953 and 1951. 
(See table I.)^ 
The fall in the prices of most of the staple exports is 
directly, though not exclusively, responsible for this reces-
sion, which would have been more serious had there not 
been an appreciable increase in the export volume during 
the second half of the year. 
If average prices in the first six months of 1954 and 
1955 are viewed collectively, an adverse trend is apparent. 
' Table I, showing Latin American exports, and table II, illus-
trating the region's imports (the analysis of which begins on p. 6 ) , 
are presented together on pages 3 and 4 in the interests of com-
parison. They have been given roman numerals in order to distin-
guish them from the other tables in this article. 
Its effects are especially marked in the case of coffee and 
cacao, slightly less so in that of wheat and fine wool, and 
rather light in that of sugar and tin. Prices of crude petro-
leum remained stable, while those of coarse wool, lead, 
zinc and copper were rising. Higher quotations for the 
last-named commodity vary considerably according to the 
market: 13.7 per cent in New York and 39.9 per cent in 
London. (See table 1.) 
It is true that these world market fluctuations do not 
always find mathematically precise expression in the ex-
port trade of producer countries. For example, the exist-
ence of large wheat stocks in the United States and Canada 
forced Argentina to bring its prices still nearer to the world 
level, to enable it to compete with other producers and to 
ensure the sale of its harvest. Thus, the real prices of 
Argentine wheat exports fell by 6 per cent, which contrasts 
with a decline of barely 4 per cent in world market quota-
tions. This development also reveals the present inadequacy 
of those bilateral arrangements to which Argentina has so 
far resorted in defence of its export prices. On the other 
hand, the special system whereby the United States makes 
its sugar purchases provided Cuba—and, to a much smaller 
extent, the other Latin American producers—with a certain 
Table II 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPARISON OF THE PRICES OF 
STAPLE EXPORTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 
1954 AND 1955 
(Cents per pound 
Average prices 
in first half 
Average prices 
in first half Percentage 
Products b of of 1955 variation 
Agricultural products 
Coffee (New York) 82.30 58.45 - 2 9 . 0 
Cacao (New York) 59.35 41.30 - 3 0 . 4 
Sugar (New York) 3.315 3.255 - 1 . 8 
Wheat (Canada) 1.86 1.785 - 4 . 0 
Cotton (London) 38.5 37.55 - 2 . 5 
Wool (London) 113.4 107.85 - 4 . 9 
Wool (Boston) 86.5 94.55 9.3 
Minerals 
Copper (New York) 29.9 34.0 13.7 
Copper (London) 29.7 41.55 39.9 
Tin (New York) 91.35 90.45 - 1 . 0 
Lead (New York) 13.6 15.0 10.3 
Zinc 10.6 12.25 15.6 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis 
of trade statistics. 
' Except in the case of wheat, the quotation for which is in dollars 
per bushel. 
i' Coffee: Santos No. 4; Cacao: Accra; Sugar: United States free 
market, f.o.b. Havana; Wheat: Manitoba No. 1; Wool: London 
auction prices, Boston; Uruguayan 5-40's; Cotton: American Middling 
measure of protection against the price depression in the 
open market. 
The changes which took place between the first and 
second quarters of 1955 are all characterized by an aggra-
vation of the previous decline. Since a completely opposite 
trend had prevailed a year previously, the recession was 
much more pronounced between the second quarter of 1954 
and the same period of 1955 than in the first three months 
of both years. 
Table 2 gives a detailed illustration, by groups of Latin 
American countries,'' of the influence of price and volume 
on the expansion or contraction of the capacity to import 
derived from exports. 
A cursory examination of the situation by countries and 
p;roups of countries provides confirmation of the fact that 
the recession was most marked for the exporters of coffee 
^ Countries have been grouped according to their staple exports. 
and cacao. However, very sharp differences exist among the 
countries forming this group. Three of them—Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and El Salvador—managed to increase their for-
eign exchange earnings by expanding the volume of ex-
ports. Brazil and Colombia—the main coffee exporters-
are in very different positions. The former country main-
tained a steady volume of exports, while the latter suffered 
from the adverse effects of a fall in prices combined with 
a 26-per-cent reduction in the volume of sales abroad.^ The 
first half of 1954 was an exceptionally favourable period 
for Colombia, since it was at this time of higher foreign 
market quotations that the country was able to sell more 
of its coffee. This is probably why the Colombian trade 
balance now displays greater disequilibrium. It should also 
be recalled that coffee forms a larger proportion of Colom-
bia's total exports than of Brazil's, and that, moreover, 
neither the volume nor the prices of the other Colombian 
exports increased. The influence of favourable factors was 
therefore of no avail in mitigating the effects of the coffee 
crisis. 
On the other hand, the sometimes extraordinary prog-
ress achieved by Brazil in previous months in placing its 
remaining exportable commodities was maintained during 
the second quarter of 1955.^ Throughout the first six 
months of the year the volume of exports expanded in the 
following way: pinewood by 21 per cent; cacao by 24 per 
cent; iron ore by 64 per cent; and manganese by almost 
100 per cent. These increases resulted from the develop-
ment of production and the opening up of new markets. 
Apart from having recovered its position on the United 
States market, iron ore was exported in greater quantities 
to Germany and the United Kingdom, and also found an 
important place in the trade with Czechoslovakia. In-
creased Argentine purchases explain the larger pinewood 
exports. The United States was responsible for the progress 
recorded in cacao exports, while at the same time a larger 
proportion of Brazilian coffee was sold to this market. 
The effects of all the favourable factors reviewed here 
were to a great extent counteracted by the contraction in 
exports of hides, which declined by 30 per cent, by the 
failure to export sugar and, above all, by the 46 per cent 
drop in cotton sales, partly attributable to an exchange 
regulation that the producers consider to be lacking in 
flexibility in face of rising costs. 
" In the closing months of 1955, there seems to have been a strik-
ing recovery in the volume of Colombia's coffee exports. 
•"See Economic Review of Latin America, Special issue, Bogotá, 
August 1955, p. 19. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPARISON OF UNIT VALUE INDICES, VOLUME AND CURRENT 
VALUE OF EXPORTS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND QUARTERS OF 1955 WITH THE 
CORRESPONDING FIGURES FOR 1954 
(Percentage variations) 
Country groups 
Unit value Volume Current value 
I II I II I II 
- 4 - 8 - 5 8 - 8 - 1 
- 2 - 1 9 - 2 3 12 - 2 5 - 9 
- 3 - 6 - 3 - 3 - 6 - 9 
6 6 37 - 9 45 - 3 
8 4 1 - 1 1 10 - 7 
- 2 - 1 0 - 1 1 2 - 1 3 - 8 
- 6 - 3 4,0 22 3 19 
Total Latin America. . . . 




Total 17 countries 
Rem,aining countries 
Sources: Tables I and II. 
The group of countries exporting agricultural and live-
stock products, taken as a whole, also presents a somewhat 
unfavourable picture, although this is due more to internal 
factors than to external influences; so much so that Argen-
tina, where the value of exports underwent the most 
marked decrease, was able to profit by a considerable in-
crement in the average unit value of its products. The 
depressive factors which operated throughout the whole 
of the first half of 1955 were the loss of the maize crop, 
and certain difficulties attending the sale of other com-
modities, namely, hides, oats, barley, rye and oleaginous 
by-products. The remarkable recovery in meat exports 
made itself felt only from June onwards and did not suffice 
to offset the downward movements already described. 
In Uruguay, too, it was domestic factors—a standstill 
in meat exports and the withholding of greasy wool from 
the market—which mainly determined a very serious fall 
in export earnings during the first half of 1955, when they 
were 36 per cent lower than over the same period in 1954. 
Conversely, however, Cuba was able to strengthen its 
free market sugar sales sufficiently to compensate for the 
effects of the price decline and to increase its resources 
by about 10 per cent. A powerful influence was exerted 
by the boom in sales to both Eastern and Western European 
countries.® 
Except for Bolivia and Honduras, the other Latin 
American countries, especially Chile and Mexico, wit-
nessed an increase in the value of their exports. Chile 
and Peru are the only countries in the region that suc-
ceeded in reaping the joint benefits of a larger volume 
of exports and a rise in prices. The impact of the second 
factor was obviously stronger in Chile, of whose exports 
a higher proportion is represented by metals. As regards 
Peru, the improvement in the price of ores was largely can-
celled out by a slight contraction in sugar and cotton 
quotations. 
A considerable increase also took place in the quantum 
of Venezuela's and Mexico's exports, owing to the incre-
ment in their volume, which easily counterbalanced the 
really rather insignificant reduction in their unit value. 
A t first glance, the boom in Mexican exports would appear 
spectacular. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that 
they underwent a marked decrease in the second quarter 
•of 1954, when the national currency was devalued. It is 
therefore clear from the figures registered in the second 
quarter of 1955, which were already somewhat higher 
than those for the first quarter, that the 1954 emergency 
is a thing of the past and that a trend towards progress 
has begun. This has already found expression in the export 
statistics now becoming available for the third quarter. 
Except in the case of Cuba, the outstanding development 
in Central America and the West Indies was the reduction 
in the volume of coffee exports, in addition, of course, to 
the fall in prices. Improved sales of cacao and bananas, 
however, more or less offset this decline. 
3 . T H E CAPACITY TO IMPORT AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
A comparison between the first quarter of 1955 and the 
same period in 1954 shows that the Latin American coun-
tries' capacity to import was adversely affected by a decline 
° Sales of sugar to the USSR in 1955 are estimated at 568,000 
tons, while Cuba's total sugar exports were only some 340,000 tons 
higher than those of the previous year. 
of about 5 per cent in the resources (in current values) 
accruing from exports, and was only very slightly offset 
by a fall in average import prices. (See table 3.) 
These data are not final, but as it has been possible to 
cover 77 per cent of the value of imports, and to include 
seven out of the nine countries which account for the larg-
est proportion of the total volume of trade,® it seems justi-
fiable to take the information given as representative of 
the over-all situation in Latin America. 
The fall in import prices between the first quarter of 
1955 and the same period of the preceding year is, in real-
ity, negligible, as it barely amounted to 0.75 per cent. It 
is clear from an examination of the figures for each quar-
ter that the general trend was unfavourable. In 1954 im-
port prices were 1.9 per cent lower in the second than in 
the first quarter. In 1955, on the other hand, they rose 
again during the same period by 1 per cent. A comparison 
of the relevant data therefore shows that in the first quarter 
of 1955 the index was lower and in the second higher than 
during the corresponding periods of 1954. 
The decrease in export prices, barely mitigated by the 
trend in the prices of imports, was reflected in a deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade, which was provisionally esti-
mated at 5.3 per cent for the first quarter. The fact that 
the terms of trade were 11.2 per cent lower in the second 
quarter of 1955 than in the last three months of 1954 leaves 
no doubt as to the probability of an aggravation of the 
situation. 
4 . HIGHER IMPORTS 
These trends towards a lower export income and a de-
terioration in the terms of trade combined to determine 
a reduction in the capacity to import. Nevertheless, from 
the statistics for the first quarter of 1955, it is not abso-
lutely clear, at any rate at a first glance, that real imports 
have decreased. On the contrary, in current values they 
rose by 7.3 per cent between the first quarter of 1954 and 
the corresponding period of 1955. (See table 11.) ' 
Still greater importance attaches to the fact that imports 
expanded in sixteen countries, and that the only note-
worthy reduction, both in absolute and relative terms, was 
recorded in Brazil. Similarly, if the data for groups of 
producer countries are examined, all show increases except 
the coffee exporters, in whose case a reduction of less than 
2 per cent is to be observed. This is surprising when it is 
remembered that the sharp fall in coffee and cacao prices 
began a year previously. A partial explanation may lie in 
the fact that the boom in imports had not reached its 
climax by the first quarter of 1954 ; an analysis of the 
quarterly statistics reveals a continuous rise throughout 
that year, since imports, the value of which was 1,640 
million dollars in the first quarter, amounted to 1,730 
millions, 1,860 millions and more than 1,900 millions in 
the second, third and last quarters respectively. The situa-
tion was reversed at the'beginning of 1955 ; imports fell 
to a value of 1,820 millions in the first three months and 
1,795 millions in the second quarter. Nevertheless, the 
average for the first half of the year was higher in 1955 
than in 1954, and, as is well known, imports have a greater 
propensity to increase than to decrease. When export earn-
ings expand to an unusual degree, as was the case in a 
" Countries whose exports and imports both represented a value 
of over 200 million dollars in 1954. 
' See p. 4. 
Table II 
LATIN AMERICA: UNIT VALUES INDICES IN DOLLARS AND TERMS OF TRADE 
(1950=100) 
1 9 5 Ü 19 5 5 
I II III IV I II 
113.8 114.7 116.6 114.6 109.5 105.3 
110.4 108.3 109.2 105.3 108.0 109.2 
103.1 105.9 106.8 108.8 101.4 96.4 
95.0 96.7 102.5 102.7 97.8 100.8 
104.7 113.9 113.5 99.4 110.7 110.7-
90.7 84.9 90.3 103.3 88.3 91.1 
124.3 132.3 141.9 128.9 113.9 102.0 
113.1 102.0 107.2 102.7 105.1 103.4 
109.9 129.7 132.4 125.5 108.4 98.6 
123.6 134.9 130.2 131.8 133.2 145.7 
112.4 109.0 114.3 115.2 107.6 106.9 
110.0 123.8 113.9 114.4 123.8 136.3 
113.8 141.6 147.8 136.2 126.2 116.7 
110.8 110.0 110.8 111.5 109.2 109.2 
102.7 128.7 133.4 122.2 115.6 106.9 
89.6 90.7 95.6 97.5 96.9 96.8 
108.0 101.9 99.0 100.0 97.4 101.5 
83.0 89.0 96.6 97.5 99.5 95.4 
113.1 113.8 113.9 110.6 106.1 110.2 
110.2 114.1 109.3 114.1 111.1 117.1 
102.6 99.7 104.2 96.9 95.5 94.1 
117.6 110.5 103.9 107.8 109.5 108.2 
112.4 109.2 107.9 102.1 108.9 111.2 
































Terms of trade. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of 
national statistics. 
Notes: Imports are in c.i.f., and exports in f.o.b., terms. 
The index of exports for Latin America as a whole is based on 
statistics from twenty countries. That of annual imports is also 
calculated on the basis of these twenty countries, unlike the quar-
terly index, later incorporated with the annual index, for the 
calculation of which the figures for the seven countries mentioned 
were used. 
» Owing to difficulties involved in defining the rate of exchange 
operative during the second quarter, the figure for the first quarter 
has been repeated. 
'' The index for 1954 and 1955 was calculated by the Banco 
Central de Chile and incorporated with the index computed by 
ECLA up to 1953. 
" The price index for 1954 and 1955 was obtained from the 
Revista Económica and incorporated with the index computed by 
ECLA up to 1953. 
The International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics supplied the index for 1954 and 1955, which was later 
incorporated with that calculated by ECLA. 
number of countries at the beginning of 1954, orders are 
immediately placed abroad, both for consumer goods and 
raw materials, which are likely to be received promptly, 
and for equipment and machinery, which will be delivered 
over the longer term. The arrival of the latter, when the 
period of prosperity is already over, helps to maintain 
imports at a level higher than is justified by the reduction 
in income. 
Herein also lies the explanation of another phenomenon 
witnessed in the first half of 1955, namely, that the share 
of capital goods in total imports, far from decreasing, 
actually seems to have expanded slightly. (See table 4.) 
The most significant case is undoubtedly that of Brazil. 
Its imports of capital goods remained at virtually the same 
absolute level, despite a decline of more than 11 per cent 
in the total value of imports. Although complete data were 
available only on the five countries included in the table, 
information from other sources suggests the conclusion 
that at least three more countries display similar trends. 
In Uruguay, for example, although total imports were re-
duced, there was an absolute increment of 15 per cent in 
purchases of machinery and spare parts. 
Data from a Colombian source which cover ten months 
of 1955 indicate a slight increase in the share of capital 
goods in total imports, a proportion which rose from 48.2 
per cent in 1954 to 49.7 per cent in 1955. Imports of ma-
chinery and chemical products are those for which the 
highest index of growth was registered in Mexico. 
Export data for the industrial countries also provide 
very interesting material for study. The total value of 
exports from the United States to the twenty Latin Ameri-
can republics, which had risen from 1,546 million dollars 
Table II 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
(Percentage based on current values in millions of dollars) 
Total Consumer goods Raw materials Fuels 
IB) (B) (A) (B) 
Argentina 100.0 100.0 149 l l s 245 3L3 i H l O s " 
Brazil 100.0 100.0 13.7 12.4 35.8 32.2 15.0 15.7 
Chile . . . 100.0 100.0 25.5 25.5 21.0 25.0 15.6 12.5 
Peru 100.0 100.0 20.4 22.5 29.2 31.4 3.1 2.2 
Venezuela 100.0 100.0 29.5 30.7 20.4 20.3 1.9 1.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 19.1 19.0 27.9 28.4 10.9 9.7 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of national statistics. 
IVote: (A) = First half 1954. 















in the first half of 1954 to 1,661 millions in the second, 
declined again to 1,515 millions in the first six months 
of 1955. In other words, it was 2 per cent and almost 9 per 
cent lower than in the first and second halves of 1954 
respectively. The decrease in exports of machinery, how-
ever, was proportionally smaller, and only in the third 
quarter of 1955 were there signs of a new trend, in that 
total exports from the United States to Latin America 
underwent a reduction of 8.5 per cent, whereas exports of 
machinery fell by 12 per cent. This situation was almost 
entirely brought about by a sudden drop in the region's 
purchases of agricultural machinery, including tractors; 
the full magnitude of the decline will doubtless become 
apparent when the final 1955 statistics for Latin America 
are available. 
To attack the problem from yet another angle, export 
data for the United States, Canada and the industrial coun-
tries of Western Europe were considered in the aggregate. 
An analysis of their exports of capital goods® to Latin 
America shows that in the first six months of 1955 these 
were 4.6 per cent higher than in the corresponding period 
of the preceding year, and 3.7 per cent lower than in the 
second half of 1954. Equally clear is the progress made 
by the European countries in the Latin American capital 
goods market. Their sales in the first half of 1955 rose by 
17.1 per cent, whereas those of the United States and 
Canada fell by 2.1 and 17.5 per cent respectively. Al-
though to a less marked degree, the same trends are re-
flected in the total value of United States, Canadian and 
European exports to Latin America. 
Chart II, based on the quarterly statistics for total ex-
ports from the industrial countries to Latin America, cor-
roborates the trends described. It can clearly be seen that 
these exports were somewhat heavier in the first six months 
of 1955 than during the corresponding period in 1954, and 
also that shipments of capital goods from the United States 
and Canada, which slightly increased in the course of 1953 
and 1954, for the first time declined in two consecutive 
quarters in 1955. The situation was reversed in the case of 
European exports in the same category, which rose in the 
second quarter. The increased sensitivity of consumer 
goods exports, especially of United States origin, is also 
apparent. Finally, it is interesting to note that the propor-
' Including the whole of Section 7 in the Standard International 
Trade Classification, plus groups 661 and 681 (cement, and iron 
and steel products). This covers approximately 38 per cent of Latin 
America's total imports. 
tion of capital goods is much greater in European exports 
to Latin America than in those of the United States and 
Canada. 
5 . SIGNIFICANT RECESSION IN TRADE BALANCES 
The cumulative effect of the increase in imports and the 
decrease in export prices reduced trade balances by 78 
per cent in the first half of 1955, thus bringing them down 
to a level much lower than the indispensable minimum re-
quired to cover the deficit which the other elements in the 
balance of payments on current account invariably present. 
(See table 5.) 
If Mexico, Panama and Venezuela are excluded," it can 
be seen that the remaining seventeen countries had a trade 
deficit of over 180 million dollars. Since the invisible in-
come of most of them is not very large, the situation is 
patently a difRcult one. 
An examination may usefully be made of the factors 
which, in the seventeen countries in question, caused the 
favourable balance of 304 million dollars registered in the 
first half of 1954 to be replaced, in the corresponding 
period of 1955, by a deficit of 182 millions. Of this differ-
ence of 486 millions, the expansion of imports accounts 
for 205 millions, and the contraction of exports for 121 
millions.^" The remainder—160 million dollars—is attrib-
utable to the deterioration in the terms of trade. In the 
whole of Latin America this last factor represents a net 
loss of 211 millions, that is, almost 50 per cent of the re-
duction in the credit trade balance. 
If the position of each country is examined, very wide 
divergencies become apparent. It is in Argentina and 
Colombia that the greatest disequilibria are found, and in 
both cases they are largely due to an increase in imports. 
Brazil's deficit is not so high in either absolute or relativé 
terms, but its situation is aggravated by the persistent re-
currence of the imbalance for several years past. Uruguay, 
° Their exclusion can be justified because, in the case of Vene-
zuela, its high trade balance is largely absorbed by external pay-
ments on current account, and in that of Mexico and Panama, their 
invisible income, from tourism and other sources, is very large, and 
generally offsets their substantial trade deficits. 
" Exports and imports at prices corresponding to the first half of 
1954. It should be explained that, if the volume of exports increased 
for Latin America as a whole, this was essentially due to the boom 
in exports from Mexico and Venezuela. Among the seventeen coun-
tries under review, Chile, Cuba and Peru registered favourable 
figures, but these did not suffice to offset the recession experienced 
by the rest. 
like Argentina and Colombia, had a surplus in 1954 and 
a deficit in 1955. Although the value of its exports rose, 
Peru witnessed an increase in its deficit, and it might well 
seem that there is danger of a return—though on a smaller 
scale—to the relative excess of imports which in 1953 
threatened the country with a monetary crisis, afterwards 
fortunately averted. 
Among the nine most important countries, only three-
Chile, Cuba and Venezuela—maintained and even raised 
the favourable balance recorded in the preceding year. 
Notwithstanding a considerable expansion of imports, it 
was Chile that achieved the greatest improvement, but as 
at the beginning of the year this country was burdened by 
a relatively heavy accumulation of short-term trade debts, 
the progress made in 1955 was not enough to restore the 
balance of trade to normal, cover arrears and finance 
other payments on current account. Nevertheless, it is safe 
to assert that Chile's foreign payments position has been 
greatly eased, and that the country has been able to effect 
sufficient imports to meet its requirements of basic food-
stuffs and raw materials. Cuba, despite the not too favour-
able sugar situation, preserved a remarkable balance be-
tween its exports and imports, both of which are follow-
ing an upward course. Mexico was the only one of the 
nine countries that was able to reduce its deficit, although 
this is still manifest in its visible trade. 
With reference to the remaining countries, attention 
must be called to the recovery achieved by Paraguay, 
which recorded a surplus in the first half of 1955 as 
against a deficit in the corresponding period of 1954. In 
contrast, the West Indies, and Central America with the 
exception of Costa Rica, suffered a serious setback as a 
direct result of the coffee crisis. 
A study of the quarterly data clearly shows that the 
present disequilibrium is tending to right itself. In the 
twenty Latin American republics, taken as a whole, the 
Chart I I 
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Source: United Nations Statistical Oifice. 
» Excluding Groups CUCI 911 and 931. 
•> Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom only. 
favourable balance of trade in the first quarters of 1954 
and 1955 fell from 367 million dollars to only 21 millions, 
but in the second quarter of the latter year it rose to 109 
millions, as compared with 196 over the same period in 
1954. A similar, but even more marked, trend is observ-
able in the seventeen countries mentioned above. Here the 
trade deficit declined from 143 to 39 million dollars be-
tween the first and second quarters of 1955, surpluses of 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: HALF-YEARLY TRADE BALANCES (EXPORTS F.O.B.; IMPORTS C.I.F.) 
(Millions of dollars, current values) 
Í95Í 
1955 
Countries and I I I I 
groups of countries (A) Total (B) 
Grand total 563.5 86.9 650.4 130.2 
Coffee and cacao 
Total 148.5 -195.7 -47.2 -89.0 
Brazil 16.3 - 5 1 . 2 - 6 7 . 5 - 4 7 . 6 
Colombia 51.7 - 6 6 . 2 - 1 4 . 5 - 9 8 . 0 
Others 113.1 - 7 8 . 3 34.8 56.6 
Agricultural products 
Totals 165.6 -108.3 57.3 -85.5 
Argentina 88.0 - 6 . 5 81.5 , - 1 2 4 . 4 
Cuba 52.9 - 4 7 . 4 5.5 58.0 
Metallic ores 
Totalb 10.8 64.1 74.9 26.4 
Chile 0.4 59.8 60.2 25.2 
Miscellaneous products 
Total" -20.6 18.5 -2.1 -34.1 
Peru - 2 1 . 6 9.6 - 1 2 . 0 - 2 5 . 2 
Total 17 countries 304.3 - 221.4 82.9 -182.2 
Mexico - 1 1 5 . 1 - 3 3 . 2 - 1 4 8 . 3 - 8 2 . 0 
Venezuela 402.6 369.1 771.7 425.6 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of national statistics. 
» Includes Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Includes Bolivia. 
0 Includes Honduras. 
Variation 
(B) to (A) 
-433.3 
-237.5 
- 3 1 . 3 
- 1 4 9 . 7 
- 5 6 . 5 
-251.1 










181 and 124 millions respectively having been registered 
in the corresponding quarters of the preceding year. 
It seems that this improvement is attributable to an ex-
panding trade with Europe, as no increase is apparent (in 
fact, quite the contrary) in trade with the United States 
and Canada, which are the chief sources of freely con-
vertible hard currency. As no direct and detailed Latin 
American statistics are as yet available on the region's 
trade movements, data for the commerce of the industrial 
countries with Latin America must be utilized. Between 
the first six months of 1954 and the first half of 1955, the 
United States reduced its imports of Latin American prod-
ucts by 162 million dollars. On the other hand, United 
States exports to Latin America were curtailed by only 
34 millions. The dollar balance in favour of the Latin 
American countries therefore fell from 180 to 52 millions. 
It must also be remembered that United State statistics deal 
with exports and imports on an f.o.b. basis. If the figures 
for Latin America's imports are expressed in c.i.f. terms,^^ 
negative balances of 32 and 155 million dollars in 1954 
and 1955 respectively are revealed. It is obvious that there 
is a tendency for the imbalance to be aggravated. The data 
for the first and second quarters of 1955 (on an f.o.b. /c.i .f . 
basis) show that the deficit in the latter stood at 166 mil-
lions, whereas in the former there had been a slight sur-
plus of 11 million dollars. 
If the same comparison, (i.e., between the first halves of 
1954 and 1955) is made for trade with Canada and the 
whole of Western Europe, a slight increase in Latin 
America's favourable balance becomes apparent. This 
amounts to 22 million dollars with Canada and 12 millions 
with Europe, and originates from the increase in Latin 
American exports to the latter and the reduction in its 
imports from the former. The favourable balance of trade 
with Japan fell from 40 to 10 million dollars, as the result 
of a decline of 20 per cent in Japanese imports from Latin 
America. 
6 . T H E GROSS RESERVES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS 
In view of the Latin American trade situation, it was 
inevitable that the gross reserves of gold and foreign ex-
change in the majority of the Central Banks should be 
subjected to a severe strain. Nevertheless, in the first 
quarter of 1955, a slight improvement was registered for 
" With an agreed surcharge on f.o.b. values of 13 per cent in the 
United States and Canada, and 15 per cent in Europe and Japan. 
the region as a whole in comparison with the volume of 
reserves available at the close of 1954. The increment was 
very small—less than 15 million dollars—but compares 
favourably with the negative results of the preceding year. 
(See table 6.) 
Once more, however, an examination of the statistics by 
countries and groups of countries reveals wide divergen-
cies. The reserves of countries with a mining industry, like 
Mexico and Venezuela, increased to a remarkable extent. 
In contrast, the situation of exporters of coffee and other 
agricultural products deteriorated so far that the loss of 
gold and foreign exchange was a good deal heavier in only 
six months of 1955 than throughout the whole of 1954. In 
actual fact, the decrease was considerable only in two 
countries, Argentina and Colombia, where it amounted to 
115 and 116 million dollars respectively. The drain on the 
latter country's reserves was especially severe, as it came 
to represent 46 per cent of the reserves existing at the end 
of 1954. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind 
that favourable results were recorded in the second quarter 
for practically all countries, Argentina and Uruguay being 
the only exceptions worth mentioning. 
If the trade balances are compared with the movement 
of reserves it is clear that the latter only partially reflects 
the negative nature of the former.^^ The discrepancy, to 
which must be added the invisible trade deficit,^^ was off-
set in part by movements of capital and in part by a further 
expansion of the volume of trade arrears.^" 
^^  In seventeen countries reserves fell during the first half of 1955 
by 125.9 million dollars, in face of a deficit of 182.2 millions in com-
modity trade alone. The other three countries witnessed an increase 
of 140.5 millions in their reserves in comparison with a trade surplus 
of 312.4 millions. 
" Mention should also be made of exports of gold and silver 
bullion which are not included in foreign trade statistics, and which 
represent a by no means inconsiderable contribution to the adjust-
ment of the balance of payments of countries producing these metals. 
In the first half of 1955, Colombia, Mexico and Peru alone acquired 
35 million dollars from this source. 
By way of example, Brazil's balance of payments may be cited. 
In the first half of 1955, its over-all deficit reached 131 million dol-
lars, made up of 48 millions corresponding to the unfavourable bal-
ance of trade (imports c.i.f.; exports f.o.b.), of 56 millions represent-
ing the net deficit in the remaining components of the services 
account, and of a net outflow of capital amounting to 27 millions. 
This deficit was covered by loans and foreign credit to the value of 
189 million dollars, from which 54 millions must be deducted for 
amortizations of previous loans, as well as the 4 millions used to 
reduce arrears in current trade payments, which are still estimated 
at 123 million dollars. 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN THE GROSS RESERVES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS 
IN 1954 AND FIRST TWO QUARTERS OF 1955 
(Millions of dollars) 
Countries and 1955 
groups of — 
countries 1954« I II Total 
Total Latin America - 1 5 7 . 7 - 7 8 . 2 92.8 14.6 
Coifee and cacao group - 5 6 . 0 - 1 2 0 . 1 39.6 - 8 0 . 5 
Agricultural group - 6 8 . 0 - 1 9 . 8 - 5 2 . 0 - 7 1 . 8 
Metallic ores group —7.0 15.0 8.7 23.7 
Miscellaneous 8.4 —4.7 7.4 2.7 
Total 17 countries - 1 2 2 . 6 - 1 2 9 . 6 3.7 - 1 2 5 . 9 
Venezuela - 2 . 0 - 1 5 . 0 84.0 69.0 
Mexico and Panama - 3 3 . 1 66.4 5.1 71.5 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of International Monetary Fund data. 
» Net variation between 31 December 1953 and 31 December 1954. 
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I I . AGRICULTURE 
1. T H E OVER-ALL SITUATION 
The 5-per-cent increase in Latin America's agricultural 
production in 1955 was an improvement on the average 
annual rate of 3 per cent at which production had ex-
panded during the five-year period 1950-54; but the per 
capita output was still 5 per cent lower than in the pre-war 
years. (See table 7.) 
Table 7 




1937/38 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/51! Í95V55» 
Total production 













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
» Provisional. 
Before the trends of Latin American agriculture in 1955 
are analysed, stress must be laid on one of its aspects 
which has long been of vital importance for the region's 
future, and which was in great evidence throughout the 
year in almost all the Latin American countries: namely, 
the advances made in agricultural production techniques. 
Not only is the trend towards mechanization increasingly 
marked, but various technological practices designed to 
improve yields and reduce risks are also coming into more 
and more general use. Similarly, the findings of agricul-
tural research, and their dissemination, are acquiring ever 
greater importance, while in 1955, as in previous years, 
international co-operation continued to play a decisive 
role. 
During the year under review more emphasis was placed 
on the production of foodstuffs than on that of raw mate-
rials and stimulants. In fact, while the former increased 
by 5.6 per cent in relation to 1954, thus raising per capita 
supplies to their pre-war level, the increment in the latter 
was only 4.2 per cent, and per capita availabilities were 
consequently 20 per cent lower than before the war. (See 
table 8 . ) 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: INDICES OF TOTAL AND PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL 




1937/38 1950/51 1951/51 1952/53 1953/5Í Í954/55» 
Total production 
FoodstuiTs 79 104.5 101.5 111.4 112.8 119.1 
Raw materials and stimulants » 93.7 98.6 109.1 105.7 109.9 114.5 
Per capita production 
Foodstuffs 106.2 102.4 97 103.6 102.6 , 106.0 
Raw materials and stimulants >> 125.9 96.6 104.3 98.3 100 101.9 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
" Provisional. 
b Including industrial oleaginous products and fibres. 
Most countries succeeded in improving their production. 
While the influence of the mainly favourable weather con-
ditions must not be overlooked, it may safely be asserted 
that the satisfactory results recently achieved reflect Latin 
America's desire to promote the recovery of the agricul-
tural sector. This intention springs either from the pressing 
need to replace imports, or from that of creating larger 
exportable surpluses, and, in a good many cases, from 
both. But whatever the motive, the primary aim is. to in-
crease supplies. 
In Brazil, many crops yielded harvests of unprecedented 
size, and others attained high levels; its agricultural pro-
duction consequently expanded by 6 per cent. The figures 
for that of Mexico, thanks to an increase in the area under 
irrigation, to abundant rainfall and to an energetic devel-
opment policy, were 10 per cent higher than in 1954. 
Argentina, while sharing in the general improvement, did 
no more than recover its 1 9 5 3 / 5 4 losses, as far as crops 
were concerned, but its livestock sector, on the other hand, 
showed obvious signs that the crisis of recent years was 
over. In all, its agricultural output rose by 9.6 per cent. 
Venezuela's production, despite adverse weather condi-
tions, increased at a rate of 3.7 per cent, which was higher 
than that of demographic growth. The 4-5 per cent incre-
ment obtained by Central America implies that in 1956 the 
shortage of basic foodstuffs from which these countries 
suffered during 1955 will be considerably relieved. One of 
the most important of the agricultural .developments in this 
area was the continued expansion of cotton production. 
The progress made by Colombia included substantial in-
12 
creases in several staple items; and Chile, thanks to good 
cereal harvests, raised its production by 9 per cent. Al-
though the over-all agricultural situation in Peru cannot 
be appraised for lack of full data, an improvement in sugar 
and coffee and a slight falling-off in cotton production 
seem to have taken place. 
Among the countries which failed to follow this upward 
trend in 1955 was Uruguay. While in the crops sector the 
high yield of 1953 /54 was successfully equalled, a decline 
was registered in livestock production, on account of a 
further reduction in the number of cattle slaughtered, and 
a smaller output of wool. 
Domestic demand once more proved a dynamic factor 
in Latin American agricultural development in 1955. Pro-
duction for home consumption attained a volume which 
exceeded that of 1954 by 7 per cent, and the annual aver-
age for the five years before the war by more than 68 per 
cent. In contrast, production primarily for export regis-
tered increases in relation to these two periods of only 3 
and 13 per cent respectively. (See table 9.) 
Table 9 




1937/38 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/5Í 195i/55<^ 
Total production 
For export 103.2 103.9 99.1 113.4 112.9 116.5 
For domestic consumption 71.1 102.7 105.6 108.2 111.8 119.7 
Per capita production 
For export 138.7 101.8 94.7 105.5 102.7 103.6 
For domestic consumption 95.6 100.6 101.0 100.6 101.7 106.4 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
" Provisional. 
This situation arose partly from conditions relating to 
the external demand for the staple Latin American prod-
ucts. During 1955 markets were burdened with world sur-
pluses, especially of sugar, wheat, rice and cotton, which 
exerted the inevitable pressure on prices. The market was 
also weak even for certain other products of importance 
to the region's economy—such as cacao and wool—where 
no surplus problem was involved. 
Nevertheless, Latin America has been combating these 
difficulties with relative success, and, with one or two ex-
ceptions, the countries of the regions were not obliged to 
impose direct restrictions on production. A slight falling-
off was registered, however, in production for export. 
A few individual cases may usefully by considered. In 
that of sugar, only Cuba and the Dominican Republic were 
obliged to reduce their output; Brazil, Mexico and Peru, 
on the other hand, raised their production, and now have 
larger quantities available for export. Brazil, by means of 
various exchange measures, succeeded in increasing its 
shipments abroad, and Peru had no difficulty in placing its 
surpluses; but Mexico was faced with more or less uncer-
tain market prospects and a considerable increment in its 
sugar stocks. 
As regards cotton, world surpluses have not hindered 
Latin America from extending its plantations and enlarg-
ing its crops, which as a general rule it has been able to 
sell on foreign markets. With respect to wheat, Argentina 
found little difficulty in placing most of its 1954 /55 ex-
portable production. At the close of the year, however, it 
was holding larger surpluses than after the previous sea-
son. Uruguay encountered various obstacles to the sale of 
its crop, and cut down the prices paid to the producers in 
order to prevent any expansion of wheat-growing. 
Perhaps the product that suffered the greatest market 
vicissitudes in 1955 was coffee. Not only were exports cur-
tailed because of the possibility—afterwards eliminated by 
the frosts in Brazil—that production might exceed demand, 
but, furthermore, prices stood lower than in 1954. In the 
closing months of the year, however, the coffee market 
showed signs of recovery and a return to normal. 
The Latin American countries adopted various measures 
aimed at combating the effects of the situations described, 
at ensuring their own capacity to compete at prevailing 
prices, and at maintaining farmers' earnings at levels high 
enough to constitute an incentive to production. Attempts 
were made to attain these ends by the devaluation of the 
export exchange rate, by special bonuses, by purchases on 
behalf of the State and by the establishment of minimum 
prices. Provisional agreements were even concluded at the 
international level with a view to promoting the consump-
tion and regulating the supply of specific products. 
2 . T H E SITUATION IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES 
Argentina 
Recent events in Argentina have brought about a re-
orientation of the country's economy, which is already find-
ing expression in a radical alteration of the agricultural 
policy pursued in the immediate past. This new policy is 
beginning to take shape—in fact, in some cases it has done 
so already—in a series of measures designed to promote, 
by means of greater economic incentives, an expansion of 
jroduction and the application of improved techniques. To 
jegin with, higher prices are being paid to the producer, 
and modifications have been introduced in the exchange 
rate policy, while it is the intention of the government au-
thorities to hand over the marketing of the crops, both at 
home and abroad, to the private sector, as soon as circum-
stances permit. 
As these special aspects of the situation in Argentina are 
discussed elsewhere,^^ the present analysis will deal only 
" See "The situation in Argentina and the new economic policy", 
p. 26. 
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with the actual events of the last agricultural year. More-
over, the effects of the new economic policy cannot make 
themselves felt to any major extent so early as the 1955/56 
season. The sowings of wheat, fodder crops and linseed, 
in fact, were made when the former discouraging price con-
ditions were still in force. Those of linseed and winter 
cereals, especially wheat, were smaller than in the previous 
season. For other cereals, in contrast, such as oats, barley 
and rye, which can be used as fodder crops, higher figures 
were recorded. (See table 10.) 
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: AREAS SOWN TO CEREALS AND LINSEED 
(Thousands of hectares) 
Percentage 
-Average difference 
im/50- between 1955/5e 
Í953/5Í Í95Í/55 Í955/56 • and Í95Í/55 
Wheat 5,891.3 5,936.8 5,226.0 -12 
Oats. . . 1,386.2 1,375.7 1,452.0 5.5 
Barley 953.1 1,089.6 1,245.2 14.3 
Rye 2,195.9 2,492.7 2,578.6 3.4 
Linseed. 911.7 739.3 693.6 - 6 . 2 
TOTAL 11,338.2 11,634.1 11,195.4 - 3 . 8 
Source: Servicio Estadístico Nacional, Síntesis Estadística Mensual. 
" Third estimate of the Servicio. 
Together with the reduced sowings of wheat, unfavour-
able weather conditions, which will have an adverse effect 
on yields and areas harvested, must be taken into consider-
ation. According to expert opinion, of the total area under 
wheat some 4.4—4.5 million hectares will be actually har-
vested in 1955/56, and that production will amount to ap-
proximately 5 million tons, that is 2.7 millions less than in 
1954/55. The exportable surplus is not likely to exceed 
1.2 million tons, as against 3.9 millions in the preceding 
year. The fact that nearly 1 million tons of surplus stocks 
were held on 1 December 1955 will partly mitigate the 
impact of this poor harvest on exports in 1956. 
As regards other crops, the stimulus of the new prices 
seems to have given rise to more extensive sowings of sun-
flower and maize, especially in areas where the wheat was 
damaged by frosts. 
Such, in broad outline, are the prospects and conditions 
attendant upon the 1955/56 season. Some consideration 
must now be devoted to the development of agriculture and 
stock-breeding in 1954/55, when a number of different 
circumstances led to a 9.6 per cent recovery in agricultural 
production in relation to 1953/54. This recent increase 
raised Argentina's output to its peak for the last six years, 
and implies an annual rate of growth considerably more 
rapid than that of 3.4 per cent registered over the preced-
ing five years. Even so, per capita production was still 4 
per cent below the levels attained in the five-year period 
before the war. 
In this improvement in Argentina's agricultural produc-
tion, a vital role was played by the remarkable recupera-
tion in the livestock sector, whose output exceeded that of 
1954 by 14 per cent. (See table 11.) 
Crops. The 7.4 per cent expansion in the crop produc-
tion implied only the recovery of previous losses. There 
was no uniformity of development among the various 
crops. For the main variations in production, weather con-
ditions were largely responsible. Indeed, the notable in-
crement in the output of wheat and other winter cereals, 
such as barley and rye, was principally attributable to this 
factor, of which the favourable influence was felt in bigger 
yields and the harvesting of a much higher percentage of 
the area sown. Maize, sunflower and sugar cane, on the 
other hand, were not so fortunate. 
The good wheat harvest made a decisive contribution to 
the improvement recorded for the crops sector as a whole. 
The 7.69 million tons obtained constituted a substanial 
increase over the previous harvest and the annual average 
for the five-year period 1949/50-1953/54. Only on three 
occasions during the last twenty-five years (in 1933/34, 
1938/39 and 1940/41) has this figure been exceeded. 
With regard to maize, the situation was different. The 
2.5 million tons produced were one of the lowest yields 
since 1929/30; only in 1942/43, 1949/50 and 1951/52 
were smaller outputs recorded. This decrease amounted to 
43 and 70 per cent in relation to the preceding year and to 
the annual average for the five-year period before the war, 
respectively. Sales abroad, at first suspended, were after-
wards fixed at only 340,000 tons, in the placing of which 
no difficulty was experienced. 
A general falling-off in 1954/55 in the output of edible 
oil products—cotton-seed, sunflower and peanuts—sharp-
ened still further the downward trend which began in 
1949/50. The fall in earnings per hectare, caused by the 
low prices previously established, and by the decline in 
the yields, was still the main reason why so limited an area 
was sown to these crops. Available supplies were 23 per 
cent lower than in the preceding year, and less than half 
Table 11 
ARGENTINA: INDICES OF TOTAL AND PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(1949/50= =100) 
1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 Í95J/54 Í954/55» 
Total production 104.2 91.8 116.7 109.9 120.5 
f Crops 112.7 90.5 133.5 123.3 132.4 
~ Livestock 92.2 93.7 93.2 91.2 103.8 
Per capita production 
Total 101.6 87.5 109.1 100.8 108.2 
Crops 109.8 86.3 124.8 113.1 118.9 
Livestock 89.9 89.3 87.1 83.7 93.2 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
" ProvisionaL 
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those obtained in 1948/49—below 25 per cent in the case 
of sunflower. Production of this crop reached its peak in 
the latter season, and in the year under review amounted 
to only 283,000 tons. The output of peanuts, again, was 
30 per smaller, and that of cotton-seed also represented a 
decrease. The serious effect of this situation on availabili-
ties of raw material for the manufacture of edible oils 
resulted in a deficit of the latter which amounted in 1955 
to roughly 100,000 tons, and had to be met from imports. 
Linseed virtually remained at the already low levels of the 
preceding season. 
Sugar production declined, but reserves carried over 
from the year before were enough to satisfy domestic re-
quirements. There was also a reduction in the output of 
cotton fibre. 
Livestock production. There can be no doubt that one 
of the most important developments in 1955 was the re-
covery registered in livestock production. To judge from 
the rate of slaughter for the first eleven months of the year, 
the improvement was extended to all species, though it was 
most striking in the case of beef cattle, both on account 
of the proportions it attained, and because of the impor-
tance attaching to this branch of stock-breeding. (See 
table 12.) 
Table 12 
ARGENTINA: SLAUGHTERING AND MEAT YIELD 




193Í-38 1950-5^ 195'i 1955" and i95i 
Beef cattle 
Animals slaughtered 7,325 8,700.1 7,942.7 9,700 22.1 
Meat yield 1,608 1,853.0 1,787.3 2,093 17.1 
Sheep 
Animals slaughtered 10,395 9,448.0 9,927.3 11,761 18.5 
Meat yield 185 179.3 188.5 223.2 18.4 
Pigs 
Animals slaughtered 2,012 1,862.4 1,806.3 1,949 7.9 
Meat yield 136 145.7 141.3 152.5 7.9 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Carnes. 
» Estimate based on data for January to November. 
The number of cattle slaughtered approached the record An increase also took place in the slaughter of sheep 
1950 figure as a result of the prolonged drought whose and pigs, in the former case, however, simply because the 
local effects began to be felt in 1948. But whereas in the price of wool provided no incentive to production, and 
former year the unusually high rate of slaughter was farmers therefore liquidated their flocks. Over the five-year 
achieved at the expense of animal stocks, in 1955 the in- period 1945-49, the output of wool reached an annual aver-
crease was consequent upon herd recovery. Domestic re- age of 187,000 tons, but the 1953/54 and 1954/55 shear-
quirements were satisfactorily met, and by mid-August it ings yielded only 180,000 and 165,000 tons respectively, 
was possible to suspend the one-day-a-week ban on the The new export exchange rate for wool will probably give 
sale of beef. a fresh lease of life to this sector of production. 
The increment in the meat output meant a substantial Brazil 
rise in export availabilities. In fact, although total beef Here agricultural production expanded by 6 per cent in 
consumption was 4.2 per cent higher than in 1954, the 1955, or at a rate rather more rapid than that of 1954 
exportable balance in 1955 seems to have amounted to (5.6 per cent), and a good deal higher than the average 
about 440,000 tons, as against 231,000 in the preceding annual rate of 3.3 per cent recorded during the five-year 
year. It was therefore 56 per cent larger than in the five- period 1950-54. This meant that the per capita output rose 
year period 1950-54, but still 24 per cent less than in pre- by 3.7 and 7.5 per cent in comparison with the same 
war times. Thus there was a reversal of the trend observ- periods. 
able in recent years, whereby the exceptional expansion of In 1954 crops were mainly responsible for the larger 
total and per capita consumption gradually reduced the volume of production. In 1955, on the other hand, the live-
exportable surpluses until in 1953 and 1954 they had fallen stock sector played its part in this development, although 
to only 230,000 and 231,000 tons. the share of crops was still the greater. (See table 13.) 
Table 13 
BRAZIL: INDICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(1950=100) 
1951 1952 1953 195Í 1955 • 
Total production 100 105.7 107.8 113.8 120.7 
Crops 98.3 104.7 105.2 112.0 118.4 
Livestock 106.4 109.6 117.6 120.3 126.8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
' Provisional. 
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The growth described resulted from a number of differ-
ent circumstances, among them the favourable weather 
conditions which as a general rule prevailed throughout 
seed- and harvest-time. The rainfall in 1955, unlike that of 
previous years, was of positive benefit in the north-west; 
ánd the frosts in the south early in the second half of the 
year had no very serious effect on yields. Their conse-
quences will make themselves felt, however, when the next 
harvests are gathered in, particularly where coffee and 
sugar are concerned. 
The increase in the area under seed was slight, espe-
cially in comparison with the progress achieved between 
1953 and 1954.^" Hence it is plain that the higher rate of 
growth of agricultural production is very largely attrib-
utable to the increment in yields. This in its turn was due 
not only to the propitious weather conditions, but also to 
the exploitation of tracts of more fertile soil recently 
brought under cultivation, to the wide-spread adoption of 
improved agricultural techniques, and to the advances 
made in the process of mechanization.^' 
The modifications introduced into the exchange policy 
adopted in October 1953 must also be reckoned among the 
factors that tended to encourage agricultural development, 
especially in the export crop sector. The improved rates of 
exchange for the various export commodities, and the flexi-
bility with which they have been applied within the differ-
ent categories established, have strengthened Brazil's posi-
tion as a competitor on world markets, while at the same 
time facilitating its export trade and guaranteeing the pro-
ducers better earnings. It was impossible for the measures 
in question to take effect in 1954, as sowing was then too 
far advanced, but their impact was plainly felt in 1955, 
when export crops not only absorbed 50 per cent of the 
increase in the area under cultivation, but also reached a 
level of production 8 per cent higher than that of 1954, in 
which year there had been practically no change from 
1953. 
Agricultural credit developed satisfactorily in 1955, 
not so much in respect of its volume in real terms as be-
cause its benefits were extended to a greater number of 
producers. A redistribution of such credit by activities gave 
the advantage to the crops sector, at the expense of that of 
livestock. 
Again, incentives to agricultural production for domes-
tic consumption were provided by the high 1954 price 
levels, as well as by the minimum price policy which had 
been in force for some years, and which also covered sev-
eral of Brazil's export products. 
Agricultural production for domestic consumption. Al-
though the expansion in agricultural production for the 
home market was only 4.9 per cent in 1955 as against 9.3 
per cent in the previous season, the output exceeded that 
of 1950 by 24 per cent. (See table 14.) Larger yields were 
registered for all crops except beans and tobacco, the most 
striking improvement being observable in cereals whose 
aggregate production increased by 9 per cent, due to record 
harvests of all the different kinds of grain: wheat, maize, 
rice, barley, oats and rye. 
" I n 1955 this increase amounted only to 222,000 hectares (1.1 
per cent) whereas the difference was a little more than 1.2 millions 
between 1953, when the area under seed was 19.7 million hectares, 
and 1954 when it reached 20.9 millions. 
" Between January 1954 and August 1955 Brazil imported 19,935 
tractors, 85 per cent of which were for agricultural use. 
The production of wheat continued to receive liberal 
government support. Fuller assistance through credit was 
given; the process of mechanization was speeded up by 
the acquisition in 1954 and 1955 of 3,000 additional trac-
tors with the appropriate equipment; fertilizers were more 
widely utilizedá and the official programme for the repro-
duction and distribution of certified seed was extended. 
The cultivation of this crop was still further expanded, 
particularly by incorporating the natural meadows of the 
States of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catalina, where the 
extreme poverty of the soil and the shortage of man-power 
were offset by the intensive use of fertilizers and machin-
ery. Although the area sown to wheat increased only on a 
very small scale in 1955, production seems to have risen 
by 13 per cent, reaching a volume of 983,000 tons. The 
position of producers was securely established by the fix-
ing of a minimum price 40 per cent higher than that of 
1954 (420 cruzeiros per 60-kilogramme bag) . 
There was also a considerable expansion in the produc-
tion of rice (16.4 per cent). To a total output of 3.9 million 
tons (unpolished) the most important contributions were 
made by the good harvests in Rio Grande do Sul, Goias 
and Minas Gerais. The cultivation of maize, on the other 
hand, improved only slightly—by 1.7 per cent—and pro-
duction amounted to a little over 6.9 million tons. 
The figures for tubers (potatoes, manioc and yams), 
despite a limited increase of only 3 per cent, constituted 
a record for Brazil. The output of peanuts rose by 30 per 
cent, reaching 219,000 tons in Sao Paulo, the main pro-
duction centre. Fruit- and vegetable-growing continued to 
increase steadily, attaining levels 24 and 50 per cent higher 
than in 1950. 
Under the stimulus of prices compatible with costs for 
marginal producers, the production of sugar outstripped 
the expansion of demand, mainly owing to the contribution 
of Sao Paulo. The 1954 /55 harvest yielded 2.125 million 
tons, and, according to estimates, that of 1 9 5 5 / 5 6 will be 
larger still (2.168 million tons), even when due account 
is taken of the damages caused by frosts in Santa Catarina, 
Paraná and Sao Paulo. The sugar output for 1954 /55 ex-
ceeded the preceding year's by 6.5 per cent, and was 31 
per cent larger than the annual average for the five-year 
period 1949 /50 -1953 /54 . 
After the requirements of domestic consumption (1.827 
million tons) had been satisfied, the last season left an 
exportable surplus of nearly 300,000 tons. The incentive 
of higher exchange rates raised exports, in the same 
period,^® to 306,000 tons, or 35 per cent more than in 
1953 /54 , thus causing a slight decrease in the stocks previ-
ously held over (218,000 tons). There are grounds for the 
hope that a still further reduction will be effected in the 
course of the current trade year ( 1 9 5 5 / 5 6 ) 
Livestock production also underwent an improvement, 
which was reflected in better supplies of meat, milk and 
eggs. Preliminary estimates suggest an expansion of 4 per 
cent for meat in the aggregate (including beef, mutton, 
The sugar year begins on 1 June and ends on the following 
31 May. 
Commitments amount to 290,000 tons, that is, they exceed by 
rather more than 40,000 tons the export availabilities estimated for 
the 1955/56 crop. In 1955, Brazil, which had not yet signed the 
International Sugar Convention, decided not to become a contract-
ing party, as it felt that the quota allotted to it (175,000 tons) 
was too small. 
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pork and goat-flesh) and of 4.5 per cent for milk. For eggs, 
the corresponding increase exceeded 8 per cent. 
Production for export. The rise in the output for 
domestic consumption was proportionally less than the 
7.7 per cent increment in production for export, which, 
however, failed to surpass the 1952 figure, Brazil's peak 
for the last seven years. (See table 14.) The over-all in-
crease was due to coifee, cotton, and castor-oil, as the 
cacao, tung and sisal yields declined. 
Table 14 
BRAZIL: INDICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ACCORDING TO DESTINATION 
(1950=100) 
1951 1952 1953 195i Í955' 
For export 











Source: Economic Commission, for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
» Provisional. 
Coffee production reached its highest level since 
1937/38 , with a volume of 1.173 million tons, or 19.55 
million bags, which was 13 per cent larger than the pre-
ceding year's production. In the achievement of this ex-
pansion a decisive role was played by the State of Paraná, 
which raised its output from 132,000 to 206,000 tons. 
The earnings of the coffee sector improved in 1955, not 
only on account of the better harvest but also owing to the 
official policy of guaranteeing planters a minimum price 
for their product. To this end the Government authorized 
a devaluation of the coffee cruzeiro and bought up large 
quantities of coffee through the Servigo do Financiamento 
da Produgao.^" 
The areas where the most important plantations are 
located were ravaged by frosts in the early part of August 
1955. The damage was considerable, and will mean lower 
yields for next season and for at least two years more.^^ 
These frosts in Brazil dispelled the existing fears that 
an expansion of production might endanger the balance 
between world supply and demand, and thus bring about 
a fall in prices. 
In the trade year 1954 /55 , coffee exports sank to one of 
the lowest levels on record for the present century: 647,700 
tons.^^ This represented a decline of 25 per cent in relation 
to the preceding trade year's 859,500 tons. The chief causes 
of so sharp a drop were probably the high minimum ex-
port prices established by the Brazilian Government, the 
unwillingness of the United States to purchase on such 
terms, and the prospects—before the frosts—of a substan-
tial increase in production. The reduction of shipments to 
The exchange rate for coffee rose from 31.5 to 37.06 cruzeiros 
to the dollar when this product was transferred from the first to 
the second category. The Government purchased 193,000 tons. 
The State worst affected was Paraná, where the largest increases 
in production had been expected. The number of trees damaged 
amounted to 624.5 millions, or 74.5 per cent of the existing planta-
tions, many of which are situated in the newly-incorporated areas 
and were to enter production in 1956 and 1957. Less severe effects 
were felt in Sao Paulo, where the 127 million coffee trees that suf-
fered damage represented only 9 per cent of the plantations. The 
falling-ofi in production will therefore not be as serious as in 
Paraná, especially since the heavy rains that followed the frosts 
helped the trees to recuperate faster. In expert estimates, export 
availabilities accruing from the 1955/56 crop wiU fluctuate in the 
trade year 1956/57 between only 810,000 and 582,000 tons, that is, 
between levels 20 and 24 per cent below those of the current year. 
" Exports were lower on only five occasions—1904/05; 1917/18; 
1918/19; 1941/42, and 1942/43-four of which, it should be noted, 
fell within either the First or the Second World War. 
the United States from 478,100 to 349,300 tons played an 
especially important part in bringing down the figures for 
Brazil's sales abroad. 
The consequence of the smaller volume of exports was 
the piling-up of large surpluses, which by the end of the 
trade year amounted to 391,000 tons, of 96 per cent more 
than in the preceding year. If to these surpluses is added 
the exportable production of 1.062 million tons, the avail-
abilities for the current trade year—1955/56—total 1.453 
million tons; that is, they exceeded by 414,000 tons the 
corresponding figure for 1954 /55 . 
At the close of this latter trade year, however, a signifi-
cant change took place in the volume of exports and in 
price trends, when the danger of a large output from Brazil 
disappeared, and United States stocks had fallen extremely 
low,^^ while demand was showing a tendency to return to 
normal. Thus, during the first four months of the trade 
year 1 9 5 5 / 5 6 (July-October 1955, inclusive), 351,500 tons 
of coffee were exported, in favourable contrast with the 
170,000 corresponding to the same period in the preceding 
year. 
The production of cotton slightly exceeded the previous 
season's (by 2.7 per cent), attaining a volume of 406,000 
tons. Despite the instability of the world market, the prices 
received by producers followed a satisfactory course, as a 
consequence of the better cruzeiro export rate^"' and the 
prospects of an exchange reform which may have resulted 
in still better export earnings for cotton fibre. If it is 
further taken into account, firstly, that projects are on foot 
for sowing cotton on those coffee plantations that were 
affected by the frosts, and, secondly, that peanut prices 
have fallen as a result of the recent exceptional output, a 
considerable expansion of the area at present under cotton, 
with the consequent increment in next season's production, 
may well be predicted. 
The output of cacao (161,600 tons) was 0.8 per cent 
smaller than the heavy yields obtained from the preceding 
year's crop; and much the same was true of sisal. To en-
courage sales abroad and improve producers' earnings, 
cacao was transferred from the second to the third category 
of export commodities, which meant a higher rate from 
dollar earnings from this source. 
Stocks held by the United States usually amount to 240,000 
tons; but on 30 June 1955 they stood at only 105,000. 
^^  In May, cotton was transferred from the second to the third 
category for purposes of export exchange earnings. 
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Mexico 
In this country agricultural production in 1955 ex-
ceeded that of the year before by 10 per cent. It is true 
that this rate of increase did not equal the 18.9 per cent 
recorded for 1954, but it was higher than the annual aver-
age of 6.8 per cent corresponding to the five-year period 
1949-53; and such an expansion involved increments in 
total and per capita production of 36.5 and 18.1 per cent 
respectively, in relation to 1950. (See table 15.) Better 
domestic supplies and larger exportable balances of vari-
ous commodities resulted. 
Although the development of livestock production can-
not be assessed on the inadequate data available, it may be 
noted that there was a considerable increase in exports of 
cattle on the hoof, especially to the United States. 
Table 15 
MEXICO: INDICES OF TOTAL AND PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 
CLASSIFIED BY FOODSTUFFS, RAW MATERIALS AND STIMULANTS 
(1950=100) 
1951 1952 1953 195'! Í955» 
Total production 104.6 98.5 105.3 125.2 137.6 
Foodstuffs 101.8 94.6 104.0 126.6 131.2 
Raw materials and stimulants''. . . 108.4 103.5 106.9 123.5 146.0 
Per capita production 101.7 93.1 96.8 112.0 119.6 
Foodstuffs 98.9 89.5 95.6 113.2 114.1 
Raw materials and stimulants''.... 105.3 97.8 98.3 110.4 126.8 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. For 1955, 
Foreign Crops and Markets, Anderson Clayton and Co., Unión Nacional de Productores de Azúcar 
and Comisión Nacional del Café. 
« Provisional. 
Cotton fibre, henequen, cotton seed, copra, sesame, palm kernels, peanuts, linseed, sugar cane, 
tobacco and alfalfa. 
The factors contributing to agricultural expansion have 
been of various kinds. Among them may be mentioned 
the plentiful supply of water for both irrigated and sea-
sonal crops the incorporation of new land, especially 
for cotton-, wheat- and rice-growing; the unusually favour-
able situation on the domestic market; and the Govern-
ment's development programmes. These last were designed, 
as in previous years, to provide producers with sufficient 
credit and more stable and accessible markets, as well as to 
obtain higher and steadier yields through the expansion 
of the area under irrigation and the use of fertilizers and 
improved seeds. Attention must also be called to the safe-
guarding of farmers' earnings by the minimum-price 
policy now in force, and by the agricultural insurance 
facilities available as from the present season. 
Record harvests were yielded in 1955 by many crops, 
especially rice, maize, copra, bananas, cotton, cacao, coffee 
and sugar. (See table 16.) 
A harvest of cereals (wheat, maize, rice and barley) 
about 7 per cent larger than that of 1954 and 25 per cent 
The distribution of rainfall throughout the year was erratic, 
the rains being late, excessively prolonged, and at certain periods 
torrential; in some cases this left the soil either too dry or too wet, 
and even resulted in floods, to the detriment mainly of the coffee, 
beans, maize and tomato crops and of the quality of cotton fibre. 
Tropical hurricanes, frosts at seed-time, and other adverse condi-
tions also caused further losses, which, according to official estimates, 
were equivalent in the aggregate to 300,000 hectares, or 5 per cent 
of the total area sown to annual crops in 1955. 
It is calculated, however, that these losses due to weather condi-
tions were offset by the increase in the land under cultivation; by 
the larger proportion of the dry-soil areas that produced a harvest, 
thanks to the abundant rainfall; and by the improvement in the 
yields. 
Moreover, the heavy rains in two consecutive years (1954 and 
1955) renewed ground-water supplies and enabled record quantities 
to be stored up in the reservoirs. It is hoped that the high levels of 
production thus made possible will be maintained for at least one 
year more. 
in excess of the annual average for the preceding five 
years,enabled Mexico, after providing for price control 
requirements and domestic supplies, to export compara-
tively large tonnages of maize and rice, basic elements in 
the national diet.^ '' It was many years since this had been 
possible. 
By 1954, in virtue of the gradual increase in the produc-
tion of wheat during recent years, it was already possible 
to cut down imports to only 71,000 tons, as against 366,000 
in the previous three-year period. A larger 1955 harvest 
will perhaps render Mexico self-sufficing as far as wheat 
is concerned, or will at any rate greatly reduce imports. 
It seems that the cotton crop also attained record levels, 
although the quality of the fibre may have been adversely 
affected by the undue prolongation of the rainy season. 
The considerable expansion of the irrigated area under 
cotton raised the already high volume of production regis-
tered in 1954 by 22 per cent, which means that the aver-
age annual output for the five-year period 1945-49 was 
almost quadrupled. It is estimated that exports may have 
amounted to 340,000 tons, as compared with 269,000 in 
1954, and with an annual average of 64,500 over the five-
year period just mentioned. Cotton fibre will thus be able 
to maintain its position as Mexico's principal export 
product. 
The deterioration observable in the production of 
sesame was partly due to competition from cotton for the 
use of the soil. Supplies of raw material for the manu-
facture of oil, however, far from declining on this account, 
improved, thanks to the more plentiful availabilities of 
cotton-seed. 
Volume estimated at constant prices. 
" During the first eight months of 1955, 48,000 tons of maize and 
8,000 tons of beans were sold to several countries, the principal buyer 
being Guatemala. It was expected that by the end of the year 17,000 
tons of rice—that is, the surplus from the last crop—would have been 
exported. 
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T a b l e 1 6 
MEXICO: MAIN CROPS IN 1955, 1950-54 AND 1954 
(Thousands of tons) 
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The steady expansion of sugar production led to an 
increase of 910,000 tons in 1955, and thus confronted 
Mexico with a problem of surpluses. The country became 
self-sufficing owing to the growth of production, in 1947, 
and a little later began to export without encountering any 
difficulty until 1952. From that year onward stocks have 
been steadily increasing, and have exceeded the volume 
which might be regarded as a normal reserve wherewith 
to meet the requirements of the domestic market. The 1955 
output alone left an exportable surplus of some 220,000 
tons, to be added to the carry-over from previous years. 
It should be pointed out that only for about 80,000 tons is 
there an assured market.^® 
Coffee production continued to expand, and for 1 9 5 4 / 5 5 
was estimated at 93,000 tons, representing a 10-per-cent 
increase on the preceding season's maximum. A still bigger 
harvest, estimated at 102,000 tons, may be expected in 
1955/56 , and large new plantations will be incorporated.^'' 
A similar trend was manifest for exports, which probably 
amounted to 76,000 tons in 1955, as against a maximum 
of 73,400 in 1954. 
No statistics are available for an appraisal of the year's 
livestock production. Once the foot-and-mouth disease 
which broke out in the early months of 1953 was elim-
inated, the United States lifted, as from January 1955, the 
ban on imports of meat and cattle on the hoof from Mexico. 
Its markets were therefore once more opened to northern 
Mexico's livestock production, and a recovery in exports, 
which, for the reasons already indicated, had been very 
low in 1954, was thus facilitated.^" 
" The International Sugar Convention, at its session on 1 July 
1955, allotted Mexico an export quota of 69,802 tons, to which must 
be added a further 10,000 tons for the United States market. 
" The Comisión Nacional del Café is largely responsible for this 
development. During the 1955 planting season it issued a free dis-
tribution of more than 3.2 million coffee trees and large quantities 
of selected seed. 
From the data for the first nine months of 1955, it may be 
estimated that rather more than 280,000 head were exported in the 
course of the year, as against 4,600 in 1954 and 134,600 in 1953. 
The United States import quota for 1955 was established at 331,000 
head (livestock, and meat in terms of cattle on the hoof). 
Progress achieved in specific development measures. 
While it is true that the expansion of Mexican agriculture 
in recent years, and especially in 1954 and 1955, was 
largely due to the abundant rainfall, credit must also be 
given to the steady endeavours to raise production made 
by the Government and by the farmers themselves. One 
aspect of this effort which deserves mention is the irriga-
tion programme whereby in 1955, 280,000 hectares were 
reclaimed for production purposes (76,000 more than in 
1954) . 
The official agricultural credit organizations continued 
to give their support, and maintained their policy of guar-
antee prices, though for some commodities these were 
readjusted in proportions ranging from 11 to 15 per cent. 
Furthermore, fifty-seven storage units, with a total capacity 
of 300,000 tons, were brought into service in various parts 
of the country. Again, programmes for the reproduction 
of improved seed placed increasingly large quantities in 
the hands of farmers.^^ 
Outstanding among the agricultural measures adopted 
in 1955 was the implementation of a programme of insur-
ance on several types of crops and against various risks, 
which will help to guarantee the farmers' earnings.®^ Dur-
ing its first stage, risks will be covered for up to 5 million 
cultivated hectares. Should receipts from premiums prove 
inadequate to cover payments for damages, the losses in-
curred will be borne by the Government. This type of in-
surance is expected to encourage investment in agriculture 
and the more wide-spread use of such aids to production 
as, for example, improved seeds, fertilizers, weed-killers 
and insecticides. 
The allocation of 636 million pesos to irrigation works in 1955 
enabled four large undertakings to be completed, besides sixty-four 
small irrigation plants and 184 deep wells. 
" Availabilities for the 1955 sowings comprised 5,400 tons of 
hybrid maize, 3,500 tons of beans and 23,000 tons of wheat, of 
selected strains, resistant to weather and to a variety of diseases 
and pests. 
" The crops insured are cotton, wheat, maize, beans, rice, sesame, 
peanuts, potatoes, barley, chickpeas and chili peppers. This insur-
ance gives protection against the following risks: hail, frosts, hur-
ricanes, drought, floods, pests, disease, and accidental fires. 
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As regards livestock production, various steps have 
been taken to improve quality, fodder resources and sani-
tary conditions. 
Central America 
Agricultural production in Central America, which had 
been showing a tendency to remain stationary since 1951, 
gave signs of increasing in 1955. According to provisional 
crop estimates, this expansion seems to vary between levels 
4 and 5 per cent higher than those of the preceding year. 
Weather conditions were unfavourable to agriculture in 
this area in 1955. There were unseasonable rains in the 
early months of the year and a subsequent postponement 
of the rainy season, the result being a drought at the end 
of April and May which spoiled the blossom of the coffee 
trees and held up sowings of maize. Again, the excessively 
heavy rains which followed in June and July hampered 
the sowing of cotton. The prolongation of these rains, to-
gether with hurricanes at the end of the season, caused 
floods in Costa Rica and on the northern coast of Honduras, 
to the detriment of crops and young livestock. 
Despite these adverse factors, the recovery in the pro-
duction of maize, beans and rice in Guatemala, and the 
considerable increase in the cotton output of both this 
country and EI Salvador, helped to determine an increment 
in Central America's total production. (See table 17.) 
Table 17 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN CROPS AND BEEF CATTLE 
AND PIG PRODUCTION IN 1954 AND 1955 







Maize 981 1,029 4.9 
Rice 94 96 3.0 
Beans 120 128 6.6 
Cotton-seed 128 152 19.3 
Sugar 138 140 1.7 
Bananas ° 28,089 27,520 - 2 . 0 
Coffee»' 168 171 1.8 
Cotton 79 94 19.0 
Livestock 
Beef cattle 589 581 - 1 . 4 
Pigs 676 693 2.5 
Sources: For Guatemala: Banco de Guatemala (coffee and bananas); 
Asociación Guatemalteca de Productores de Algodón (cotton fibre 
and seed); and Dirección General de Estadística (remainder). For 
El Salvador: Instituto Regulador de Cereales (maize, rice and beans); 
Cooperativa Algodonera (cotton); Dirección General de Estadística 
(coffee exports and beef slaughtering); and Departamento de Estu-
dios Económicos y Estadística del Ministerio de Agricultura 
(remainder). For Honduras: Ministerio de Hacienda (banana exports); 
and Sección Estudios de Economía Agrícola del Ministerio de 
Recursos Naturales (remainder). For Nicaragua: Dirección General 
de Estadística. For Costa Rica: Dirección General de Estadística. 
Preliminary figures. 
« Exports during calendar years 1954 and 1955, except in the 
case of Honduras, where the periods are the financial years (1 July 
to 30 June) 1953/54 and 1954/55. 
" Thousands of bunches. 
^ In terms of animals slaughtered during calendar years 1954 
and 1955. 
An analysis of the over-all situation in 1955 brings to 
light several significant facts. In the first place, the in-
adequacy of domestic supplies of basic foodstuffs deter-
mined heavy imports of maize, beans and rice from coun-
tries outside the region, and, furthermore, reduced the ex-
port trade of Honduras and Nicaragua, which are tradi-
tional suppliers for the other Central American countries. 
Secondly, stress must be laid on the continued expansion 
of cotton production, on the decline in the coffee crop,^'' 
and on the striking increase in the use of fertilizers and 
insecticides in agriculture. 
As regards supplies, it should be pointed out that the 
deficit had its origin in the poor harvest of 1954, when 
the five countries in the aggregate obtained outputs of 
maize, beans and rice which were smaller, by 12, 17, and 
28 per cent respectively, than those registered in 1953. 
The countries which suffered most were Guatemala and 
El Salvador. The former, which had for some years been 
self-supplying, and had even exported certain quantities of 
these basic commodities to El Salvador and Mexico, found 
itself obliged in 1955 to effect larger imports of foodstuffs 
than at any other time in this last decade: 37,000 tons of 
maize, 5,000 tons of rice, and 9,200 tons of beans. The 
decline in sowings and harvests in 1954 brought about by 
internal disturbances accounts for this situation. In El 
Salvador the disequilibrium between the country's natural 
resources and its population—already accentuated by the 
expansion of cotton cultivation, which meant that grain 
was sown only on marginal land—was aggravated by the 
poor harvest of 1954. Imports of maize amounted to 42,000 
tons, and were thus 76 per cent higher in 1955 than in 
the preceding year, and more than three times as great as 
the annual average for the five-year period 1950-54. Im-
ports of rice and beans were not quite so high, although 
still considerable. The failure of Honduras and Costa Rica 
to produce enough grain obliged these countries to resort 
to imports for the first time in many years. Nicaragua was 
the only country in Central America which did not need to 
purchase grain abroad in 1955, but on the other hand its 
exports were heavily reduced, owing to the encroachments 
of cotton on land formerly used for cereals. 
Prospects for 1956 are decidedly different, except per-
haps for El Salvador and Costa Rica. The 1955 harvests, 
from which consumption in 1956 will be met, were good 
in Guatemala and normal in Honduras and Nicaragua, and 
it is expected that the first of these countries will prove 
self-sufficient and that the other two will be able to in-
crease their exports. It is estimated that El Salvador's 
imports of beans and rice will be curtailed, but that, on 
the other hand, it will have to make larger purchases of 
maize abroad, on account of a further decline in the 1955 
crop. The Government is endeavouring to achieve a rela-
tively short-term improvement in the present situation, 
mainly on the basis of programmes for the reproduction 
of hybrid strains of maize from Mexico. Costa Rica will be 
the only country whose deficit will be aggravated in 1956, 
as its output decreased in consequence of the hurricanes 
and floods in 1955. 
With respect to cotton, it is of interest to note that the 
rate of expansion attained in recent years makes Central 
America the area in which the highest relative increase 
has been achieved. Production, which in 1948 amounted to 
barely 5,900 tons of fibre, has expanded almost without 
interruption, until in 1955 it reached a volume of 93,700 
tons. The harvest was 19 per cent and 134 per cent larger 
than those of 1954 and 1953 respectively. The countries 
" See note 36 on page 21. 
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where cotton sowings increased most in 1955 were El Sal-
vador and Guatemala. This growth of cotton production 
in Central America, which began during the post-war 
period of high prices, continued even after prices had 
fallen. Yields in these countries are among the best in the 
world,^® and costs can therefore be kept relatively low. 
One of the advantages of the expansion described, based 
as it is on the application of very advanced techniques, is 
that it has aroused interest in all technological innovations 
among farmers in Central America. A new type of agricul-
tural entrepreneur is to be found among the present genera-
tion of planters, who will no doubt exert considerable 
influence on other branches of the region's agriculture in 
the years to come. In cotton-planting, wide-spread use is 
already made of mechanized methods of the selection and 
disinfection of seed, of pest control by the spraying of 
organic insecticides from the air and of the fertilization 
of the soil, as well as other new techniques. By way of 
example may be cited the significant rise in the consump-
tion of inorganic fertilizers, from an annual average of 
42,000 tons between 1949 and 1953, to about 74,000 in 
1955. 
In contrast to the development of cotton production, the 
coffee crop was small as compared with that of the pre-
ceding year.^® The only country which obtained a normal 
harvest was Honduras; all the rest—and especially El Sal-
vador—registered lower figures, despite increases in the 
area of the plantations and notwithstanding a variety of 
technical improvements. The fall in production was exclu-
sively due to bad weather, which, furthermore, affected the 
quality of the product and, consequently, the earnings of 
coffee planters. 
The output of bananas was once again limited. Only 
Honduras made some progress, but without equalling the 
production of previous years. 
Livestock production remained relatively at a standstill. 
That of beef cattle declined by 1.4 per cent in the area as 
a whole, owing to small decreases in Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua; but that of pigs improved by 2.5 per cent, 
except in the case of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
Cuba 
Broadly speaking, the conditions that had prevailed 
during the previous three years were maintained in Cuba 
in 1955. This country's agricultural production caters 
mainly for the domestic market, and there is a tendency 
to restrict export products. In 1955, in fact, not only was 
the production of sugar once more curtailed, but various 
measures were adopted with a view to limiting that of 
tobacco in 1956. The position is different with respect to 
products for domestic consumption, as the bean, maize 
and potato crops increased, the output of rice remained 
high, and the coffee harvest was large enough not merely 
In 1955 El Salvador obtained an average yield of 646 kilo-
grammes of cotton fibre per hectare, and Guatemala 610, without 
having recourse to irrigation. 
This decline in production is not fully reflected in the figures 
given in table 17. The lack of adequate statistics compelled ECLA 
to make use of export data, which are supplied for calendar years 
and in which the vicissitudes of production are partly offset from 
one year to another. Thus, while the figures for 1954 in table 17 
reflect to some extent the poor harvest of 1953/54, those for 1955 
are affected by the relatively high output of 1954/55, and comprise 
only part of the poor crop in 1955/56. 
to meet consumption but also to provide fairly substantial 
export surpluses, for the first time in many years. 
Market conditions, and the existence of carry-overs from 
earlier years, obliged the authorities to place further re-
strictions on the production of sugar. The output—4.53 
million tons—was 7.3 and 38 per cent lower than those of 
1954 and 1952 respectively. Mainly as the result of the 
sale of 568,000 tons to the USSR, exports are estimated to 
have exceeded those effected in 1954 by approximately 
310,000 tons. Even so, the sugar surplus, which reached 
its post-war peak of 1.94 million tons at the close of the 
calendar year 1954, probably increased by the end of 
1955, reaching a still higher maximum of 2.22 million tons. 
One factor which may help to relieve the situation of 
the sugar economy, in face of the successive restrictions 
on production since 1952, is the processing of molasses, 
a practice which had virtually been abandoned in 1944, 
but was renewed ten years later. In 1954, 495 million litres 
were obtained, and, in 1955, 874 millions. The output for 
both years was exported. 
The production of tobacco in recent years considerably 
outstripped both local consumption and exports, with the 
consequent piling-up of stocks, which were withdrawn 
from the market upon the creation of a special stabiliza-
tion fund. This situation has necessitated the establish-
ment of a system of controls restricting production in the 
areas sown to tobacco. The effects of this measure did not 
make themselves felt before 1956, and the 1955 harvest 
was larger than that of the preceding season. 
In the rice crop it is estimated that there will be little 
change from that of 1954 (192,000 tons, unpolished). 
Producers have had to cope with a number of problems, 
among which mention may be made of the shortage of 
water, the immoderate growth of weeds, a loss of fertility 
in many tracts of soil and a reduction in credit facilities. 
The output of maize was larger, and a still greater 
expansion is expected in the next few years, owing to the 
more wide-spread use of hybrid seed, which has given 
excellent results and which is being reproduced and dis-
tributed on a commercial scale. To this must be added the 
incentive to producers provided by the minimum-price 
policy. Although most of the production of maize is ab-
sorbed for human consumption, there is an increasingly 
marked tendency to use it in the preparation of feed con-
centrates, especially for poultry. 
Cuba has normally been an importer of coffee. Never-
theless, for the first time in many years, its good 1955 
harvest provided an exportable surplus estimated at not 
less than 120,000 bags. Its output seems to have amounted 
to 41,000 tons, or 7 per cent more than in the preceding 
year. Satisfactory yields of beans and potatoes were also 
obtained, enabling imports of the former to be reduced. 
The production of potatoes was once more in excess of 
consumer requirements, and there is no market for this 
product abroad.®^ It is therefore deemed advisable that 
production be curtailed in the next few years. Nevertheless, 
the lack of proper storage facilities, and the resulting im-
possibility of keeping the potatoes in good condition, 
forces Cuba to import them for home consumption during 
the last three or four months of the calendar year. 
In 1955, an unusual shortage of potatoes in the United States 
enabled Cuba to export a small quantity to this market. 
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The production of beef declined in the latter part of 
1954 and the first half of 1955, after a prolonged drought. 
The shortage became more acute half-way through the 
year, and induced the Government to lift the customs duties 
on beef imports as a means of easing the supply situation. 
This measure was adopted for a period of three months. 
I I I . INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
1. T H E GENERAL SITUATION 
During the second quarter of 1955 Latin America's 
industrial production displayed the same symptoms of 
weakness as were to be observed in the first three months 
of the year. The rapid expansion which had been brought 
about in 1954 by the recovery in Argentina and Mexico, 
and the continuance of vigorous industrial growth in 
Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, was no longer in evidence 
during the first half of 1955. Throughout the quarter under 
review, no increase over the output of the previous six 
months was recorded. This indicates a short-term trend 
towards a stagnation of industrial production. (See table 
18.) 
Table 18 









Total 6 countries 122.4 
Other countries 112.6 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
» Adjusted for seasonal variation. 
It may be noted that in Brazil and Chile the situation of 
industry definitely deteriorated, and that it began to do 
so in Venezuela, despite the favourable circumstances at 
present attending the country's economic development. In 
Colombia the rate of industrial growth, in relation to the 
first quarter of the year, was practically nil, while the 
modest increase in Argentina's output amounted to only 
1.4 per cent in relation to the fourth quarter of 1954. 
These trends in Latin American industry are in contrast 
with the situation in other countries. In the United States, 
industrial production during the first six months of 1955 
reached peak levels, exceeding that of the second half of 
1954 by 8 per cent; in the United Kingdom it expanded 
by 5 per cent; and in the other industrialized countries of 
Europe it registered increments which, though differing 
from one country to another, were considerable in every 
case.^® 
Despite the dynamic forces stimulating the expansion 
of industry in Latin America, there are a number of factors 
which have been militating against its progress. Different 
as they are, most of these have a common origin in the 
direct and indirect effects of foreign trade. In some cases 
the trouble rises from the persistent failure to increase 
An examination by branches of activity shows that in the 
United States and the United Kingdom the highest increases were 
recorded for iron and steel, chemical products, machinery and 
vehicles. In contrast, very slow rates of growth were noted in textiles 
and other non-durable consumer goods, and some degree of stag-
nation was to be observed in the industries producing processed 
foodstuffs. 
exports; in others, there is a gradual deterioration in the 
terms of trade. As a result of this latter development, the 
Latin American countries' capacity to import tends, on 
the whole, to remain stationary, or, at all events, does not 
keep pace with import requirements. When this relative 
inflexibility of the capacity to import becomes even more 
rigid, at certain periods, it brings about downward move-
ments in domestic production over the short term. Simi-
larly, it has caused competition between imports of con-
sumer goods and those of capital goods and raw materials, 
thus increasing the difficulty attaining higher investment 
coefficients and intensifying industrial activity. It should 
be borne in mind that the more acute the balance-of-pay-
ments tensions, the greater, as a rule, is the tendency 
to curtail essential imports such as capital goods, raw 
materials and fuels, and that this hampers the normal 
development of industry. Such was apparently the case in 
Brazil and Chile in 1955. Some countries, which for 
several years past have shown a marked trend towards 
a relative decline in their capacity to import, suffered in 
addition from shortcomings in energy and transport, which 
also hindered their economic evolution over the medium 
and long term. Outstanding examples are Argentina and, 
again, Chile. 
Nevertheless, the influence thus exerted by the foreign 
sector, with the accompanying restrictions on imports and 
devaluation of currencies, has sometimes stimulated in-
dustrial development, as it has given additional protection 
to domestic manufactures. A recent case in point is that of 
Mexico, which, after the devaluation of its currency in 
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April 1954 and the virtual stabilization of its balance of 
payments, increased its income from agriculture and 
energetically expanded industrial production. 
Recently, too, factors of another kind have had a still 
stronger impact on industrial development in Latin 
America. The stationary income levels in Argentina and 
Chile implied a certain stagnation of demand, which meant 
that in both countries idle capacity existed in some 
branches of industry. Income distribution in Mexico might, 
over the long term, prove a powerful impediment to any 
expansion of the domestic market, especially for con-
sumer goods. Finally, restrictions on credit aimed at con-
trolling internal disequilibria, taxation through exchange-
rate differentials, and the fiscal policy in relation to pri-
vate enterprise, seem to have affected the development of 
industry in Colombia, Chile and Brazil during the first 
quarter of 1955. 
2 . T H E SITUATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Argentina 
The serious basic problems with which Argentina's 
industrial activity has been confronted since 1950—short-
age of energy and transport, and the need to renew equip-
ment—have not hitherto been tackled in accordance with 
any clearly defined principle. This naturally constitutes an 
obstacle to the expansion of the manufacturing sector; in 
fact, the satisfactory development of industry achieved in 
1954 was sufficient only to raise total production to former 
levels, such as that of 1951, without enabling it to exceed 
them. If population growth is taken into account, it is 
clear that there was actually a marked decline in per 
capita production, which reduced it to a level 10 per 
cent below that of 1951.^® 
The rapid recovery of Argentina's industry in 1954, 
which involved an expansion of 8 per cent in relation to 
1953, and its slower continuance in the second quarter of 
1955, when output was 2 per cent greater than in the first 
three months of the year, were primarily due to adventi-
tious factors originating in a rise in demand which allowed 
existing resources to be more fully utilized. The industrial 
" For an analysis of these problems and the existence of idle 
productive capacity, see the article entitled "The Situation in 
Argentina and the New Economic Policy", section 4, "Prospects for 
Industry", on p. 41 of this issue. 
growth of 1954 was largely based on that year's wage 
increases, but its effects gradually weakened as prices 
rose and demand therefore inevitably declined. In 1955, 
the expansionist effects of the demand for manufactured 
goods apparently arose from an increase in the gross 
national product,^" accruing from the better harvests in 
1 9 5 4 / 5 5 and from the development of other sectors of 
the economy. It seems, therefore, that until the end of 
1955 it was the fluctuations of demand that controlled the 
evolution of industrial production. 
It should be noted, first and foremost, that the expansion 
of Argentina's industry observable in the second quarter 
of 1955 originated mainly from the durable goods sector. 
It was here that the greatest increments were registered 
(see table 19) , notably for rubber goods (25 per cent), 
metals (22 per cent), vehicles and machinery (15 per 
cent) and electrical equipment and apparatus (24 per 
cent). 
In contrast, the output of non-durable goods in 1954 
and 1955 remained practically stationary in relation to 
that of preceding years. This was true of almost all 
branches, but especially of the foodstuffs industry, where, 
in the second quarter of 1955, the activity registered was 
only 3.5 per cent greater than in the first three months 
of the year, when production had already fallen 6.5 per 
cent below the figures for October-December 1954. This 
standstill in the output of foodstuffs was attributable to 
the following causes. Great progress was previously neces-
sitated by Argentina's long record of high consumption 
levels, so that any further expansion of this industry was 
able to keep pace only with demographic growth and not 
with an additional rise in demand. The situation was also 
influenced by the unsatisfactory sales in some export in-
dustries, as well as in others producing commodities for 
domestic consumption, such as flour, butter, cheese and 
oils. Since the foodstuffs industry represents 30 per cent 
of the non-durable goods sector and 20 per cent of Argen-
tina's entire manufacturing activity, its incidence on the 
general level of industrial production is considerable. In 
the output of textiles—another of the important non-dura-
ble goods industries—a substantial increase of 28 per cent 
was registered in the second quarter. It must be taken into 
" Estimated at 4 per cent, in real terms, for the whole of the year. 
Table 19 













Volume of industrial production » 110.4 109.7 
Number of workers employed 93.0 94.9 
Number of man-hours worked 97.6 90.8 
Volume of certain items: 
Foodstuffs 102.3 95.6 
Textiles 95.6 77.6 
Rubber 175.9 151.3 
Metals 111.3 102.9 
Vehicles and machinery 127.3 124.3 
Electrical equipment and apparatus 168.5 137.1 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
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account, however, that this upward trend in textiles fol-
lowed a period during which production was very low, 
as is indicated by the fact that the output fell by 30 per 
cent between 1950 and 1953, and was 19 per cent less in 
the first quarter of 1955 than in the last three months 
of 1954. 
In addition, there was a marked expansion of the paper 
industry, in which Argentina holds first place among the 
Latin American countries, accounting for almost 30 per. 
cent of the region's production; and it is probable that in 
the course of 1955 the output of 330,000 tons attained 
in former peak years was exceeded. Alongside this develop-
ment, there was also considerably more activity in printing 
and reproduction. 
To sum up, the relative maintenance of industrial recov-
ery in the second quarter of 1955, after the more striking 
expansion in 1954, can in no way be held to indicate that 
the fundamental problems affecting the long-term develop-
ment of manufacturing activity in Argentina have been 
successfully solved. 
Brazil 
The same factors which played an important part in the 
decline of industrial production during the first three 
months of 1955 seem to have continued operating through-
out the second quarter, if anything with more vigour than 
before. A further decrease in industrial activity brought 
it down to levels 5 per cent and 3 per cent below those 
prevailing in October-December 1954 and in the first 
three months of 1955, respectively. 
Bank credit restrictions continued to exert a discourag-
ing influence on industry during almost the whole of the 
second quarter. From June onwards, there was a relative 
increase in credit to the private sector, the effects of which 
could not be assessed earlier than the third quarter of 
1955. Imports of raw materials also pursued their down-
ward trend, although prices of some of these apparently 
tended to decrease in national currency because of the 
relatively lower dollar quotations during the quarter under 
review, as regards both the weighted average and some 
of the categories into which the exchange market is divided. 
The considerable wage increases granted in the first quar-
ter and during part of the second certainly implied higher 
production costs, the effects of which were discouraging 
as long as credit restrictions were in force; but it would 
seem that, at the same time, they reinvigorated consumer 
demand, in which a certain contraction had been noted 
during the first three months of 1955. It was precisely in 
consumer goods that the most marked decline in produc-
tion was observable during this quarter. (See table 20.) 
Between April and June, on the other hand, there was a 
reversal of this trend, as the output of consumer goods 
recovered by 2 per cent in relation to the first quarter, 
while that of producer goods underwent a 12-per-cent de-
crease. This decline seems to have been caused partly by 
the credit restrictions mentioned above, as the producer 
goods industries are those which most frequently resort to 
bank credit in Brazil, and partly by specific movements 
in certain important branches, deterniined in their turn by 
other factors. 
Table 20 




Total 141.5 139.0 
Producer goods 158.2 157.4 
Consumer goods 135.8 129.7 
Building 151.8 153.6 
Electric energy 130.8 147.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
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The iron and steel industry must perhaps have suffered 
during the first and second quarters of 1955 from the 
changes introduced by the Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional into its production plans, which are not usually 
very flexible. The falling-off in the demand for specific 
types of steel, with the resultant piling-up of stocks, seems 
to have led to a proportionate reduction of the output 
of these particular types in subsequent periods. Produc-
tion plans are drawn up every three months by this Com-
pany. 
The decline in the building industry in the second quar-
ter of 1955 involved a contraction of the demand for 
certain kinds of glass and iron products, the output of 
which consequently decreased. The fact that cement pro-
duction continued to increase in the first quarter of the 
year, despite the relative stagnation in building, was 
mainly due to the inauguration of new factories. Between 
April and June, however, the cement output fell by 3 per 
cent as a result of this decline in construction activities. 
Another branch of industry which followed the same 
downward course as in the first quarter was the manufac-
ture of paper (almost exclusively newsprint). Here a vital 
influence was exerted by the disadvantage at which domes-
tic production was placed, partly because the exchange 
system favoured the foreign product, and partly because 
the cost of imported pulp, already high, gradually rose 
with the rising cost of the foreign exchange required to 
cover it. 
Short-term development prospects for Brazil's indus-
try seem at present to be dominated, on the one hand, by 
the expansion of bank credit, which came into play as a 
favourable factor from June 1955 onward, and, on the 
other, by balance-of-payments difficulties and the deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade, with all their adverse effects 
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on the supply of capital goods and raw materials from 
abroad, and on the national income. 
Colombia 
One of the most outstanding events in the economic life 
of Colombia was the signing of a contract between the 
Instituto Industrial, which had the full support of the 
Government, and an Italian company, for the building of 
a fertilizer factory which will utilize the gas from the El 
Centro petroleum deposits managed by the Empresa 
Colombiana de Petróleos. This plant, for which the invest-
ment required will be in the neighbourhood of 12 million 
dollars, including 7 millions in foreign currency to cover 
equipment and technical services, will enter production 
in mid-1958, with a daily capacity of 50 tons of ammonia, 
150 tons of nitric acid, 65 of ammonium nitrate and 35 
of urea. Together with the Solvay plant at Zipaquirá, it 
will place Colombia in the forefront of the Latin American 
countries with respect to the heavy chemical industry. 
Chile 
Chile's industrial output continued to decline in the 
second quarter of 1955, falling 3.3 per cent lower than in 
the preceding three months, when it had already decreased 
by 6.1 per cent in relation to the last quarter of 1954. 
No very great changes were to be noted in installed capac-
ity or in the general difficulties besetting industry during 
the previous period.'"^ The cotton textile branch main-
tained its development without any enlargement of its 
former capacity, though its supplies of raw material were 
apparently somewhat improved. Production of rayon fila-
ment remained at a low level. The textile and clothing in-
dustries in general, however, expanded by 20 per cent— 
a considerable recovery in comparison with the period 
from January to March—but still failed, by the same 
percentage, to equal the figures recorded for the last 
quarter of 1954. In the iron and steel industry a sharp 
downward movement was caused by particular circum-
stances (repairs to the Huachipato blast furnace, which 
are usually carried out once in three or four years, and the 
seventeen-day strike which held up activities in June). 
Lastly, the building industry expanded by about 50 per 
cent in relation to the preceding period, in sharp con-
trast with its evolution in the first quarter of 1955, when 
it fell 20 per cent lower than in the last three months of 
1954. 
Again, in the second quarter of 1955, credit restric-
tions operated in much the same way as in the previous 
three months, making it difficult for raw material avail-
abilities to be financed over the short term and for stocks 
to be maintained. In contrast, supplies of imported raw 
materials improved considerably, thanks to the larger 
inflow of foreign exchange accruing from the rise in the 
price of copper. The shortage of electric energy was also 
somewhat eased, mainly owing to the entry into produc-
tion of a new power station in May. On the other hand, 
the continuance of inflationary price increases reduced 
the purchasing power of specific sectors of the popula-
tion; demand for certain manufactured products there-
fore contracted, with the consequent aggravation of the 
problem of idle capacity. 
Peru 
At the end of the first and during the second quarter of 
See Economic Review of Latin America, special issue, Bogotá, 
August 1955, pp. 4-6. 
1955, Peru witnessed the emergence of various industrial 
projects, some of which imply a significant expansion of 
basic heavy industry. Five agreements for financing the 
completion of the Chimbóte iron and steel plant and of 
the Cañón del Pato hydroelectric power station, were con-
cluded between the Corporación Peruana del Santa and a 
French consortium made up of a bank and four private 
enterprises. The installation of the steel rolling mill was 
subsequently begun in Chimbóte. 
A new cement factory entered production with a capital 
of 70 million soles and a current daily capacity of 1,500 
barrels. According to calculations, this rate of production 
will shortly be doubled. Another proposal took definite 
shape when work began on the construction of the coun-
try's third cement factory at Chiclayo. Its estimated capac-
ity is 1,300 barrels daily, and the capital involved is 60 
million soles. Furthermore, a 2.5-million-dollar credit, 
with a government guarantee, was granted by the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development to a 
cement company, for the building of the new plant at 
Pacasmayo. 
Important projects are also under way in the fertilizer 
and explosives sector. Four are of particularly far-reach-
ing significance. The first, for obtaining ammonium prod-
ucts, will probably enter production at the beginning of 
1956. 
As regards the consumer goods industry, competition 
from imported goods has tended to prevent it from pro-
gressing in 1955. At any rate, this seems to have been the 
case in certain branches, such as the textile industry, which 
was adversely affected by competition from foreign, espe-
cially Japanese, products. 
Mexico 
At the opening of 1955, Mexico's industrial situation 
was characterized by the same expansionist forces as had 
made themselves felt in the second half of 1954, basically 
deriving from that year's exceptional harvests, from a 
vigorous campaign to replace capital and durable con-
sumer goods imports and from a considerable increase 
in public expenditure. Nevertheless, these factors, which 
really came into play only from July 1954 onwards, seem 
to have originated relatively smaller effects in the course 
of the first semester of 1955, to judge by comparison with 
the rate of industrial growth in the second half of 1954. 
During that period, industrial production increased by 
almost 8 per cent in relation to the first six months of the 
year, but the figures reached were exceeded by 5 per cent 
in the first half of 1955. 
Again, such development as was still observable in 1955, 
seems to have been principally based on the manufacture 
of capital goods. Within the process of Mexico's industriali-
zation, this branch of industry has followed a steady up-
ward course. Consequently, the expansion recorded in 1954 
and its continuance in 1955 introduces no radical change 
into the situation of Mexican industry, but simply repre-
sents the prolongation of a long-term trend, only inter-
rupted, as in 1953, by an over-all recession in economic 
activity. 
In the first half of 1955, the output of pig-iron was 12 
per cent larger than in the second half of 1954, while 
that of steel bars rose by about 5 and that of cement by 
10 per cent. In contrast, certain branches of consumer 
goods manufactures, which had declined in recent years 
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and had expanded during the second half of 1954, again 
remained more or less stationary in 1955. The index for 
the textile industry, which, given 1950 as the base year, 
was 106 in the second half of 1954, rose by only 1 per cent 
in the first six months of 1955. Between these two periods, 
there was no change in the output of tires, while that 
of soap and beer declined; the production of edible oils, 
on the other hand, increased to an exceptional extent. 
The influence of an exaggerated concentration of earn-
ings in the higher income groups, and the consequent stag-
nation of the domestic market, coupled with the fact that 
in the consumer goods industries there was practically no 
margin for the further replacement of imports, prevented 
output from keeping pace in recent years with over-all 
economic development. After the expansion which took 
place in the second half of 1954, these adverse factors 
apparently began to operate afresh during the first six 
months of 1955. 
The generation of electric energy increased by almost 
7 per cent in relation to the second half of 1954. The 
continually growing market for energy was kept compara-
tively well supplied, as a result of the strong impetus given 
to electrical construction by the Mexican Government, 
through its Comisión de Electricidad. 
THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA AND THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
1. SOME ASPECTS OF ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DURING RECENT YEARS 
If economic development is judged by the growth of 
the nation's per capita income and by the degree of effi-
ciency with which man-power and capital resources are 
utilized, the balance for the last ten years shows that 
Argentina's over-all economsy has not made any real ad-
vance, and that the utilization of basic resources has actu-
ally deteriorated. During this interval, periods of progress 
have alternated with others of recession, but the former 
had not enough impetus to continue for any length of time, 
either because the structural basis essential for steady 
growth was lacking, or because the unfavourable action 
of fortuitous circumstances led to a loss of the ground 
gained. Although the endeavour to accelerate industriali-
zation at times raised production to high levels, most of 
its achievements were merely transient, or at best, out of 
proportion to the effort made. 
Table 1 shows that in 1954 the per capita gross product 
was barely 3.5 per cent higher than in 1946.^ (See also 
chart I .) 
If the increment in the stock of capital is considered, 
the figures for the same period are somewhat more satis-
factory, but the effects of increased investment seem to 
have been offset by a decline in productivity. (See table 2.) 
Allusion has already been made to the vicissitudes char-
acterizing the period under review. If fluctuations from 
one year to another are set aside, two phases can be 
clearly distinguished. The first comprises the early post-
war years up to 1948. This stage was marked by a rapid 
and pronounced rise in income, investment and produc-
tivity, per capita income reaching its peak at the end of 
the period. Thenceforward, a decline set in, and the 1948 
level was not regained in any subsequent year. 
' For the statistical sources utilized, see the Appendix to this 
article, p. 45. 
Table 1 
ARGENTINA: INFLOW OF AVAILABLE GOODS AND INVESTMENT 























(S) (C) {D) (E) {F) (G) (H) 
1935 37,538 39 37,499 2,538 34,961 27,094 3,239 7,867 
1936 39,303 1,492 37,811 1,705 36,106 28,379 3,741 7,727 
1937 44,200 3,649 40,551 843 39,708 30,252 4,516 9,456 
1938 41,441 765 40,676 - 1 , 2 2 8 41,904 29,972 7,515 11,932 
1939 42,674 441 42,233 1,375 40,858 31,448 3,758 9,410 
1940 42,895 - 2 3 42,918 821 42,097 33,731 2,776 8,366 
1941 44,896 - 2 6 5 45,161 2,065 43,096 33,805 4,003 9,291 
1942 45,674 15 45,659 2,229 43,430 35,380 2,458 8,050 
1943 45,563 215 45,348 3,798 41,550 34,042 2,376 7,508 
1944 50,881 425 50,456 3,700 46,756 38,746 1,684 8,010 
1945 147 48,836 3,667 45,169 37,939 2,060 7,230 
1946 2,001 53,197 2,674 50,523 38,946 5,369 11,577 
1947 63,253 4,139 59,114 - 1 , 9 5 8 61,072 42,346 12,906 18,726 
1948 65,961 3,608 62,353 - 3 , 1 1 8 65,471 46,311 13,247 19,160 
1949 1,285 61,544 - 1 , 9 9 8 63,542 49,670 7,759 13,872 
1950 .— 62,291 425 61,866 48,282 6,966 13,584 
1951 - 3 64,222 - 1 , 5 1 7 65,739 49,776 9,155 15,963 
1952 59,740 - 2 4 6 59,986 - 1 , 4 1 2 61,398 46,919 7,817 14,479 
1953 63,010 - 2 1 5 63,??5 1,333 61,892 50,285 4,287 11,607 
1954 - 1 0 4 66,091 724 65,367 51,386 7,070 13,581 
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(A) (B) (C) (£>) (£) (F) (G) m 
Per capita VALUES 
{Pesos at 1950 prices) 
1935 3 2,898 196 2,702 2,094 250 358 
1936 113 2,876 130 2,746 2,158 285 303 
1937 273 3,032 63 2,969 2,262 338 369 
1938 56 2,989 90 3,079 2,205 552 325 
1939 32 3,051 99 2,952 2,272 272 408 
1940 - 2 3,054 58 2,995 2,400 198 398 
1941 - 1 9 3,162 145 3,017 2,367 280 370 
1942 1 3,145 154 2,991 2,437 169 385 
1943 15 3,073 257 2,816 2,307 161 348 
1944 28 3,364 247 3,117 2,583 109 425 
1945 10 3,200 240 2,960 2,486 135 339 
1946 129 3,428 172 3,255 2,509 346 400 
1947 262 3,744 - 1 2 4 3,868 2,682 818 369 
1948 224 3,873 - 1 9 4 4,067 2,876 823 367 
1949 78 3,725 - 1 2 1 3,847 3,007 470 370 
1950 — 3,673 25 3,648 2,847 411 390 
1951 — 3,686 - 8 7 3,773 2,857 525 391 
1952 3,346 - 1 4 3,360 - 7 9 3,439 2,628 438 373 
1953 - 1 2 3,469 73 3,395 2,759 235 402 
1954 - 6 3,561 39 3,522 2,768 381 372 
Source: Producto e ingreso de la República Argentina en el periodo 1953-54, Buenos Aires, 1955. Col. (A): op. cit., table 17; Col. (B): Col. (A) 
minus Col. (C); Col. (C): op. cit., table 15; Col (D): Col. (C) minus Col. (E); Cois. (E) and (F): op. cit., table 18; Col. (G): op. cit., table 18 
and Col. (H): op. cit., tables 5, 18 and 31. 
Several factors combined to determine first the upward 
and later the downward movement. 
The close of the Second World War found Argentina 
in possession of abundant reserves, thanks to the greater 
decline in imports than in exports, which resulted in fav-
ourable balances, notwithstanding the deterioration in the 
terms of trade. 
But the scanty imports during the war years meant that 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: CAPITAL STOCK, PRODUCTIVITY, AND 
THE UTIUZATION OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY PER 
ACTIVELY EMPLOYED PERSON, 1945-54 
(Pesos at 1950 prices) 


















1945 114,437 18,984 8,101 0.427 
1946 116,497 18,954 8,656 0.457 
1947 121,866 19,446 9,432 0.485 
1948 134,772 20,979 9,706 0.463 
1949 148,019 22,346 9,291 0.416 
1950 155,778 22,848 9,136 0.400 
1951 162,744 23,180 9,147 0.395 
1952 171,899 23,832 8,316 0.349 
1953 179,716 24,345 8,565 0.352 
1954 184,003 24,211 8,696 0.359 
Sources: Producto e ingreso de la República Argentina en el período 
1953-54. Op. cit., table 1 and ECLA, Economic Surveys for 1951-52 
and 1953. Col. (A): for 1945, Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1951-52; for other years, table 1. Col. (B): Col. (A) divided by the 
estimate of active population cited in ECLA's Economic Surveys. 
Cols. (C) and (D): table 1 and source of Col. (B). 
the country was undergoing an intensive process of dis-
investment. 
Later, the reserves held were largely used to repatriate 
the external debt and to nationalize foreign investments 
in public services. So heavy a pressure was exerted by 
imports at the end of the war that they expanded much 
more than exports, thus bringing about a reversal of the 
former trend. While exports reached their maximum ton-
nage in 1946, when their volume was 16 per cent larger 
than in the preceding year, imports almost doubled in the 
same space of time, and in 1947 registered a similar in-
crement, which raised them to their peak—370 per cent 
higher than in 1945—by 1948, just when there was a 
marked falling-off in sales abroad. Only the remarkable 
improvement in the terms of trade enabled exports, despite 
a lesser increase and a subsequent decrease in their volume, 
to finance heavy foreign purchases. But in 1948-49 their 
continued decline coincided with a deterioration in the 
terms of trade. (See table 3 and chart II.) 
It is thus not surprising that by 1949 a trade debt had 
accumulated which compelled Argentina to apply for a 
loan from the Export-Import Bank. 
The downward trend of world prices was prolonged 
in the following years despite the slight recovery to which 
the war in Korea gave rise. Among its well-known causes 
were the magnitude of the output from the larger producer 
centres, and the consequent inevitable piling-up of stocks. 
Again, the very low level of Argentina's exports in specific 
years—1952, for example—was due to weather conditions 
which damaged crops, and in some cases, to the Govern-
ment's exchange policy. 
At all events, exports never recovered the high levels 
prevailing during the five years before the war (1935-39) , 
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Chart I 
ARGENTINA: NATIONAL GROSS PRODUCT AND INCOME, TERMS OF TRADE EFFECT, AND 
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1935 67.7 139.6 102.5 94.5 
1936 83.4 127.8 105.7 106.6 
1937 93.6 146.9 143.1 137.5 
1938 76.5 104.3 135.9 19.8 
1939 73.5 127.5 111.8 93.7 
1940 68.8 104.4 97.1 71.8 
1941 71.0 105.8 74.7 75.1 
1942 64.5 97.3 62.3 62.8 
1943 66.4 107.0 42.6 71.0 
1944 61.7 106.3 43.7 65.6 
1945 86.5 106.1 44.4 72.7 
1946 96.0 123.0 81.5 118.1 
1947 101.3 115.5 162.5 117.0 
1948 117.6 97.3 165.4 114.4 
1949 101.0 72.5 116.8 73.2 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1951 97.2 78.6 114.2 76.4 
1952 73.3 51.0 82.3 37.4 
1953 74.3 88.9 70.5 66.1 
1954 77.9 94.9 88.6 73.9 
Sources: Col. (A): 1935-48, Banco Central de Argentina, La evolu-
ción del balance de pagos de la República Argentina, Buenos Aires, 
1952; 1948-54, Ministerio de Comercio de Argentina, Memoria 
Anual, Ejercicio 1953, Buenos Aires, 1954, and statistics brought 
up to date on the basis of information from the same source. 
Cols. (B) and (C): table 1; Col. (D): Col. (A) x Col. (B). 
and the peak which they reached in 1946 was still far below 
the index attained in 1937. 
From this cursory analysis and the statistics on which 
it is based, one characteristic feature of Argentina's eco-
nomic development clearly emerges, which is, moreover, 
common to most of the Latin American countries: the in-
fluence of the terms of trade. Their fluctuations cause 
increases or decreases in income and investment. This 
latter, in the case of Argentina, keeps so closely parallel 
with the terms of trade as to emphasize the role of external 
factors in the country's development. Capital formation, 
which must to a large extent be founded on imports, de-
pends on the capacity for foreign payments, which in its 
turn is influenced by the terms of trade. The statistics re-
veal, furthermore, that Argentina's exports tend to expand 
less than the country's economy, making the latter dan-
gerously vulnerable to outside contingencies, so long as 
this dependence persists. 
An exceptional impetus was given to industry in the 
post-war period. During the war years, the fall in imports 
had already constituted an incentive to the expansion of 
industrial production, thus relieving the shortage brought 
about by restrictions, and providing a larger fund of 
experience which it was afterwards possible to exploit 
under the aegis of a definitely protectionist policy and 
in a period of heavy capital goods imports. 
Industrial expansion was also fostered by the shift 
of man-power from agriculture, and by the rise in income, 
which led to an increase in domestic demand for manu-
factured goods. 
The evolution of the statistics for the value of produc-
tion by sectors provides interesting material for study, 
and clearly illustrates the two stages indicated above. (See 
table 4 and chart III.) 
Production in the agricultural and stock-breeding sector 
has remained stationary for at least ten years. This situa-
tion is the more serious, since domestic demand has in-
creased not only for the reasons mentioned but also on 
account of population growth, so that availabilities for 
export have diminished. 
Industry has followed a similar trend over the last five 
years. Annual statistics show that the index of 100.7 re-
corded for 1948 was not exceeded until 1951, and then 
only very slightly. The indices for per capita production 
are even more discouraging. 
Between the stagnation of primary activities and the 
decline in industry there was obviously a relationship of 
cause and effect. The persistent weakening of exports de-
prived industrial development of a support which is in-
dispensable until it has reached a stage advanced enough 
to lessen its dependence on external contingencies. Argen-
tina's economy, like that of all countries in a similar phase 
of development, has not yet undergone the structural 
changes which would enable it to carry the weight of in-
dustrialization without substantial imports of capital 
goods, raw materials and fuels. In the case of Argentina, 
no heavy industry exists, and there are few accessible 
sources of regular and adequate fuel and raw material 
supplies. Sufficient illustration is provided by the fact 
that petrolera imports came to constitute 49 per cent of 
total energy consumption, as against only 39 per cent be-
fore the war. 
Again, the growth of industry iteself created an ever-
increasing demand for fuels and raw materials, and the 
composition of imports had to be modified accordingly, 
a development which, although satisfactory in principle, 
renders manufacturing activities still more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the capacity to import. This partly explains 
why the expansion in productive capacity achieved in 
years of heavy purchases abroad could not be fully ex-
ploited when it was no longer possible to import sufficient 
quantities of raw materials and fuels. (See table 5.) 
It should be noted that these changes in the structure 
of imports—largely in favour of fuels and raw materials 
—took place as from 1948 within a steadily decreasing 
volume of total imports. 
With the external difficulties arising from the contrac-
tion in imports were coupled the internal setbacks to 
industrial activity inherent in an inflationary process. 
The costs inflation resulting from wage and salary in-
creases was financed by means of bank credit. Between 
1946 and 1948 real remunerations improved, owing to 
an increment of over 5 per cent in gross income, which 
was doubtless partly attributable to the exceptionally 
favourable external conditions then prevailing. So favour-
able a consequence of the improvement in the terms of 
trade and the increase in productivity enabled wages and 
profits to rise simultaneously in the industrial sector; but 
once these conditions ceased to exist, a price-wage spiral 
became manifest, real remunerations fell, and industrial 
activity could be maintained only with the help of a further 
extension of bank credit. To all this must be added the 




ARGENTINA: NATIONAL GROSS PRODUCT, BY SECTORS AND PER CAPITA, 1935-54 
Year 
Agriculture and Industry General 
Total fisheries Stock-breeding and mining Building services 
A . DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS PRODUCT 
{As a percentage of total) 
1935 100.0 17.2 10.5 20.0 4.8 47.5 
1936 100.0 14.3 10.7 21.3 5.0 48.7 
1937 13.8 10.2 21.2 6.1 48.7 
1938 100.0 11.6 10.3 21.9 6.7 49.5 
1939 100.0 13.3 10.2 22.0 5.9 48.6 
1940 100.0 14.3 10.4 21.8 5.2 48.3 
1941 100.0 15.6 10.7 21.6 5.1 47.0 
1942 100.0 14.7 10.9 21.6 5.1 47.7 
1943 100.0 11.2 11.4 22.8 5.3 49.3 
1944 100.0 13.9 10.6 23.1 5.8 46.6 
1945 100.0 9.5 10.8 23.0 5.8 49.9 
1946 100.0 9.6 9.9 24.6 5.7 50.2 
1947 100.0 9.9 8.9 25.5 5.2 50.5 
1948 100.0 9.7 8.2 24.4 6.4 51.3 
1949 100.0 8.5 8.3 24.0 7.2 52.0 
1950 100.0 7.7 8.0 24.4 7.3 52.6 
1951 100.0 8.7 7.4 24.2 7.0 52.7 
1952 100.0 7.2 8.1 24.2 6.4 54.1 
1953 100.0 10.5 8.1 22.4 5.8 53.2 
1954 100.0 9.6 7.8 23.2 6.2 53.2 
B, Per capita GROSS PRODUCT 
{Pesos at 1950 prices) 
1935 2,898 498 304 580 139 1,377 
1936 2,876 411 308 613 144 1,400 
1937 3,032 418 309 643 185 1,477 
1938 2,989 347 308 655 200 1,479 
1939 3,051 406 311 671 180 1,483 
1940 3,054 437 318 666 159 1,474 
1941 3,162 493 338 683 161 1,486 
1942 3,145 462 343 679 160 1,500 
1943 3,073 344 350 701 163 1,515 
1944 3,364 468 357 777 195 1,567 
1945 3,200 304 346 768 185 1,597 
1946 3,427 329 339 843 195 1,721 
1947 3,745 371 333 955 195 1,891 
1948 3,873 376 318 945 248 1,986 
1949 3,726 317 309 894 268 1,937 
1950 3,673 283 294 896 268 1,932 
1951 3,686 321 273 892 258 1,943 
1952 3,360 242 272 813 215 1,818 
1953 3,468 364 281 777 201 1,845 
1954 3,561 342 278 826 221 1,894 
Source: Table 1 and Producto e ingreso de la República Argentina en el periodo 1953-54, op. cit., tables 15 & 16 & Appendix IV. 
Industry was thus compelled to meet high production 
costs, while at the same time it was confronted with a 
weakening of domestic demand, brought about by the 
decrease both in real wages and in the earnings of agricul-
ture. It should be remembered, however, that while in-
flation raised the general level of prices, those paid to 
farmers for basic products improved only slightly or re-
mained unchanged; a transfer of income from this sector 
to the non-agricultural activities was thus promoted, and 
the effect produced upon these latter by the altered cir-
cumstances was to some extent counteracted. Moreover, 
industry enjoyed the advantage of the import replace-
ments achieved, by virtue of which its own products could 
be substituted for many formerly purchased abroad. 
This process of import replacement, however, was itself 
slowed down by the difficulties described. Investment— 
mainly channelled into public works, which, however de-
sirable they may be, do not produce goods to satisfy 
consumer demand—lost its impetus, imports of raw ma-
terials declined, and fuel availabilities just sufficed to 
maintain industrial activity at a level which, if it repre-
sented no progress, at least did not involve a significant 
deterioration. 
The interplay of all these factors resulted in an indus-
trial situation that prevented the serious problem of the 
two basic sectors of Argentina's economy—energy and 
transport—from being grasped in its full magnitude. The 
deficit in electric energy, in particular, has in recent years 
been responsible for the imposing of restrictions on con-
sumption which, in the case of many industries in the 
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Chart III 
ARGENTINA: PER CAPITA NATIONAL GROSS PRODUCT, BY SECTORS 
(Pesos at 1950 prices) 
(Semi-logarithmic scale) 
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{Millions of pesos a( Í950 prices) (As a percentage of total) 
1 9 3 5 6 , 2 2 7 2 , 1 1 1 1 , 8 9 9 6 4 8 1 , 5 6 9 3 3 . 9 3 0 . 5 1 0 . 4 2 5 . 2 
1 9 3 6 6 , 4 2 1 2 , 0 5 5 2 , 0 0 3 6 5 5 1 , 7 0 8 3 2 . 0 3 1 . 2 10 .2 2 6 . 6 
1 9 3 7 8 , 6 9 3 2 , 7 3 0 2 , 5 3 8 8 1 7 2 , 6 0 8 3 1 . 4 2 9 . 2 9 . 4 3 0 . 0 
1 9 3 8 8 , 2 5 6 2 , 7 3 3 2 , 1 3 0 8 6 7 2 , 5 2 6 3 3 . 1 2 5 . 8 10 .5 3 0 . 6 
1 9 3 9 6 , 7 9 2 2 , 0 3 1 2 , 0 5 1 8 3 5 1 , 8 7 5 2 9 . 9 3 0 . 2 12 .3 2 7 . 6 
1 9 4 0 5 , 8 9 9 1 , 7 5 8 1 , 8 4 0 6 8 4 1 , 6 1 7 2 9 . 8 3 1 . 2 11 .6 2 7 . 4 
1 9 4 1 4 , 5 3 8 1 ,243 1 , 7 3 4 5 3 5 1 , 0 2 6 2 7 . 4 3 8 . 2 11 .8 2 2 . 6 
1 9 4 2 3 , 7 8 5 1 , 1 3 2 1 , 6 0 9 3 0 3 7 4 2 2 9 . 9 4 2 . 5 8 . 0 7 9 . 6 
1943 2 , 5 8 8 8 4 6 1 ,227 1 8 9 3 2 6 3 2 . 7 4 7 . 4 7 . 3 12 .6 
1 9 4 4 2 , 6 5 5 1 ,033 1 , 1 9 7 181 2 4 4 3 8 . 9 4 5 . 1 6 . 8 9 . 2 
1945 2 , 6 9 7 1 ,055 1 , 0 9 0 1 9 4 3 5 8 39 .1 4 0 . 4 7 . 2 13 .3 
1 9 4 6 4 , 9 5 1 1 , 4 9 0 1 , 4 0 1 6 2 4 1 , 4 3 6 3 0 . 1 2 8 . 3 1 2 . 6 2 9 . 0 
1 9 4 7 9 , 8 7 2 2 , 7 5 4 2 , 2 0 1 8 0 0 4 , 1 1 7 2 7 . 9 2 2 . 3 8 . 1 4 1 . 7 
1 9 4 8 1 0 , 0 4 8 1 , 8 7 9 2 , 2 8 1 1 , 1 2 5 4 , 7 6 3 18 .7 2 2 . 7 11 .2 4 7 . 4 
1 9 4 9 7 , 0 9 6 1 , 1 0 0 2 , 1 2 9 9 3 0 2 , 9 3 7 15 .5 3 0 . 0 13 .1 4 1 . 4 
1 9 5 0 6 , 0 7 5 8 6 9 1 , 5 1 2 8 2 0 2 , 8 7 4 14 .3 2 4 . 9 13 .5 4 7 . 3 
1951 6 , 9 3 8 1 , 1 3 8 1 , 9 3 6 8 3 9 3 , 0 2 5 16 .4 2 7 . 9 1 2 . 1 4 3 . 6 
1 9 5 2 5 , 0 0 0 6 3 5 1 , 1 1 5 9 1 5 2 , 3 3 5 12 .7 2 2 . 3 18 .3 4 6 . 7 
1953 4 , 2 8 3 6 0 0 9 9 8 8 2 2 1 ,863 14 .0 2 3 . 3 19 .2 4 3 . 5 
1 9 5 4 5 , 3 8 2 6 4 0 1 , 4 9 6 8 7 2 2 , 3 7 3 11 .9 2 7 . 8 1 6 . 2 4 4 . 1 
B. 1950-54 » 
(Thousands of pesos at 1950 prices) 
1950 mi 1952 1953 195U 
Non-durable consumer goods 540,923 500,625 324,862 370,769 388,246 
Durable consumer goods 91,572 393,953 145,375 106,943 108,187 
Fuels 593,318 661,065 679,989 653,835 674,032 
Raw'materials for industry 1,094,614 1,526,449 827,024 797,309 1,156,945 
Capital goods materials 583,362 776,532 445,802 287,788 665,824 
Building materials 504,361 507,766 322,916 223,627 355,889 
Capital goods for agriculture 152,517 161,969 177,234 175,847 82,888 
Capital goods for industry and mining 588,650 568,868 442,836 378,621 439,233 
Capital goods for transport 257,456 367,406 339,259 418,737 288,988 
TOTAL 4,406,773 5,464,633 3,715,297 3,413,476 4,160,232 
Source:\Economic Survey of Latin America, 1951-52 (information brought up to date by ECLA). 
» In this new and more detailed classification of imports, no data earlier than those for 1950 are available. 
Greater Buenos Aires area, have made themselves felt in a 
reduction of the number of working days. But as demand 
was not great enough to allow industry to work at full 
capacity, the impact of these measures was felt only in 
part. 
As regards transport, the situation is, if possible, still 
more critical. During the period 1948-54, disinvestment 
in rolling stock and equipment amounted to more than 
20 per cent. 
Where the railways are concerned, this process of dis-
investment is reflected in the age and state of disrepair 
not only of the rolling stock, but also of the repair 
workshops and sheds. According to estimates, only one-
fourth of the steam engines, which still make up most of 
the traction power available, are in good condition; 38 
per cent should be completely overhauled or removed 
from service. To this must be added the unsatisfactory 
condition of many of the tracks, the average age of which 
varies from thirty-two to fifty years on the main railway 
lines. All this results in an increasingly defective service 
and in heavy financial deficits on the operating costs. 
The average distance covered annually by freight cars 
has decreased in recent years by more than 50 per cent. 
A similar state of affairs exists with respect to motor 
vehicles and the road network. According to official data, 
the extent of the national highways kept in good repair 
fell from 52,192 kilometres in 1947 to 51,582 in 1954; 
and it is estimated that the mending and reconstruction 
of the road surfaces on the principal highways—for the 
most part in poor condition or completely destroyed, the 
normal expansion of the network and the building of ap-
proach roads, plus the cost of road upkeep and the re-
newal of road equipment, would call for investment to 
the value of 1,900 million pesos in 1956 and 2,300 mil-
lions in each of the ten following years. 
At the end of 1953, the total number of motor vehicles 
was calculated to be 657,000. The economic importance 
of lorries (265,000 units out of the above total) is under-
lined by the following data for 1951 : while the railways 
carried about 33 million tons of goods and accounted for 
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17,700 million ton/kilometres, lorries were responsible 
for the transport of 76 million tons of goods and for 
14,000 million ton/kilometres. The average age of vehicles 
is probably over fifteen years, and many have been in 
use for more than twenty, which means heavy expenditure 
on repairs and maintenance. Estimates suggest that the 
renewal of the lorry park would call for at least 100,000 
new units. 
River transport facilities, except for the Paraná fleet 
of push-tow boats, are also out of date and obsolete. 
Finally, there is a pressing need for the renewal of some 
of the port installations and equipment, and for the reform 
of port administration and management, with a view 
to eliminating the risks of congestion which a possible 
increase in the volume of exports would incur. 
This background information may help to explain the 
critical situation in which Argentina's economy found 
itself in mid-1955, and to account for the emergency 
measures adopted by the Government. 
A s has already been stated, industrial development was 
energetically promoted by the authorities, and in the early 
years of the post-war period enjoyed the benefit of excep-
tionally favourable external circumstances. In accord-
ance with the normal process in such a case, industry at-
tracted man-power from primary activities and absorbed 
the flow of immigrants. Furthermore, as a result of the 
heavy imports effected in 1946-48, it was able to increase 
investment and was kept well supplied with raw materials. 
These factors seem to have sufficed to raise both the prod-
uct and the productivity of industry over the short term, 
and to achieve a certain degree of import replacement. 
But they have shown themselves incapable of maintaining 
the rate of development and enabling industry to reach 
a more advanced stage. 
The development of industry was attended by a two-
fold disequilibrium. On the one hand, that of energy and 
transport failed to keep pace with it; and on the other, 
it was eifected at the expense of agriculture, which, in 
contrast, was handicapped by backward techniques and 
a lack of incentives from prices and demand. 
The latter difficulty arose from the channelling of pro-
ductive resources and available foreign exchange towards 
public works and away from agriculture. This explains 
why, with a rate of investment which on the whole appears 
satisfactory, recent years have witnessed a persistent de-
cline in productivity per unit of capital and per active 
worker. (See again table 2.) 
The transfer of manpower to industry was not strictly 
confined to "surplus" agricultural workers. It was simply 
a shift of population resulting from the attraction of the 
better salaries and wages ofl^ered by the urban industries, 
and did not coincide with any increase in investment or 
any improvement in farming techniques, which, by raising 
agricultural yields per active worker and per unit of land, 
would have rendered this transfer innocuous. 
Data on the stock of capital and on productivity by 
sectors shed interesting light on the situation. (See table 
6 and chart I V . ) 
The sometimes abrupt annual fluctuations in the product-
capital ratio for agriculture, as well as in productivity per 
active worker, appear to have resulted almost exclusively 
from weather conditions which increased or reduced crops. 
Thus the sharp decline registered in 1952 was due to the 
disastrous effects of weather conditions in that year, and 
the exceptional recovery in 1953 to the very favourable 
weather then prevailing. In another sense, variations in 
the product-capital ratio are also a reflection of the low 
rate of investment in agriculture. Broadly speaking, no 
progress is being made. 
Much the same was true of the industrial sector as far 
as the output per worker is concerned. A decline was reg-
istered in 1952 and 1953 and a recovery in 1954. But here 
investment was more intensive and the product-capital 
ratio fell steadily. 
Lastly, in services, where available capital was highest, 
and, moreover, increased slightly, productivity per unit 
of capital decreased, and a still sharper drop was observ-
able in the product per active worlcer. 
A comparison of these data with changes in the struc-
ture of employment leads to an obvious conclusion. The 
process which has been taking place of late in Argentina 
is retrogressive, since the transfer of man-power from 
the high-productivity sectors to the comparatively non-
productive services is just the opposite of the movement 
characteristic of a developing economy, which had been 
noted in previous years. Moreover, the degree of efficiency 
with which productive resources are being utilized is 
patently tending to decline. 
Hence it is clear that Argentina constitutes a typical 
instance of the promotion of development without the 
balance and integration which are essential if the growth 
achieved is to prove strong and lasting. Lacking such 
support, industrial activities weakened after an initial 
period of intense prosperity, and, consequently, as soon 
as external factors ceased to be favourable, the economy 
betrayed its traditional vulnerability to their adverse in-
fluence. 
The expansion of industry demands a considerable in-
crease in capital formation, and this is impossible with-
out imports of producer goods, raw materials and fuels. 
Such replacements as can be achieved enable the com-
position of imports to be modified in favour of these in-
dispensable prerequisites. It is a question, therefore, not 
of curtailing purchases abroad, but of selecting them. In 
fact, they must be increased, at least during the early 
stages. Argentina was able to do this, especially in 1947 
and 1948, when it enjoyed exceptionally advantageous 
terms of trade, which coincided with a boom in agricul-
tural production. The subsequent deterioration in the 
terms of trade was accompanied by a falling-oif in pri-
mary production and an increase in domestic consump-
tion, and exports did not suffice to finance imports, limited 
as these were. A balance-of-payment problem thus arose, 
so that the country had to restrict its purchases severely 
in some cases, and in others was obliged to contract debts 
or resort to its reserves. The situation was at times tem-
porarily relieved, as in 1953 and 1954, by excellent har-
vests, but the latent disequilibrium once more became a 
reality in 1955, when the estimated balance-of-payments 
deficit amounted to 200 million dollars. The addition of 
previous commitments, originating chiefly in the use of 
credit in bilateral agreements and in debts on deferred-
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A. AGHICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
1945 27,375 23.9 13,086 0.362 4,739 
1946 27,959 24.0 14,353 0.371 5,325 
1947 28,273 23.2 15,830 0.393 6,2251 
1948 29,650 22.0 16,780 0.376 6,316 
1949 31,380 21.2 17,739 0.329 5,845 
1950 31,779 20.4 18,201 0.308 5,601 
1951 32,061 19.7 18,716 0.323 6,036 
1952 33,177 19.3 18,401 0.277 5,090 
1953 34,146 19.0 18,497 0.344 6,371 
1954 34,041 18.5 17,916 0.338 6,053 
B . INDUSTRY, BUILDING AND MINING 
1945 11,498 10.1 8,954 1.266 11,334 
1946 12,349 10.6 8,266 1.305 10,789 
1947 14,746 12.1 8,256 1.231 10,161 
1948 18,194 13.5 9,937 1.056 10,489 
1949 21,167 14.3 11,295 0.907 10,247 
1950 23,211 14.9 12,426 0.851 10,571 
1951 24,899 15.3 13,084 0.805 10,529 
1952 26,816 15.6 14,807 0.684 10,136 
1953 28,575 15.9 16,546 0.624 10,324 
1954 29,808 16.2 17,053 0.652 11,116 
C. SERVICES 
1945 75,564 66.0 28,493 0.322 9,188 
1946 76,189 65.4 28,176 0.351 9,876 
1947 78,847 64.7 29,257 0.379 11,077 
1948 86,928 64.5 30,760 0.368 11,320 
1949 95,472 64.5 32,027 0.335 10,735 
1950 100,788 64.7 31,457 0.325 10,226 
1951 105,784 65.0 31,067 0.320 9,940 
1952 111,906 65.1 31,094 0.290 9,017 
1953 116,995 65.1 30,715 0.287 8,831 
1954 120,154 65.3 30,403 0.293 8,897 
Source: See sources of table 2. 
This deficit in the balance of payments, the short-term 
inflexibility of the capacity to import, the inadequate 
energy supplies and the disinvestment in the transport 
system, together with the renewal of the inflationary 
process, would thus seem to have been the outstanding fea-
tures of Argentina's critical economic situation in mid-
1955. 
2 . T H E E X C H A N G E R E F O R M AND T H E NEW 
A G R I C U L T U R A L PRICES 
The new policy upon which the Government has em-
barked is designed to give a completely new direction 
to the economy. The preparation of a programme cover-
ing its most vital aspects has been announced, but in face 
of the pressing nature of certain problems and the need 
to overcome the most immediate difficulties, short-term 
emergency measures have been adopted. The most impor-
tant of these, to which the present remarks will be con-
fined, are related to the exchange system and to basic 
prices for agricultural products. 
It has long been realized that the Argentine peso was 
heavily o ver-valued on the official exchange market (the 
only one authorized). In actual fact, the basic rates of 
5 pesos to the dollar for ordinary exports and priority 
imports, 7.50 pesos for ordinary imports and priority 
exports, and 14 pesos for minor exports, non-essential im-
ports and financial transactions, as well as for the various 
combinations of all these, were completely out of line 
with internal price and cost levels. They involved a dis-
parity in purchasing power that within the internal econ-
omy was reflected in a discouraging lack of incentives 
for agricultural producers; heavy losses for the Argentine 
Institute of Trade Promotion, which finances purchases 
of crops by official institutes; an expansion of bank credit; 
exceptionally high profits for some importers and dealers: 
and an increasing number of clandestine transactions. 
The aim of the reform brought into force on 28 October 
1955 is to eliminate the deficit in grain transactions and 
the resulting inflationary pressure; to raise farmers' in-
come; to reduce the excessive profits of intermediaries; 
to prevent the flight of foreign exchange export earnings; 
and, finally, to create an atmosphere favourable to the 
inflow of capital, and to the expansion not only of exports 
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as a whole, but also of those which were proving merely 
marginal. 
The measures adopted may be summed up as follows: 
(a) Standardization of the exchange rate at 18 pesos 
to the dollar on the official market, through which most 
foreign trade transactions will still be negotiated. Since 
not all agricultural prices require a readjustment equiva-
lent to this devaluation, it may be possible to retain up to 
25 per cent of the national currency obtained by liquidat-
ing foreign exchange export earnings in this sector. There 
will be a special duty on imports in process of negotiation. 
(b) The creation of a free exchange market. This will 
handle movements of capital—except in the case of for-
eign capital already in the country, which for the moment 
will remain under the control of the Central Bank—as well 
as remittances of profits obtained after 30 June 1955 on 
Chart IV 
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Chart IV (continued) 
B . - A R G E N T I N A : GROSS PRODUCT-CAPITAL STOCK RATIO 
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capital already invested. This market will also deal with 
import transactions determined by the Central Bank, and 
export operations not included on the official market list, 
always provided that the products concerned do not in-
corporate imported materials to a value exceeding 20 
per cent of their external sales price. 
(c) The application by the Ministry of Finance of 
exchange-rate surcharges and even exceptional duties in 
specific cases (for example, that of automobiles), so as 
to avoid a boom in imports through the free market, which 
might exert exaggerated pressure on the rate of exchange 
or prejudice domestic production. 
(d) The creation of the Fondo de Restablecimiento 
Económico Nacional, which will draw upon a variety of 
resources, among them the retentions, surcharges and 
duties enumerated. This Fund will be entirely devoted 
to improving the technological and economic situation of 
agriculture, and to paying whatever subsidies may have to 
be granted in order to mitigate the possible effects of the 
devaluation of the peso. 
Three aspects of this reform deserve special emphasis: 
in the first place, the marked devaluation of the national 
currency; secondly, the standardization of the official 
rates, despite the multiplicity that may result from sur-
charges and retentions, which are, in any event, regarded 
as temporary; and, thirdly, the creation of the free mar-
ket. According to official statements, the scope of the free 
exchange system will be gradually extended as and when 
circumstances permit. 
Apart from their importance in establishing some degree 
of freedom and more realistic exchange rates, these meas-
ures are directed towards one outstanding goal which 
seems to be the dominant feature of the Argentine Govern-
ment's short-term policy—namely, the revival of agricul-
ture, neglected for the reasons already described. Shortly 
after the adoption of the exchange reform, the authorities 
raised minimum guarantee prices for the following prod-
ucts, bringing them closer to international parities: wheat, 
barley, oats, rye, linseed, maize, sunflower and peanuts. In 
one case, that of linseed, the increase amounted to almost 
100 per cent; in the other instances, it varied between 
15 and 40 per cent. 
An examination of government statements, however, 
reveals that the official programme, although linked to the 
basic and traditional sector of Argentina's economy, where 
recovery is essential, embraces further aims, some im-
mediate and others inore remote. These comprise the eas-
ing of the balance-of-payments situation by means of an 
expansion of the export trade; an increase in the capacity 
to import; and the encouragement of industry. It can thus 
be seen that the special character of the steps taken does 
not imply neglect of the economy as a whole or of its future 
prospects, and that these measures in fact constitute an 
approach to the more vigorous development programme 
which is in course of preparation. It is impossible, with-
out venturing into the realm of conjecture, to appraise the 
efficacy of the incentives provided so that Argentina may 
find a rapid way out of its serious difficulties. But what 
can be briefly analysed within the limits imposed by the 
nature of these notes, is the country's present economic 
state, together with the possibilities of a satisfactory re-
sponse to the stimuli in question. 
3 . T H E RECOVERY OF AGRICULTURE 
Over the short term, the devaluation of the currency 
is practically equivalent to a redistribution of income in 
favour of agriculture, since an immediate expansion of 
production cannot be achieved for obvious reasons of time, 
except to some extent in the case of maize and sunflower. 
A beneficial influence may perhaps be exerted on the care 
with which the crops are sown and harvested. 
This redistribution of income was designed not only to 
remedy the unfavourable treatment to which the agricul-
tural sector has been subjected, but also to provide means 
of increasing capital formation and introducing better 
techniques. It is this principle, as well as the aim of avert-
ing immediate inflationary efl'ects, that lies behind the 
proposed temporary retention of some part of the sur-
charge established. 
After a somewhat longer interval, Argentina's agricul-
tural sector, once it has felt the benefit of improved tech-
niques and of the stimulus provided by remunerative prices, 
will probably be able to contribute substantial increases 
to the volume of production. This assumption requires 
illustration with a brief assessment of the efl'ects of the 
agrarian policy followed during recent years. 
Among the main features of this policy were the fixing 
of prices for basic products, and the centralization of such 
purchases and exports in the hands of the State. Other 
agricultural commodities remained outside the scope of 
this system. An examination may now be usefully made of 
the differing evolution of the areas sown to these'two groups 
of products (by five-year periods, to prevent the variations 
due to weather conditions from weighing too heavily). 
Table 7 shows, in the first place, the serious reduction of 
the total area under cultivation, which has decreased by 
as much as 4.5 million hectares in the last twenty-five 
years. If population growth is taken into account, it will 
be seen that the per capita figures were 1.66 hectares in the 
pre-war period and 0 . 9 6 in 1 9 5 0 - 5 4 . 
In the second place, while there was a gradual decline 
in the area sown to crops with fixed official prices, that 
occupied by products subject to no price control registered 
a continuous increase. This trend became more obvious 
from 1945 onwards. One reservation must be made: the 
crops grouped in the table as free from price controls 
include not only those that really were so, but also some 
which, although directly or indirectly subject to official 
price regulations, were nevertheless better off than cereals 
and oleaginous products, since their prices were relatively 
more advantageous. In practice, the policy of official prices 
for exportable products provided the intended stimulus 
only in certain periods. In some instances, the improve-
ment in world prices benefited the purchasing institutes; 
in others, as was the case in recent years, the established 
buyer prices were too low to encourage production. 
Little by little, farmers abandoned the cultivation of 
crops covered by the system of fixed prices. The most 
striking example was offered by oleaginous products; the 
3.6 million hectares under cultivation in the five-year 
period 1 9 4 0 - 4 4 decreased to 2 . 3 millions in the next five 
years, and to only 1.5 millions by 1955. In the area sown 
to cereals, the reduction amounted to 24 per cent, or some 
4.2 million hectares. (See table 8.) 
3§; 
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: AREA UNDER SEED 
(Thousands of hectares) 
193Í-38 19m-U 19Í5-Í9 Í950-5Í 1955 
Total area 21,814 21,245 18,974 17,349 17,254 
Index 100 97.4 87.0 79.5 79.1 
(A) Crops subject to controlled prices 
Cereals" 17,347 16,309 13,870 13,176 13,896 
Oleaginous products •> 3,277 3,607 3,492 2,285 1,455 
TOTAL 20,624 19,916 17,362 15,461 15,352 
Index 100 96.6 84.2 75.0 74.4 
(B) Crops not subject to controlled prices".. 1,190 1,329 1,612 1,888 1,902 
Index 100 111.6 135.4 158.6 159.8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of data from Síntesis Estadística 
Mensual. 
' Wheat, maize, oats, barley and rye. 
Sunflower, peanuts and linseed. 
" Rice, potatoes, manioc, yams, beans, chickpeas, cotton, sugar cane, miscellaneous vegetables, 
mate, tobacco, vineyard products, castor oil, millet and canary-seed. 
As regards yields, except in the case of wheat, barley, 
rye and peanuts, where a moderate upward trend is regis-
tered, the situation is not very encouraging, as production 
is either stationary or declining. 
This demonstrates that in agricultural techniques Argen-
tina is either backward, or has failed to make due progress. 
The deterioration in the yields of maize, sunflower and 
oats is especially serious. 
Table 8 
ARGENTINA: AREA SOWN TO VARIOUS CEREALS 
(Thousands of hectares) 
Í934-38 19iO-ii 1945-49 1950-54 Í955 
Wheat 7,499 7,057 5,985 5,891 5,937 
Maize 6,699 5,397 3,518 2,750 3,002 
Oats 1,459 1,699 1,601 1,386 1,376 
Barley 739 767 1,033 953 1,090 
Rye 952 1,389 1,733 2,196 2,493 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of data from Síntesis Estadística 
Mensual, and Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Such a situation contrasts with developments in other 
producer countries (see table 9 ) , where considerable ad-
vances have been achieved through the creation of disease-
resisting strains producing better or earlier yields, the 
wide-spread use of such aids as fertilizers, insecticides and 
weed-killers, or a higher degree of mechanization. 
This picture might be interpreted as indicative of the 
destruction or exhaustion of renewable basic resources. 
Soils would seem to be undergoing a loss of fertility and 
even, in some cases, changes in their original composition. 
This accounts for the disadvantage at which Argentina 
finds itself when it has to compete on a world market 
burdened with surpluses. 
Lastly, the efí'ects of the price policy also made them-
selves felt in a reduction of the farmers' real earnings per 
hectare and in the internal price distortions which caused 
the replacement of one crop by another within the general 
downward trend. (See table 10.) 
Statistics show that as a general rule—valid even for 
those crops which were in a relatively more privileged 
position—earnings per hectare in recent years were lower 
than in 1946-48, and in some instances failed to equal those 
registered in 1934-38. The wide disparities in the income 
of the different sectors are also evident. Further, a close 
parallel exists between the relative reduction of income 
and the decrease in the areas under seed. (See again table 
8.) Thus, in the case of maize, which suffered very heavy 
losses in 1949-53, the 1954/55 sowing covered barely 3 
million hectares, as against 6.7 millions in the five years 
before the war. The sharp decline in earnings on olea-
ginous products meant the complete elimination of exports 
of edible oil and oil seeds, and a deficit of not less than 
100,000 tons of oil in supplies for home consumption. 
From these data some idea can be formed of the scope 
of the incentives to production now created. In 1956, under 
the new price regime, and on the assumption that yields 
similar to those of the preceding five-year period will be 
obtained, a general improvement in earnings is expected; 
this will, however, be highest for those products which 
were at the greatest disadvantage, and for which, as has 
already been pointed out, larger price increases were 
granted. Thus, even if the different products are not 
entirely restored to the relative positions they occupied 
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Table 8 
COMPARISON OF THE YIELDS OF WHEAT, MAIZE, OATS, AND BARLEY IN THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
(Kilogrammes per hectare) 






United States 908 888 1,150 1,137 1,150 +26.6 
Canada 914 821 1,177 998 1,373 + 50.2 
Australia 821 869 759 944 1,136 +38.4 
Argentina 934 977 1,102 1,099 1,164 +24.6 
Maize: 
United States 1,386 1,568 2,007 2,239 2,402 +73.3 
Canada 2,460 2,551 2,493 2,840 3,340 +35.8 
Mexico 576 565 602 713 757" +31.4 
Argentina 1,874 1,810 1,998 1,766 1,529 - 1 8 . 4 
Italy 1,889 1,962 1,777 1,547 2,092 +10.7 
Oats: 
United States 942 1,045 1,139 1,228 1,203 +27.7 
Canada 1,015 973 1,288 1,083 1,455 +43.3 
France 1,392 1,450 1,208 1,276 1,554 +11.6 
Argentina 1,146 946 812 1,063 1,220 + 6.5 
Barley: 
United States 1,080 1,188 1,274 1,228 1,203 +11.4 
Canada 1,184 1,114 1,243 1,159 1,552 +43.2 
Argentina 1,182 965 1,182 1,211 1,264 + 6.9 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and Agriculture Organization, on the basis of national statistics. 
» Average 1950-53. 
in 1934-38, at least there will no longer be such wide dis-
parities between them. 
It may now be asked whether, with due regard to the 
time required for the newly-sown crops to mature, the 
better prices are likely to bring about an increase in pro-
duction, If the decline was due to a fall in productivity and 
a reduction of the area under cultivation, an affirmative 
reply is logically justifiable and in line with Argentina's 
own experience. It has just been shown that, despite the 
persistent decrease in the total area sown to crops, there 
was a steady rise in the proportion utilized for products 
not subject to price regulations, and that, within the con-
trolled group, the crops least unfavourably placed with 
respect to earnings and prices tended to oust those that 
were worst off. 
But the problem of the land available for producing 
more export crops is not so simple. It was only in part that 
cultivation for home consumption, encouraged as it was 
by the expansion of demand and the higher prices fetched, 
was responsible for the displacement of products grown 
for the foreign market. There was competition from indus-
trial crops as well, and in every case considerations of 
comparative costs had to be taken into account. At the 
same time, the shifts of emphasis from one crop to another 
took place within a total cultivated area that was constantly 
diminishing. This was largely because livestock production 
also competed for the available land; stockbreeding be-
came more wide-spread, and larger tracts were needed for 
this activity.^ Lastly, it should be noted that a certain 
amount of land was left to lie fallow. 
^ For a study of livestock questions, see the article in this issue 
entitled "The Latin American Meat Problem", p. 58. 
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: INDICES OF FARMERS' GROSS INCOME PER HECTARE, 1934-38 AND 1945-54 
fAt 1950 pnces) 
Year Wheat Oats Barley Rye Maize Linseed Sunflower 
1934-38 116.3 147.8 155.6 131.9 301.5 159.9 183.6 
194 5 87.2 189.5 243.2 173.2 258.0 93.1 181.1 
194 6 112.0 286.0 326.6 300.4 343.4 213.5 181.0 
194 7 109.1 142.3 182.8 157.8 303.9 148.3 118.6 
194 8 156.9 184.9 159.6 178.2 304.7 130.7 143.5 
194 9 114.4 138.1 127.6 109.3 213.0 75.3 119.5 
195 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
195 1 92.9 113.0 132.9 112.2 208.9 87.3 98.4 
1952 . . . . . . 60.8 103.1 103.7 89.9 239.7 91.0 78.4 
195 3 142.3 178.9 197.0 221.5 269.2 92.2 77.5 













Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of ofBcial statistics, table I, and Producto e ingreso de la República Argentina 
en el periodo 1953-54, op. cit., table 31. 
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Thus, the expansion of agricultural production, espe-
cially for export, must be considered from several points 
of view. 
The most important of these, in a programme of agri-
cultural recovery, would seem to be that of productivity. 
The low standards to which farming technique had sunk 
give grounds for the hope that a higher degree of mechan-
ization, the use of such aids as fertilizers, weed-killers, 
insecticides and improved strains, and the adoption of 
more rational methods, may enable current yields to be 
greatly exceeded. 
If it is further assumed that land is to some extent lying 
idle, and that such areas are those least fitted, or too ex-
hausted, for the defective and anti-economic exploitation 
to which they were formerly subjected, the raising of 
yields by the employment of more advanced techniques 
seems an indispensable measure for the prevention of the 
excessive rise in costs which would otherwise result from 
the reincorporation of marginal land. This is especially 
true in view of the need for Argentina's agricu ture to 
strengthen its ability to compete with other producer coun-
tries. It is almost superfluous to point out that the effort 
to introduce technical improvements must definitely be 
extended to livestock production, so that the claims of 
stock-breeding on the land available may not redound too 
greatly to the detriment of crop cultivation. Progress made 
in this sphere will mean that the former activity requires 
less space and will be able to make restitution of tracts 
which it formerly took over from agriculture. 
Other problems must be considered in checking the 
reliability of the assumption that the policy undertaken 
will be successful. 
The channelling into investment of the additional in-
come accruing from the price reform is not likely to be a 
spontaneous development. The desire to return to levels of 
consumption prevailing in more prosperous times might 
divert resources towards non-productive uses. Furthermore, 
the financial situation of agricultural enterprises is far 
from flourishing. The agricultural portfolio of the Banco 
de la Nación, which is the main source for this type of 
credit, records long delays in the payment of debts. In 
April 1955, when the loans registered in this section 
totalled 6,500 million pesos, only 48 per cent of those due 
for repayment was recovered, and, by 1954, 43 per cent 
could be regarded as bad debts or in arrears. 
The whole question is closely bound up with that of 
credit policy, and of the measures already taken by the 
Government to increase investment—such as, for instance, 
the retention of part of the fixed price—or, like those 
relating to taxation, announced for the near future. There 
is also the problem of foreign exchange availabilities for 
importing agricultural capital goods. 
Another serious difBculty is that of transporting crops 
to the ports of embarkation. Government purchases of 
cereals which it had not been possible to remove from 
inland rural districts to the ports were estimated, in mid-
1955, at 2.1 million tons. 
Lastly, a potential expansion of agricultural production 
raises the problem of its sale abroad. 
Reference is made in this connexion, not to the current 
agricultural season (1955/56) which is already far ad-
vanced, and the results of which will be largely unaffected 
by the Government's recent measures, but to the future 
expansion which these may bring about. It is well known 
that some of Argentina's products have to face market 
difficulties in consequence of the accumulation of stocks 
in the United States and Canada and the increment in 
European production, this being especially true of wheat. 
Hitherto, an outlet for such commodities has been supplied 
by bilateral agreements, and any reform aimed at the 
restoration of a multilateral regime will have to provide 
for the maintenance of certain specific sale-purchase con-
tracts or for some other system of ensuring a market for 
products which are difficult to place. 
For some items, however, prospects are very favourable. 
The maize situation, for instance, displays particular fea-
tures which seem to promise a return to Argentina's former 
export levels, despite the upward trend in the world output. 
The low production costs of linseed might perhaps enable 
it to recover the United States market, or at all events to 
gain others. Some of the Latin American countries are 
potential purchasers of certain products such as sunflower 
seed. As a general rule, market conditions are good and 
prices comparatively steady for meat and livestock, and 
the same can be said of dairy produce—cheese, whey and 
butter—a field in which Argentina enjoys, in some cases, 
an advantage over its competitors from the standpoint of 
quality, and, in others, seasonal opportunities. Lastly, the 
reformed exchange rate will place many other products 
in a position to compete on world markets, always provided 
that the response of agricultural entrepreneuTS to the in-
centives supplied takes the form of additional investment 
and higher standards of technique which will reduce costs 
and raise yields. 
4 . PROSPECTS FOR INDUSTRY 
A rapid recovery in industry is another of the aims 
pursued through agricultural recuperation and the im-
provement of the balance-of-payments situation. 
The exchange measures adopted in October 1955 do not 
offer a direct stimulus to industry, except in the shape of 
access to the official market for imports of replacements. 
Indirectly, however, the new exchange rates constitute an 
additional form of protection for industry against compe-
tition from imported products, which may further the 
substitution process and open up better prospects for the 
export of domestically-produced goods. 
As has already been stated, the immediate outlook for 
the balance of payments is not particularly promising; 
during the next few months the Government proposes to 
restrict purchases through the official market to essential 
products, on a better basis of selection, but at levels strictly 
compatible with the maintenance of economic activity. It 
is impossible to forecast the capacity of the newly-insti-
tuted free market, or the feasibility of importing the goods 
required for industry through this medium. Short-term 
industrial recovery should therefore be envisaged on the 
assumption that some time must elapse before the balance-
of-payments situation permits of any considerable increase 
in capital goods imports, but that it will not preclude the 
purchase of the raw materials and fuels essential for the 
full utilization of currently available capacity. 
In face of these limitations, a short-term increment in 
industrial production, on the supply side, would in theory 
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presuppose the existence of (a) idle or under-utilized 
capacity, and (b) available man-power. 
How far these prerequisites are present may be judged 
with the help of the statistical data given earlier in this 
article. 
As regards the former—the existence of under-utilized 
capacity—a first impression may be based on the figures 
for investment in industry. (See again table 6.) During the 
last five years there has been a satisfactory increase in 
this sector's capital stock; at the same time, however, the 
product-capital ratio has steadily declined, and, except in 
1954, the product per active worker has remained prac-
tically stationary. It is true that in these statistics the build-
ing industry is included, but an examination of the com-
position of capital goods imports (see again table 5) 
shows that those for industry were maintained at a rela-
tively high level, at least during 1950-52. It should also 
be remembered that very heavy imports of this type were 
eifected between 1947 and 1949. If it is further borne in 
mind that the active population employed in industry has 
gradually decreased since 1951 (see table 11), it is not 
too hazardous to assume a downward trend in the efficiency 
with which the country's productive resources are utilized. 
There is an insufficiency of statistical data on which to 
assess the existence and extent of unemployment in Argen-
tina ; but shifts of the active population from one occupa-
tion to another provide useful grounds for conjecture. 
Employment in industry has been diminishing in both 
absolute and relative terms, since the period of rapid ex-
pansion which it underwent between 1947 and 1950, when 
agricultural employment declined; whereas an absolute 
increase in the number of farm workers, largely due to 
the vegetative growth of the rural population, has enabled 
the agricultural labour force to preserve its relative posi-
tion in the last few years. On the other hand, both absolute 
and relative increments are registered in the services sector, 
which means that it has been absorbing the workers freed 
by industry. Here, then, is confirmation of the previous 
statement that Argentina is witnessing a retrogressive trans-
fer of its active population from the more productive 
branches of employment to those where productivity is 
lower. 
When, in addition, the rise in investment in the services 
sector and the fall in the product-capital ratio are recalled. 
no further proof is needed that the country's resources 
were not used to the best advantage in recent years. 
Consequently, if data to determine the existence of un-
employment are lacking, there are indications of under-
employment, which appear the more deserving of con-
sideration, inasmuch as in services the productivity per 
worker has declined more sharply than in other activities. 
It would seem justifiable to draw the provisional conclu-
sion that a recrudescence of industrial production can be 
achieved through fuller utilization of the country's produc-
tive resources, and the absorption of the labour force 
under-employed in services. It may safely be asserted that 
the former development alone would suffice to ensure suc-
cess. But whether or not it takes place depends upon the 
behavior of other factors and the validity of certain as-
sumptions. 
Among these latter is the supposition that Argentina's 
foreign exchange availabilities will be enough to keep its 
industry adequately supplied with raw materials. It is a 
well-known fact that such imports, after reaching their 
peak in 1951, underwent a sharp decline. (See again table 
5.) In 1954, however, they again approached their 1950 
level, and the fact that their volume was also considerable 
in 1955 implies in some cases an accumulation of stocks. 
A reasonable hypothesis, based on official declarations, 
would be that in 1956 industry would have at its disposal 
raw material supplies equivalent to those of 1954. It would 
then be able to maintain activities at a satisfactory level, 
as the 1950 production index was equalled in the latter 
year. 
As for fuels, they have been absorbing an increasingly 
larger share of available foreign exchange, and are among 
the essential imports unaffected by the Government's pro-
gramme of restrictions designed to stabilize the balance 
of payments. 
If in these aspects of the economy no very great difficul-
ties present themselves, the same cannot be said of energy 
and transport. Attention has already been called to the 
disinvestment in Argentina's transport system and the 
problems to which it gives rise for the agricultural sector, 
which are, mutatis mutandis, much the same as those it 
creates for industry. It was also pointed out that owing to 
the shortage of electric energy, restrictions have inevitably 
been imposed on industrial activity. It is here that any 
Table 11 




{including mining) Services Agriculture • Industry Services 
(Thousands) {Percentage of total) 
1945 : 6,028 2,092 1,284 2,652 34.7 21.3 44.0 
1946 6,146 1,948 1,494 2,704 31.7 24.3 44.0 
1947 6,267 1,786 1,786 2,695 28.5 28.5 43.0 
1948 6,424 1,767 1,831 2,826 27.5 28.5 44.0 
1949 6,624 1,769 1,874 2,981 26.7 28.3 45.0 
1950 6,818 1,746 1,868 3,204 25.6 27.4 47.0 
1951 7,021 1,713 1,903 3,405 24.4 27.1 48.5 
1952 7,213 1,803 1,811 3,599 25.0 25.1 49.9 
1953 7,382 1,846 1,727 3,809 25.0 23.4 51.6 
1954 7,600 1,900 1,748 3,952 25.0 23.0 52.0 
Sources: IV Censo General de la Nación, 1947; Síntesis Estadística Mensual; Emilio Llorens and Carlos Correa Avila, Demografía argentina 
(Buenos Aires, Universidad Nacional, 1948); Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1953. 
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short-term increase of existing capacity seems far from 
easy. The entry into production of the San Nicolás plant 
has been delayed, since many months' work is still required 
before interconnexion with the Greater Buenos Aires grid 
will be completed. Even then, only part of the deficit will 
be covered. Nothing short of heavy investment—higher 
than the capacity to import can be expected to finance in 
the near future—will enable further expansion to be 
achieved. 
But the unknown quantity hardest to assess is demand. 
The depressive factors responsible in 1952 for a marked 
decrease in national income and the accompanying contrac-
tion of demand, did not fail to affect industrial produc-
tion, for which in the following year the lowest figures 
in the five-year period were recorded. The subsequent 
recovery, largely brought about by good harvests, restored 
the industrial output index for 1954 to its 1950 level, and 
such data as are available for the first half of 1955 indi-
cate that the upward movement continued, though at a 
somewhat slower rate. It should also be recalled that in 
the early months of 1954 a wide-spread rise in wages had 
a tonic effect on economic activities, which had previously 
suffered from the depressive influence of deflation. 
Hence it may be inferred, in the first place, that insist-
ence on the role of agriculture as the basis of the capacity 
to import, and especially of the power to purchase capital 
goods and raw materials for industry, is fully justified. 
(See again table 5.) Secondly, it is clear that industrial 
supply has a high demand-elasticity; and, finally, that the 
stagnation of industry over the last five years was due to 
the combined action of lower investment and of the reduc-
tion in raw material availabilities caused by the foreign 
exchange shortage, as well as to the falling-off in demand. 
These factors arose in their turn from the decline in agri-
culture, brought about by weather conditions or low prices. 
The recent recovery has coincided with good harvests, 
which partly offset the unsatisfactory price levels still 
prevailing on world markets. Thus the dynamic force 
which agriculture represents for Argentina is once more 
thrown into relief, as is also the incidence of the balance-
of-payments situation on economic activity. 
Thus, the recuperation of agricultural income would 
seem destined to improve the short-term prospects of in-
dustrial recovery. But the tension in the balance-of-pay-
ments situation has obviously reached a moment of crisis, 
and will not be influenced as readily as usual by the agri-
cultural sector; firstly, because, as has already been 
pointed out, the expansion of production and of the ex-
port trade will not take place at once, and secondly be-
cause the requirements of the basic sectors—energy and 
transport—in capital goods and fuel imports have become 
more pressing, and wiU absorb both the foreign exchange 
savings achieved in other branches, and the increments 
obtained. 
For the rather more distant future the outlook varies. The 
assumption that industry will increase its output was based 
on another hypothesis: namely, that despite the high in-
dices for 1954 and 1955, there will still be idle capacity. 
But later the need to replace industrial equipment will 
arise, and the limitations imposed by the energy deficit 
and the shortcomings of the transport system will be 
greater still. It is these considerations that the Govern-
ment has to bear in mind in planning its longer-term eco-
nomic programme. 
Nevertheless, to return to short-term possibilities, it is by 
no means certain that the rise in demand from the agri-
cultural sector will suffice in itself alone as a stimulus to 
industry, if what is achieved for the moment is only a re-
distribution, and not an over-all increase, of income. This 
leads back to the subject of inflation—one of the risks in-
volved in the devaluation of the currency authorized 
through the new rates of exchange. 
5 . INFLATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The first effect, foreseen by the authorities themselves, 
is a rise in prices of imports which spreads to other goods. 
Some comment may usefully be made in passing on the 
influence exerted on internal price levels in recent times by 
the over-valuation of the currency. This was very small 
indeed, as imports generally reached the consumer by 
way of a chain of intermediaries in whose hands remained 
the profits accruing from over-valuation. Where exports 
were concerned, buyers' prices for crops were much higher 
than quotations at the official exchange rate, and the pur-
chasing institution's losses were financed with bank credit. 
That is, inflationary pressure resulted almost exclusively 
from the action of internal factors, which prevented the 
fall in prices that over-valuation might otherwise have 
brought about. The other domestic elements in Argentina's 
inflationary process are well known. They included credit 
expansion, higher salaries and wages, inflationary financ-
ing of mortgages, and increased public expenditure. These 
conditions were continually creating monetary income 
which went to satisfy consumption rather than investment 
needs. There is a very significant disparity between the fig-
ures for the increment in the national gross income in cur-
rent values, and those for real income at constant prices. 
Apparently, therefore, the repercussion of the higher 
exchange rates on domestic prices will be limited, or at all 
events much less than the magnitude of the adjustment 
would suggest. According to official estimates, the cost of 
living will not rise more than 10 per cent. 
Neither will the inflationary process be the same as 
before. Hitherto the creation of monetary income in the 
ways already described exerted pressure on costs and de-
mand, and raised prices; whereas now the initial price 
increases will be consequent upon the new exchange rates, 
and the higher monetary income will serve to maintain 
demand, or to expand that originating from agriculture. 
If additional income were created in excess of that re-
quired by the initial rise in prices, there would be an in-
crease in total monetary expenditure which might bring 
pressure to bear on prices and accelerate their upward 
trend. Nevertheless, so long as unemployment and idle or 
under-utilized capacity existed, the increment in income 
would remedy these defects rather than force up prices, 
and would ultimately be reflected in an expansion of 
production. 
This favourable result, in theory the most likely, is in 
practice dependent upon an increase in productivity. If a 
larger output could be obtained only by the use of less 
efficient capacity and man-power, a further rise in prices 
would be inevitable, under the twofold influence of higher 
costs and a more plentiful money supply. But this does 
not seem to be the case in Argentina. 
Inflation, which had come to a halt in 1953, gained fresh 
impetus from the 1954 rise in wages. The new exchange 
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measures were adopted while this upward trend was still 
continuing. If real wages go on decreasing in consequence 
of price increases, which in many cases have already de-
stroyed the advantages gained in 1954, pressure for fresh 
readjustments will soon make itself felt, and what was at 
first a mere redistribution in favour of agriculture will end 
up as an over-all expansion of monetary income. Thus 
the hypothesis formulated above seems a very probable 
one. 
But there are also decidedly hopeful prospects of a rise 
in productivity, which would suffice not only to meet the 
greater monetary demand and offset its inflationary con-
sequences, but also to bring about an increase in real 
wages. This might even be compatible with a functional 
distribution of income which would reduce the share of 
labour. Herein perhaps lies the most important aspect 
of Argentina's economic future, with respect both to the 
risks of more serious inflation and to the success of the 
measures which have been or may be adopted to rescue 
the country from its present difficulties. Some further 
explanation is consequently called for. 
In 1949 the remuneration of workers absorbed 59.4 per 
cent of the country's total net income, as against only 46.7 
per cent in 1945. Since then it has fluctuated around the 
same figure. It was also in 1949 that remuneration per 
worker reached its peak level, but in subsequent years it 
followed a gradual downward course which was not inter-
rupted until 1954. (See table 12.) 
This implies that although labour retained a high pro-
portion of total income, individual wages declined along 
with income and the product-capital ratio. 
If a general rise in wages were to occur in the next 
few months, coupled with the increment in the income 
of the agricultural sector, and if there were not at the 
same time an increase in the national product, the infla-
tionary process would inevitably become more acute, and 
the various problems besetting Argentina, far from finding 
a solution, would become graver still. Further, even were 
labour to maintain its share in income, real wages per 
worker could improve only at the expense of other sectors. 
It has already been shown that the weak point in Argen-
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND REAL 
INCOME PER WORKER, 1945-54 
(Millions of pesos at 1950 prices) 
Salaries and wages 
Total net As a percentage of Wages per 
Year income Total total net income worker 
1945 43,813 20,461 46.7 4,816 
194 6 48,990 22,927 46.8 4,389 
1947 57,433 27,510 47.9 5,164 
194 8 60,048 31,465 52.4 5,763 
194 9 56,716 33,689 59.4 5,984 
195 0 55,673 33,905 60.9 5,851 
195 1 57,411 32,552 56.7 5,454 
195 2 53,078 32,378 61.0 5,281 
195 3 55,690 32,300 58.0 5,147 
195 4 59,076 35,209 59.6 5,450 
Source: Table 1, Producto e ingreso de la República Argentina en 
el período 1953-54, tables 5, 7 and 31 and the sources of table 11. 
tina's economy is the decline in producitvity, due to the 
under-utilization or unsuitable channelling of resources. 
Attention was also called to the obstacles in the way of a 
substantial short-term increase in such resources, mainly 
created by the balance-of-payments situation and the 
priority that will have to be given to improving energy 
supplies and transport. Thus, the most accessible road to 
a significant rise in income seems to be by way of higher 
productivity. If 1957 were to witness a recovery of the 
product-capital ratio obtained in 1948—which was not the 
peak figure, as that of 1947 exceeded it—the progress made 
could be considered more than satisfactory. It is this that 
table 13 attempts to demonstrate. 
The estimates envisage normal demographic growth and 
are based on a number of reasonable assumptions: namely, 
that the active population will represent about the same 
proportion of total population as in 1954; that the stock 
of capital will increase in accordance with a net invest-
ment rate rather lower than those recorded in 1954 and 
1955; and that, finally, the labour sector's share in in-
come will be 52.4 per cent, as in 1948—that is, a good deal 
lower than in any of the years that followed. 
Table 13 
ARGENTINA: PRODUCTIVITY AND REAL WAGES PER WORKER IN 1957 ON THE BASIS OF A HYPOTHETICAL 
IMPROVEMENT IN THE UTILIZATION OF MAN-POWER AND CAPITAL RESOURCES 
Present Hypothetical 
Í9fl8 i95!¡ Í957 
Unit (Pesos at 1950 prices) 
Population 16,100 18,562 19,800 
Active population 6,424 7,600 7,920 
Gross product 62,353 66,091 90,285 
Capital stock 134,772 184,003 195,000 
Capital stock per actively employed person 20,979 24,211 24,621 
Gross product per unit of capital (Pesos) 0,463 0,359 0,463 
Gross product per actively employed person (Pesos) 9,706 8,696 11,400 
Gross product per person (Pesos) 3,873 3,561 4,560 
Total net income 60,048 59,076 81,257 
Total wages 31,465 35,209 42,579 
Wages as percentage of net income 52.4 59.6 52.4 
Wages per worker 5.763 5.450 6.325 
Source: Tables 1, 2, 11 and 12. 
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Under these hypotheses, a product of 0.463 pesos per 
unit of capital—which was the figure reached in 1948— 
would imply (see again table 13) an increment of more 
than 35 per cent in net national income and an improve-
ment of 16 per cent in real wages per worker. 
The fundamental argument to be deduced from these 
postulates is simply an indication of the possibilities in-
herent in a policy mainly aimed at raising the productivity 
of capital and labour. Whether or not they are frustrated 
will depend upon a number of other conditions which have 
also been enumerated in this article. Undoubtedly the 
most important unknown quantities are to be found in 
the evolution of the balance of payments; in the degree 
to which this evolution permits an expansion of energy 
production, a reform of the transport system, and the 
purchase of the fuels and raw materials required for the 
attainment of a higher level of activity; in the avail-
ability or non-availability of foreign loans and invest-
ment; and in the other fiscal, credit and monetary meas-
ures adopted by the Government. In other words, a whole 
body of factors will come into play whose nature forbids 
any prophecy as to the course of inflation and of Argen-
tina's economic development in the near future. 
APPENDIX 
Attention is drawn to the fact that the analysis presented 
here is mainly based upon a new and important compila-
tion of economic statistics published by the Government 
of Argentina: Producto e Ingreso de la República Argen-
tina en el periodo 1935-54 (Buenos Aires, 1955). This con-
stitutes the first official report on national income available 
since that published in 1946 by the Banco Central de la 
República Argentina. The new survey represents a con-
siderable advance upon former research in comprehen-
siveness and depth, since it fills up a gap in Latin American 
economic statistics and supplies data on the gross product 
by economic activities, on the national income by distribu-
tive shares and on the distribution of expenditure between 
consumption and investment. Information on expenditure 
and the gross product by sectors is presented both in cur-
rent prices for each year covered by the survey and in 
1950 constant prices. The method of calculation adopted 
was based on the value added for each activity sector and, 
at the same time, on the difference between the gross 
value of production and the cost of goods and services 
provided by other sectors. A vital aspect of the work of 
estimating national income was constituted by the prep-
aration of an analysis of inter-industrial relationships, 
which not only facilitates the computation of the value 
added by activity sectors, but also renders possible an 
integrated analysis of production (by activity), foreign 
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trade, movement of goods and services, and final expendi-
ture on consumption, investment and exports. 
It is interesting to note the implications of this new 
report with respect to the analyses of Argentina's eco-
nomic development made by ECLA in recent years. In this 
connexion it should be noted that for want of official data, 
previous ECLA studies of this country's economic trends 
have been partly based on extra-official estimates. A stand-
ard of comparison now exists, for instance, by which to 
appraise the presentation of three important aspects-
gross product, gross income and gross investment at 1950 
constant prices—in the Economic Survey of Latin America 
for 1951-52, 1953 and 1954. Such a comparison, as shown 
in the accompanying chart, clearly demonstrates that the 
analyses of these aspects made in the Commission's earlier 
publications are fully confirmed by the new official data. 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ACCELERATION OF THE INFLATIONARY 
PROCESS IN CHILE 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the sharp ac-
celeration of the inflationary process, which began in the 
second half of 1953, from the standpoint of the influence 
of foreign trade and fiscal policy.^ The abrupt price de-
cline on the international metals markets which took place 
early in 1953 adversely affected Chile's most important 
export commodity. The contraction in copper exports had 
' For an analysis of long-term factors which have stimulated the 
inflationary process in Chile, see Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1954 (E/CN.12/362/Rev.l ; United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
1955.II.G.1), chapter I, entitled "The growth of income, investment 
and inflationary expansion", section III. "Inflation and anti-inflation-
ary policy. A. The example oí Chile", pp. 22-38. 
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serious repercussions on public finances, since a consider-
able proportion of government income is obtained from 
taxes levied on the large copper companies. Moreover, 
this revenue covers the financing of import subsidies, 
which, in 1952, represented a relatively high proportion 
of total government "expenditures" in real terms. The Gov-
ernment was therefore obliged to resort to heavy devalua-
tion of the currency as a means of lessening these sub-
sidies and thus reducing the budget deficit. The immediate 
eifect of devaluation was a significant rise in prices, which 
was later accentuated with the granting of compensatory 
adjustments in wages and salaries, and the maintenance 
of a liberal credit policy. In addition to the inflationary 
pressures brought about by the adoption of these measures, 
an increase in domestic taxation also contributed to the 
price rise, since it took the form of heavier indirect taxes 
and was financed through the expansion of the money 
supply. Along with the considerable growth of effective 
demand—a concomitant of the situation just described-
there was a restriction of the total supply of goods and 
services, owing to the critical foreign trade position. 
Although conditions improved in 1954, the crisis in 
the government budget and in the system of exchange-rate 
subsidies persisted, its prolongation being influenced by 
the granting of higher "returned-value" exchange rates^ 
to the large copper companies, with a consequent drop in 
public revenues and a further reduction of import sub-
sidies. Moreover, the inability of taxes to keep pace with 
an accelerated inflation, because of the rigidity of the tax 
system, resulted in a loss of revenue. Again, the exchange 
situation further deteriorated when the growing foreign 
exchange requirements of the Government reduced avail-
abilities for the granting of subsidies, through preferential 
exchange rates, to the private sector. Thus it was that the 
1953 crisis in the basic export commodity, far from pro-
ducing deflationary effects through depressing the level 
of income, caused a series of measures to be adopted which 
more than doubled the rate of inflation prevailing in 
former years. 
An analytical approach to the study of this phenomenon 
requires the prior examination of certain structural and 
institutional conditions which determine the relationship 
of the large copper-mining companies to the rest of the 
^ For an explanation of this concept, see section 3 on treatment 
of copper export proceeds, below. 
national economy. Firstly, it would be well to measure 
the enormous discrepancy between the productivity of 
these enterprises and that of other economic activities, 
before an analysis is made of the mechanisms whereby the 
country absorbs part of the difference in productivity 
through taxation and the system of exchange subsidies. It 
is also necessary to assess in quantitative terms the relative 
importance of copper production and exports within the 
Chilean economy. 
2 . PRODUCTIVITY OF T H E LARGE COPPER COMPANIES 
In table 1, the productivity of the large copper com-
panies is contrasted with the productivity of the economy 
as a whole and that of industry and agriculture. 
During the period covered, average productivity in the 
export sector was eleven times greater than that of the 
economy as a whole, about thirteen times that of industry 
and almost twenty times that of agriculture. In these great 
disparities lies the fundamental reason why copper plays 
such an important role in the Chilean economy. Its ex-
tremely high productivity and relatively favourable com-
petitive position in the world markets enable copper min-
ing to bear a heavy tax burden, by which the country 
retains a considerable proportion of the proceeds from 
copper sales. In other words, copper makes a substantial 
contribution to the financing of the budget and external 
payments. 
3 . T A X A T I O N , EXCHANGE-RATE SUBSIDIES AND TREATMENT 
OF COPPER EXPORT PROCEEDS 
Taxation, as it stood in the early months of 1955, can 
be classified as follows:^ 
(a) Income tax: in recent years this consisted almost 
exclusively of a 50-per-cent tax applied to the difference 
between the sales price in New York and cost of copper 
delivered to that market;^ 
(b) Customs duties; 
(c) Special tax on sales or surtax: established in May 
® For a detailed account of the legislation applicable to the large 
copper companies, see Banco Central de Chile, Balanza de Pagos de 
Chile, 1951, 1952 and 1953. Act 11828 of May 1955 greatly modified 
the system of taxing these enterprises. A description of the terms 
of the Act is to be found in the Appendix to this article. 
* In 1952 this rate had been raised to 60 per cent. 
Table 1 
CHILE: GROSS PRODUCT, ACTIVE POPULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY OF COPPER MINING, INDUSTRY, 
AGRICULTURE AND THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE 
(Pesos at 1950 prices) 
Economy as a whole Copper mining Industry Agriculture 
Gross Active Produc- Gross Active Produc- Gross Active Produc- Gross Active Produc-
product population tivity product population tivity product (Thnucnntle • population tivity product {Thousands 
population tivity 
Year of millions) {Thousands) of milUons) (Thousands) of millions} (Thousands) of millions) {Thousands) 
1950 149.4 2,178.7 68.6 11.2 14.5 770.6 26.3 438.2 60.0 25.1 629.5 39.9 
1951 155.4 2,232.8 69.6 11.8 14.2 826.1 27.2 455.6 59.8 25.1 630.3 39.9 
1952 161.8 2,288.7 70.7 12.5 14.6 853.2 30.0 473.6 63.3 25.4 631.3 40.2 
1953 156.1 2,341.5 66.7 11.2 16.2 691.7 32.8 500.0 65.5 27.2 632.0 43.1 
1954 160.7 2,383.6 67.4 12.0 14.4 837.0 33.6 27.0 
Sources and methods: Economic Commission for Latin America. See Economic Survey of Latin America, 1951-52, p. 33, and Economic Survey 
^ Latin America, 1954, p. 24, table 11. The figures for copper mining were based on data from the Servicio Nacional de Estadística, Anuario de 
Minería; Banco Central de Chile, Balanza de Fagos de Chile; Ministerio de Minería; and Departamento de Estudios Financieros del Ministerio 
de Hacienda. The estimates are preliminary and subject to revision and amendment. 
46 
1952, when the Banco Central de Chile assumed control 
of sales 
(d) Implicit "tax" on production costs: represents the 
amount of over-valuation of the exchange rate at which 
the copper companies purchased pesos to cover expenses 
paid in Chilean currency." This is the difference between 
the so-called "returned-value" rate and the rate at which 
the Government sells the dollars obtained through the 
sale of pesos to the companies. 
In order to estimate the Government's real income, de-
rived from all the above taxes, on the one hand, and the 
amount of the subsidies granted to the various imports, on 
the other, it is necessary to convert the dollars obtained 
to national currency at a rate that will account for the over-
valuation of the peso, which has been very large indeed 
in recent years. For the purpose of this analysis, the method 
is the same as that used by ECLA for computing the gross 
product at constant values: that is, the conversion is made 
at a purchasing power parity peso-dollar rate based on a 
pre-war equilibrium rate adjusted for subsequent price 
movements.^ The parity rate can be applied to the full 
amount of dollars obtained from income tax, the special 
sales or surtax, and customs duties. However, a complica-
tion arises in estimating the public sector's income from 
the implicit "tax", since for each dollar required to cover 
local expenditures of copper production the Government 
must disburse a peso amount equivalent to the "returned-
value" exchange rate. As a result, the public sector's real 
income from this source amounts only to the difference 
between the "returned-value" rate and the parity rate. The 
Government's real income from all these taxes is made up 
of two parts: firstly, the proceeds that actually flowed into 
the budget as a consequence of the sale of the dollars ob-
tained from the large mining sector; and, secondly, the 
difference between the selling rate and the purchasing 
power parity rate, which represents the adjustment of the 
Government's real income. Fundamental importance at-
° The price received over and above 24.5 cents per pound on all 
sales was retained by the Government. 
° This rate of exchange, known as the "returned-value" rate, was 
maintained at 19.37 pesos to the dollar between 1935 and 1951. As 
from the latter year, it was applied to only part of the "returned 
value". Exchange rates of 50 pesos to the dollar in 1952, 60 pesos in 
the following year and 110 pesos in 1954 were applied to the remain-
ing part, which yearly represented a greater proportion of the total. 
Thus, average "returned-value" exchange rates were as follows: 




' For fuller explanation, see Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1951-52, general note on concepts, sources and methods, p. 33. 
taches to the selling rate, since therein lies the explanation 
of the direct relationship existing between the government 
income obtained from the large mining companies and the 
system of exchange-rate subsidies. The Government grants 
these subsidies through the sale of these dollars (obtained 
from the copper companies) at highly over-valued rates of 
exchange. The difference between the parity and selling 
rates of exchange therefore determines the magnitude of 
the subsidies. In order to ensure consistency of method-
ology, it is necessary to treat as government expenditure 
this exchange differential between the selling and the parity 
rates, which has, as indicated above, already been con-
sidered as government receipts.® 
It should also be pointed out that all the large mining 
companies—copper, nitrate and iron—are accorded special 
treatment with regard to the return to Chile of part of the 
value of their export sales. Normally, exporters are obliged 
to return the entire proceeds of their sales, whereupon the 
Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior authorizes all re-
mittances abroad and any imports that are approved. The 
large mining companies, on the other hand, are required 
to return only the foreign exchange needed to cover pro-
duction costs in local currency. Thus, these enterprises, 
unlike the other sectors of Chilean economic activity, do 
not depend on the balance-of-payments situation for their 
purchases of capital goods and other imports, nor are they 
prevented from remitting abroad their profits and interest, 
etc. 
4 . T H E IMPORTANCE OF T H E LARGE COPPER COMPANIES IN 
T H E C H I L E A N ECONOMY 
Some idea of the importance of copper can be obtained 
by comparing its gross income with that of the economy as 
a whole. The proportion represented by the former rose 
to an average of almost 8 per cent between 1950 and 1954. 
(See table 2.) On the other hand, the gross product of the 
copper sector forms 7.5 per cent of the total gross product. 
Since large-scale copper-mining is in the hands of only 
three foreign enterprises employing less than 1 per cent of 
the active population, these percentages become all the 
more significant. 
® Foreign exchange for import subsidies is obtained not only from 
the copper companies, but also from other large mining enterprises, 
including nitrate and iron. However, estimates of exchange differen-
tials exclude the insignificant contribution of the large iron-mining 
companies. Nitrate, which had previously accounted for 21-26 per 
cent of the total, began to lose importance after 1950. As from 1951, 
the "returned-value" exchange rate of the nitrate sector rose rapidly. 
As a result, in 1953 and 1954, about 90 per cent of the import sub-
sidy was financed by copper exchange-differentials. It is clear, then, 
that copper mining determines the exchange-subsidy policy. 
Table 2 
CHILE: INCOME AND GROSS PRODUCT OF COPPER IN COMPARISON WITH TOTAL 
INCOME AND GROSS PRODUCT 
(Thousands of millions of pesos at 1950 prices) 
Gross income Tolal (A> as a Gross product Tolal (C) as a 
Year 






gross product percentage 
of(D) 
1950 11.2 149 .4 7 .5 11.2 149 .4 7 .5 
1951 11.5 157 .9 7 .3 11.8 155 .4 7 .6 
1952 16.5 166 .9 9 .9 12.5 161 .8 7.7 
1953 12.5 161 .5 7 .7 11.2 . 156.1 7 .2 
1954 12.2 165 .0 7 .4 12,0 160 .7 7 .5 
Source: Table 1. 
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From such comparisons it is not, however, possible to 
obtain an exact impression of the way in which the impor-
tance of copper makes itself felt in the national economy. 
The relationship with public financing is the first point 
that needs to be examined. In 1952, taxes levied on the 
large copper companies amounted to a maximum 74.5 per 
cent of their gross value added. (See table 3.) As has al-
ready been pointed out, the high proportion of gross in-
come captured by taxation represents the public sector's 
absorption of part of the great discrepancy between the 
productivity of the copper sector and that of the rest of the 
economy. It is because of the heavy tax burden and the 
relative importance of copper mining within the national 
product that this sector makes such a substantial contribu-
tion to total governmental income. As a matter of fact, 
during 1950-54, between one quarter and one third of all 
fiscal revenue came from this source, the proportion reach-
ing 37.5 per cent in 1952. (See again table 3.) 
Exchange-rate subsidies are closely linked to govern-
ment income from the copper sector, and an assessment of 
their magnitude is still another way of demonstrating the 
Table 10 
CHILE: TAXATION ON COPPER MINING 














(B) 0» a 
percentage 
of(C) 
1 9 5 0 , 57.1 6 .4 24 .6 26 .0 
1951 61 .7 7.1 26 .7 26 .6 
1952 74 .5 12.3 32 .8 37 .5 
1953 72 ,8 9 .1 29 .5 30 .8 
1 9 5 4 65 .6 8 . 0 26 .2 30 .5 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. Col. (A): 
table 8; Col. (B): on the basis of data from the Banco Central de 
Chile, Balanza de Pagos de Chile; Col. (C): table 9. 
importance of this source of revenue. Table 4 shows that 
only in the first two years of the period 1950-54 did ex-
change-rate subsidies represent less than 20 per cent of 
total governmental expenditure, reaching in 1952 the ex-
traordinary figure of 26.4 per cent. 
Table 4 
CHILE: TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
















Exchange Other transfers 
rate to the 




jab ic sector b 
(G) 
1950 2 7 , 2 6 1 . 0 10 ,143 .0 4 , 3 4 2 . 0 12 ,776 .0 6 ,060 .7 3 ,195 .3 3 ,520 .0 
1951 2 8 , 2 8 7 . 6 10 ,373 .8 5 ,137 .7 12 ,777 .1 5 ,351 .9 3 ,303 .4 4 ,121 .8 
1952 3 8 , 6 2 2 . 2 11 ,394 .9 5 ,794 .9 2 1 , 4 3 2 . 4 10 ,205 .2 5 ,995 .9 5 ,231.3 
1953 3 6 , 5 7 7 . 2 13 ,410 .4 5 , 1 4 7 . 0 1 8 , 0 1 9 . 8 7 ,428 .2 4 , 7 6 8 . 0 5 ,823 .6 
1954 31 ,967 .1 12 ,880 .0 5 ,200 .7 13 ,886 .4 5 , 5 9 6 . 6 4 , 1 9 4 . 6 5 ,095.2 
PERCENTAGES 
1 9 5 0 1 0 0 . 0 37 .2 15 .9 4 6 . 9 22 .2 11 .8 12.9 
1951 1 0 0 . 0 36 .7 18.2 45 .1 18 .9 11.7 14.5 
1952 100 .0 2 9 . 5 15 .0 55 .5 26 .4 15.5 13.6 
1953 1 0 0 . 0 36 .7 14.1 49 .2 20 .3 13 .0 15.9 
1 9 5 4 100 .0 40 .3 16.3 4 3 . 4 17.5 13.1 12.8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of data from the Departamento de Estudios Financieros del Ministerio de 
Hacienda. 
Note: Col. (A) = Col. (B) + Col. (C) + Col. (D). 
" Includes subsidies to non-profit-making organizations; return of revenue; other contributions and subsidies. 
Includes social security payments; intergovernmental and international transfers; subsidies to municipalities and to the Caja de 
Amortización. 
That the level of import subsidies is high is evident from 
yet another standpoint. (See table 5.) Between 1950 and 
1953 the subsidy on the import price rose to more than 34 
per cent, as was revealed by a sample of more than 85 per 
cent of all imports.® The same table shows that the subsidy 
on imported consumer goods averaged 40 per cent, and was 
lowest in the case of imported capital goods. 
The high proportion of government expenditure and of 
import prices represented by subsidies is an indirect con-
firmation of the structural distortion of the Chilean econ-
omy which is reflected, as pointed out above, in the striking 
discrepancy between the productivity of the copper sector 
" This does not include the foreign purchases made by the large 
mining companies with their own exchange availabilities. 
and that of the economy as a whole. It can in fact be 
roughly estimated that more than 15 per cent of available 
goods and services, as represented by imports, carries a 
subsidy of more than one-third with respect to the parity 
exchange rate. This shows the important function both of 
taxation on copper mining and of the system of import 
subsidies to ensure that part of this sector's high pro-
ductivity is absorbed by the rest of the economy. 
One last aspect of copper's importance in the economy 
of Chile is the share of the value of exports of this metal 
in the total value of exports and in the capacity to import. 
In the first instance, it can be seen that the role of copper 
is very significant, its average share during 1950-54 being 
42 per cent. The peak figure, reached in 1952, was more 
than 57 per cent. (See table 6.) 
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Table 10 









A . SUBSIDY AS A PERCENTAGE OF IMPORT PRICE » 
195 0 52.1 
195 1 46.9 
195 2 47.3 
195 3 42.1 
195 0 23.1 
195 1 25.0 
195 2 31.9 


































Source: Economic Coinmission for Latin America, on the basis of data from the Servicio Nacional 
de Estadística, Anuarios de Comercio Exterior, and from the Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior. 
» Comprising more than 85 per cent oí total imports, after deduction of imports effected by the 
large copper-mining companies with their own foreign exchange. 
Table 6 
CHILE: COPPER EXPORTS OF THE LARGE MINING 
COMPANIES AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
(Millions of pesos at 1950 prices) 
Year 
Value of copper 
exports 
Value of total 
exports 
Copper exports 
as a percentage 
of total 
exports of goods 
1950 12,920 25,993 49.7 
1951 13,672 29,748 46.0 
1952 19,037 33,248 57.3 
1953 14,542 32,585 44.6 
1954 13,976 31,816 43.9 
Source: Table 7. 
But it is also necessary to compare the total value re-
turned from copper sales (includes local expenditures on 
production and taxes), with Chile's capacity to import, in 
order to assess the proportion of the value of sales re-
mitted abroad. Throughout the whole of the period under 
review, copper's gross share of the capacity to import was 
more than one third, this contribution rising to more than 
40 per cent in 1953 and 1954. (See table 7.) 
5 . T H E A C C E L E R A T I O N OF T H E I N F L A T I O N A R Y PROCESS IN 
1953 
Owing to the sharp contraction of copper exports, a new 
inflationary pressure began to make itself felt in 1953. 
This was the crisis in the system of exchange-rate subsi-
dies, which was probably the most important factor in 
accelerating inflation. 
As has already been explained, the large copper com-
panies return to Chile a substantial part of their dollar 
export earnings, which constitutes their gross contribution 
to the country's capacity to import. If the foreign pur-
chases made by the companies^" with their own exchange 
are deducted from the value returned, the net contribution 
" In recent years, their irnports have fluctuated between one fifth 
and one tenth of the "returned value". 
Table 7 
CHILE: EXPORTS AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT OF COPPER 







































1 9 5 0 3 2 2 , 1 2 1 1 2 , 9 2 0 4 , 0 1 0 8 , 9 1 0 2 4 , 8 8 8 3 5 . 8 1 , 4 2 5 7 , 4 8 5 3 0 . 1 
1951 3 0 8 , 7 6 4 1 3 , 6 7 2 3 , 6 9 4 9 , 9 7 8 2 9 , 8 4 1 3 3 . 4 2 , 2 0 6 7 , 7 7 1 2 6 . 0 
1 9 5 2 3 4 3 , 8 8 4 1 9 , 0 3 7 3 , 0 9 4 1 5 , 9 4 3 3 2 , 7 0 4 4 8 . 7 2 , 0 4 0 1 3 , 9 0 3 4 2 . 5 
1 9 5 3 2 8 2 , 3 3 5 " 1 4 , 5 4 2 2 , 2 8 2 1 2 , 2 6 0 2 9 , 2 2 1 4 2 . 0 1 , 5 8 6 1 0 , 6 7 4 3 6 . 5 
1 9 5 4 3 3 6 , 1 7 4 1 3 , 9 7 6 3 , 3 2 0 1 0 , 6 5 6 1 , 1 1 7 9 , 5 4 1 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of information from the Banco Central de Chile, Balanza de Pagos de Chile; 
for the 1954 statistics, data from the Departamento de Estudios del Banco Central de Chile. 
Note: Col. (D) = Col. (B) - Col. (C) 
Col. (F) = Col. (D) / Col. (E) 
Col. (H) = Col. (D) - Col. (C) 
Col. (I) = Col. (H) / Col. (E) 
• Not including inflow of capital for new investment, as statistics for the whole period are not available. 
Including stocks of exports held abroad which were sold in 1954. In the value of exports, on the other hand, only actual sales are taken 
into account. 
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to the capacity to import is obtained. (See again table 7.) 
This share provides practically all the Government's for-
eign exchange availabilities for the granting of subsidies," 
and mainly consists of taxes levied on the large mining 
companies/^ 
With the drastic reduction of copper exports in 1953, 
net "values returned" decreased by 23 per cent. (See again 
table 7.) The resultant 26-per-cent fall in revenue caused 
a 10-per-cent decline in the Government's total receipts, 
the tax yield from other sources having remained stable. 
(See table 8.) 
As the decrease in total expenditure was much smaller 
than this decline in revenue, by 1953 the over-all budget 
deficit exceeded 7,000 million pesos (at 1950 prices), that 
is, almost 20 per cent of the total expenditure. The reduc-
tion in total expenditure was due to the Government's 
smaller foreign exchange availabilities and was achieved 
through a sharp devaluation of the peso, which drastically 
reduced exchange-rate subsidies. Not only were expenses 
curtailed by this measure, but it was also possible to in-
crease the income from exchange-rate differentials. In fact, 
as devaluation implied a high selling rate, and therefore 
a wider margin between this and the "returned-value" 
exchange-rate, there was an increase in the exchange-rate 
differentials flowing into the budget. Thus devaluation 
prevented the fall in this item of government receipts from 
being more serious than it actually was. 
When account is taken of the events just described and 
of the institutional characteristics of the system of ex-
change-rate subsidies, it can be inferred that devaluation 
possessed great advantages from the standpoint of public 
financing. On the one hand, it reduced expenditure on 
transfers, and, on the other, counterbalanced to some extent 
the decrease in government receipts. 
The reasons why devaluation had an immediate and 
pronounced effect on the general price level are to be 
found in the dependence of domestic prices and costs on 
the external prices of imports, in the magnitude of the 
subsidy on import prices, in the extent of devaluation, and 
in the special compensatory adjustments of salaries and 
wages. The structure of imports—consisting mainly of 
^^  The remainder is obtained from the iron and nitrate companies, 
and, as has already been pointed out, forms a very small proportion 
of the total. 
Other "returned values", which represent less than 10 per cent 
of the total, consist of salaries, wages and purchases in Chilean 
currency. 
foodstuffs, raw materials and basic fuels—is largely re-
sponsible for the heavy dependence of domestic prices of 
these commodities, and also of industrial and transport 
costs, on the external prices of imports. Domestic prices of 
imported goods are governed to a large extent by the 
relevant subsidies since the latter represent a high propor-
tion of import prices. Consumer goods, raw materials and 
fuels are precisely those imports which are the most 
heavily subsidized (see again table 5) , and it is on these 
categories that the burden of the reduction in subsidies 
falls: 11 per cent in the case of consumer goods, 8.2 per 
cent in that of raw materials and 11.4 per cent in that of 
fuels. 
The magnitude of the devaluation also played a part 
in determining the sharp rise in the cost-of-living index 
which immediately followed. The official rate of exchange 
of 31 pesos to the dollar was replaced by a parity of 110 
pesos, but devaluation was in fact less than these figures 
would appear to indicate, owing to the multiplicity of 
exchange rates for the different import categories. Never-
theless, it amounted to more than 70 per cent. Lastly, the 
immediate inflationary effects of devaluation were com-
bined with the simultaneous granting of special compen-
satory adjustments in wages and salaries. 
The direct impact of devaluation on prices was later 
accentuated by an expansionist monetary and fiscal policy. 
The inflationary efl'ects of both a budget deficit and bud-
getary policy are involved here. Although the sharp re-
duction of exchange-rate subsidies caused total govern-
mental expenditure to fall by 5.3 per cent, expenditure 
on investment and especially on current account increased. 
Since the subsidy does not constitute effective payments 
and therefore—unlike investment and current expenditure 
—has no direct income-generating effect, it may be con-
cluded that the over-all policy was likewise expansionist. 
The inflationary impact of the increase in domestic tax-
ation during 1953 is also worthy of examination. Although 
the tax yields of the large copper companies were con-
siderably reduced, revenue from other economic activities 
remained stable. Since gross income contracted slightly, 
the tax burden on the rest of the economy was somewhat 
heavier. (See again table 8.) Because the variations were 
so slight it might be considered that this phenomenon is of 
no importance. However, a glance at other figures (see 
table 9) will reveal interesting facts. Revenue from in-
direct taxation increased by 10.8 per cent, while the pro-
portion of these taxes in total governmental income rose 
from 34.3 per cent in 1952 to 41.1 per cent in 1953. 
Table 8 
CHILE: DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDEN 
(Thousands of millions of pesos at 1950 prices) 
Year 























(A) OS a 
nerceniage 
of(B) 
1950 23.4 149.4 15.7 6.4 11.2 57.1 17.0 138.2 12.3 
1951 25.7 157.9 16.3 7.1 11.5 61.7 18.6 146.4 12.7 
1952 31.6 166,9 18.9 12.3 16.5 74.5 19.3 150.4 12.8 
1953 28.4 161.5 17.6 9.1 12.5 72.8 19.3 149.0 13.0 
1954 . . . 25.4 165.0 15.4 8.0 12.2 65.6 17.4 152.8 11.4 
Source: Tables 2 and 9. 
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T a b l e 9 
C H I L E : G O V E R N M E N T R E V E N U E 







































( / ) 
1 9 5 0 . . . . . . 2 4 , 6 4 4 . 1 1 , 2 6 1 . 6 2 3 , 3 8 2 . 5 9 , 4 5 3 . 7 6 , 0 9 2 . 2 3 , 3 6 1 . 5 8 , 7 2 6 . 3 5 , 5 3 9 . 1 3 , 1 8 7 . 2 5 , 2 0 2 . 5 
1 9 5 1 . . . . . . 2 6 , 7 4 9 . 2 1 , 0 3 3 . 8 2 5 , 7 1 5 . 4 1 0 , 8 3 0 . 9 6 , 5 6 4 . 3 4 , 2 6 6 . 6 1 0 , 6 3 3 . 4 5 , 9 3 4 . 3 4 , 6 9 9 . 1 4 , 2 5 1 . 1 
1 9 5 2 3 2 , 7 8 7 . 6 1 , 1 4 9 . 0 3 1 , 6 3 8 . 6 1 1 , 2 4 8 . 0 6 , 7 9 3 . 3 4 , 4 5 4 . 7 1 4 , 6 4 8 . 0 5 , 7 4 8 . 8 8 , 8 9 9 . 2 5 , 7 4 2 . 6 
1953 . , 2 9 , 4 5 2 . 1 1 , 0 9 1 . 7 2 8 , 3 6 0 . 4 1 2 , 1 1 8 . 4 8 , 4 0 8 . 1 3 , 7 1 0 . 3 1 1 , 8 6 3 . 6 6 , 1 9 4 . 3 5 , 6 6 9 . 3 4 , 3 7 8 . 4 
1 9 5 4 . . . , . . 2 6 , 1 6 8 . 4 8 0 4 . 9 2 5 , 3 6 3 . 5 1 0 , 2 1 3 . 7 7 , 6 7 2 . 2 2 , 5 4 1 . 5 1 0 , 8 3 3 . 8 6 , 0 0 0 . 7 4 , 8 3 3 . 1 4 , 3 1 6 . 0 
P E R C E N T A G E S 
1950 100 .0 5 .1 9 4 . 9 3 8 . 4 2 4 . 7 1 3 . 7 3 5 . 4 2 2 . 5 12 .9 2 1 . 1 
1951 100 .0 3 . 9 9 6 . 1 4 0 . 5 2 4 . 5 1 6 . 0 3 9 . 8 2 2 . 2 1 7 . 6 15 .8 
1 9 5 2 1 0 0 . 0 3 . 5 9 6 . 5 3 4 . 3 2 0 . 7 1 3 . 6 44 .7 1 7 . 5 2 7 . 2 17 .5 
1953 100 .0 3 . 7 96 .3 4 1 . 1 2 8 . 5 12 .6 4 0 . 3 2 1 . 0 19 .3 14 .9 
1 9 5 4 100 .0 3 .1 9 6 . 9 3 9 . 0 2 9 . 3 9 . 7 4 1 . 4 2 2 . 9 18 .5 16 .5 
Source: E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n f o r Lat in A m e r i c a , o n the bas is o f data f r o m the D e p a r t a m e n t o de Es tud ios F i n a n c i e r o s del Min is ter io 
d e Hac ienda . 
Note: Co l . (C) = Co l . ( D ) + Col . (G) + Co l . (J ) ; Co l . (D ) = Co l . (E) + Col . ( F ) ; Co l . (G) = Col . (H) + Co l . ( I ) . 
This extremely regressive tendency of the additional tax 
burden, formed by taxes whose impact falls directly on 
prices, has important inflationary effects, inasmuch as it 
takes place within the framework of an expansionist mone-
tary and fiscal policy and creates pressures on the credit 
system for the financing of at least part of the additional 
taxation. The latter eifcct is of special importance in the 
case of direct taxation on the domestic sector, revenue 
from which also increased by almost 8 per cent in 1953. 
While indirect taxation, owing to its effect on prices, also 
aggravated the pressure exerted by claims for higher 
wages, direct taxes particularly affected the financing ca-
pacity of enterprises, which, in order to fulfil their tax 
commitments, were obliged to have recourse to credit, and 
in an effort to recover their level of profits raised the prices 
of their products. It is not surprising that an increase in 
taxation should have been able to produce an inflationary 
effect, in view of the considerable monetary expansion 
which took place in 1953. Under such conditions, the tax 
burden becomes so much heavier in current values that tax 
commitments cannot be fulfilled without recourse to credit 
and a subsequent raising of prices. 
One last factor of great importance in the price rise 
caused by devaluation is the system whereby the salaries 
of civil servants and private employees are legally adjusted. 
In practice similar adjustments are also granted, although 
less automatically, to other wage-earners.^^ Under these 
circumstances, the redistribution of income aimed at by 
devaluation as a means of restricting imports and encour-
aging exports is nullified over the short term. Increased 
wages offset the loss in real income, and, combined with 
the higher prices for raw materials and fuels, raise costs 
of production of exports. The initial benefit of devalua-
tion is thus dissipated, and pressures are again exerted on 
the balance of payments at a new exchange-rate level. 
" F o r an analysis o f the inf lat ionary e f f ec ts p r o d u c e d b y the vari -
ous sectors ' e f forts to d e f e n d their share o f real i n c o m e , see Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1954, op. cit., p . 34. 
6 . P E R M A N E N T FACTORS OF T H E CRISIS IN T H E SYSTEM OF 
E X C H A N G E - R A T E SUBSIDIES 
The foregoing analysis was exclusively concerned with 
the short-term crisis in exchange-rate subsidies, which was 
one of the most important determinants of the 1953 de-
valuation. It should, however, be mentioned that two fac-
tors tended to exert a more permanent influence. Both are 
related to the contracting capacity of the Government 
to grant subsidies based on the over-valued rate of ex-
change at which it receives its dollars from the large cop-
per companies. Increasing inflation has also raised costs 
in the export sector. As in the case of nitrate at the end 
of the 1940's, better conditions were granted so that the 
copper industry might be able to compete more success-
fully on the world market and expand its capacity. The 
incentive offered took the form of a progressive devalua-
tion of the "returned-value" exchange rate, which rose by 
48 per cent between 1952 and 1953 and by 82 per cent 
during 1953-54. In the same two periods, the parity rate, 
by which the subsidies are calculated, increased by 24 per 
cent and 70 per cent respectively (see table 10), that is, 
to a lesser degree than the "returned-value" rate. Clearly, 
therefore, the margin available for import subsidies has 
been gradually narrowed. 
A similar effect was produced by the tendency of the 
public sector to use a growing proportion of its dollar 
availabilities to meet its own commitments for imports, 
external expenditure and the servicing or amortization of 
foreign debts. In 1953, the Government used up almost 
40 per cent of the foreign exchange obtained from the large 
mining companies in order to meet its dollar require-
ments. Never before had this proportion exceeded 28 per 
cent." (See table 11.) 
" It is impor tant to stress that cap i ta l g o o d s i m p o r t s p u r c h a s e d 
b y the C o r p o r a c i ó n d e F o m e n t o a n d o ther quasi -state b o d i e s , as we l l 
as the serv i c ing o f f o r e i g n debts c o n t r a c t e d by these inst itutions, 
a c c o u n t e d f o r the increase c o n c e r n e d . 
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Table 10 
CHILE: COST-OF-LIVING INDEX AND PURCHASING POWER PARITY EXCHANGE RATE 
Cost-of-living Percentage 
index variations in the Parity 
cost-of-living exchange 
Year (.Í950 = 100) index Year rate« 
1950 100^0 15^2 1950 85.0 
195 1 122.3 22.3 1951 96.6 
195 2 149.4 22.2 1952 115.3 
January/June 1953 161.5 8.1 
July/December 1953 213.0 31.9 
January/December 1953 187.2 25.3 1953 142.9 
January/June 1954 276.1 47.5 
July/December 1954 368.8 33.6 
January/December 1954 322.5 72.3 1954 243.7 
January/March 1955 436.8 35.4 
Source: For cost-of-living index, Servicio Nacional de Estadística, Sinopsis Estadística. 
" The 1937 free exchange rate was selected as base, and the parity exchange rates for the subse-
quent years were estimated as a function of the base parity, of the relative variations in the cost 
of living in Chile and of the implicit deflator of United States gross income. 
Thus the Government had fewer availabilities with 
which to subsidize private sector imports, while subsidy 
requirements continued to grow rapidly with the per-
manent over-valuation of the preferential exchange rates. 
The conflict between limited availabilities and subsidy 
requirements is rendering the preferential exchange-rate 
system incapable of fulfilling its function of mitigating 
the effects of the rise in import prices, since further de-
valuation is becoming more frequent each year and directly 
affects the level of domestic prices. 
7 . T H E FISCAL PROBLEM IN 1 9 5 4 
During 1954, the index of the cost of living in Chile rose 
by 72 per cent, implying a trebling of the previous rate 
of increase. (See again table 10.) This aggravation of the 
inflationary process was due both to the influence of those 
factors which had brought about the 1953 crisis in the sys-
tem of exchange-rate subsidies, and to the large fiscal 
deficit in 1954. 
The total value of copper sales during the latter year 
was practically equivalent to that of 1953. However, the 
proportion returned to Chile fell from 84 per cent in 1953 
to 76 per cent in 1954, owing to the granting of an ex-
change rate of 110 pesos for part of the dollars needed 
to meet production costs. The result was a further decrease 
in the revenue from the copper exports, this time of nearly 
10 per cent. (See again table 8.) The decline would have 
Table 11 
CHILE: UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE BY THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Millions of dollars) 
Foreign exchange 
Uiitization of surrendered to 
foreign exchange the public sector 
by the public by copper and 
sector nitrate Percentage of 
Year ( £ ) (B) (A) to (B) 
195 0 36.5 130.9 28 
195 1 38.5 136.5 28 
195 2 52.2 225.2 23 
195 3 66.8 172.7 39 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis 
of data from the Banco Central de Chile, Balanza de Pagos de Chile. 
been even greater had not the banking exchange rate-
applied to a substantial proportion of imports—been de-
valued from 110 pesos to 200 to the dollar. 
In 1954 the revenue from other sectors of economic 
activity fell by 15 per cent. The explanation for the low 
tax yield lies in the rigidity of the taxation system, which 
inevitably loses some of its efficacy when confronted by a 
price increase of the magnitude registered in 1954, and by 
the possibilities for tax evasion. 
The 3-per-cent fall in direct domestic taxation (see again 
table 9) is due to the following phenomena: (a) the tax 
is assessed on the taxable income of the preceding year; 
{b) in certain cases, taxable income is calculated on the 
basis of an official valuation which is not opportunely ad-
justed to the rise in prices; and (c) tax evasion is encour-
aged by rapidly-rising prices. 
The revenue from indirect taxation has fallen by 15 
per cent. The reason for this abrupt decline in the real 
value of revenue would seem to be that indirect taxes are 
not of general application and are therefore not suscepti-
ble to all but merely to some price rises. This phenomenon 
is especially pronounced in the case of duties and taxes 
on imports, which are calculated on the basis of the offi-
cial import rate of the dollar, which has increased a good 
deal less than prices as a whole. This potential discrepancy 
between the rate of increase in the prices of goods and 
services subject to indirect taxation and the general rate 
of price increases has reduced the real purchasing power 
of the tax yield, when this has been deflated by the general 
price index. 
Another important reason for the lower revenue from 
indirect taxation is to be found in the evasion of taxes 
on production and the transactions tax, which are assessed 
from declarations. These taxes, which are the most im-
portant form of indirect taxation, are also assessed on a 
former period, although in this case the lapse is only three 
months. The effect of rising prices is naturally felt in all 
its intensity in the real revenue from specific taxes, among 
which the most important is that applied to gasoline. 
In 1954, total governmental expenditure (see again 
table 4) also underwent a sharp decrease of 14 per cent. 
This was achieved by curtailing government payments to 
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social security institutions, as well as by resorting to de-
valuation as a means of reducing import subsidies and of 
restricting current expenditure. But since total receipts 
fell more than total disbursement, the over-all deficit in 
1954 amounted to 18 per cent of the latter. 
As a result, 1954 witnessed a combination of all the 
inflationary factors which were mentioned in connexion 
with the crisis of the preceding year, namely, devaluation, 
deficit, new tax levies, and the effect of the adjustment of 
salaries and wages. To this should be added the ever-in-
creasing influence of the permanent factors underlying the 
critical situation of the exchange-rate system. These are 
the utilization of foreign exchange by the public sector 
itself, the progressive devaluation of the "returned-value" 
exchange rate, as well as certain perennial inflationary 
characteristics of the monetary and fiscal system. 
APPENDIX 
T H E " N E W D E A L " FOR T H E LARGE COPPER COMPANIES 
The "New Deal" Act-No. 11828, dated 5 May 1955-
was aimed mainly at inducing the large copper companies 
to increase their production, both by further investment 
in the enlargement of their installed capacity, and by a 
fuller utilization of existing capacity. It is expected that 
the stimulus to additional investment will be supplied by 
those provisions of the Act which are designed to reduce 
the companies' burden of taxation. 
Among these provisions the following are the most im-
portant: {a) the abolition of the special tax on sales or 
surtax on the difi'erence between prices received and the 
price of 24.5 cents per pound of copper; (fc) the replace-
ment of the former income tax by another at a basic rate 
of 50 per cent with a 25-per-cent surtax depending upon 
the level of production;^® (c) the establishment of the 
"returned-value" exchange rate^ ® at the average rate used 
For every 1-per-cent increase in production over and above 
a basic average (95 per cent of the production of each company 
between 1949 and 1953), the surtax decreases by one-eighth. When 
enterprises double their production, the surtax is suspended, and 
only the basic 50-per-cent rate is applied. 
" This was originally 19.37 pesos to the dollar, and began to rise 
in recent years, until in 1954 it reached an average of some 62 pesos 
to the dollar. 
for the majority of Chilean exports; (</) the restoration 
of sales control to the producers. A Departamento del 
Cobre was established, however, which is authorized to 
negotiate sales on behalf of producers in cases where 
their sales policy is not in conformity with the "national 
interest". 
The "New Deal" Act will give rise to some important 
changes in the taxation and exchange situation of the large 
copper companies. Government income accruing from the 
surtax (equal to the price received over and above 24.5 
cents per pound) disappeared under the new legislation. 
The "returned values" on production costs decreased con-
siderably, because of the application of a higher rate of 
exchange, which enables expenditure in national currency 
to be covered with a smaller quantity of foreign exchange. 
The greater the devaluation of the "returned-value" ex-
change rate, the greater will be this reduction. 
On the other hand, the yield of income tax will increase, 
both because of the above decreeise in production costs 
and because—within the production levels predictable over 
the next few years—the average rate of the tax might be 
somewhat higher than that hitherto in force. Nevertheless, 
it should be pointed out that, for a given volume of pro-
duction, the larger receipts on account of income tax in 
no case offset the loss of revenue on production costs, 
since on every dollar by which production costs decrease, 
the Government recovers from 50 to 75 cents, according to 
the tonnages produced. 
The effect of the new legislation on the tax yield in 
national currency depends on the rate of exchange applied 
to dollar, earnings. These receipts are, however, to be con-
sidered in constant values, as the whole of the analysis 
was made on this basis. Therefore the remarks on dollar 
receipts apply also to constant values. Nevertheless, one 
reservation must be made. This is important because it 
limits the validity of a common opinion, namely, the idea 
that with the devaluation of the "returned-value" exchange 
rate the rise in fiscal income would help to reduce the 
budgetary deficit. This would be true in real terms only 
if there were a proportionately greater devaluation of the 
selling rate, that is, of the rate of exchange applied to 
imports financed with the Government's foreign exchange. 
COLOMBIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY IN A YEAR OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
DISEQUILIBRIUM 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
A number of important events took place in Colombia's 
economy during 1955. Most of these were directly or in-
directly associated with the external sector, and led up to 
a crisis in the balance-of-payments situation. The decline 
in the price of coffee, which had already begun in the 
second half of 1954, and the reduction in the volume of 
total exports, severely restricted the capacity to import; 
yet purchases abroad, throughout a large part of 1955, 
were maintained at even higher levels than in the preced-
ing year. The net result was a marked disequilibrium in 
Colombia's balance of payments. To curtail imports and 
bring them into line with a decreasing capacity for foreign 
payments, various exchange measures were adopted in 
1955, which ultimately proved inadequate to achieve their 
aim. This was mainly due to two factors. 
Firstly, the rapid and comprehensive development of 
Colombia's economy in 1945-54 involved basic structural 
modifications, whose vital importance for the balance-of-
payments position is readily understandable if their na-
ture is recalled. Over the period between the pre-war 
years and 1954, the trend of changes in occupation was 
towards the employment of a higher proportion of the 
active population in industry and services, and the ab-
sorption of smaller numbers by the traditional sectors, 
including those producing for export. A similar move-
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ment affected capital formation in the various branches 
of production, as the result of a re-direction of investment 
towards the more highly productive activities. The struc-
tural alterations to which this process gave rise were re-
flected in a much more rapid increase in the output of 
manufactured and other domestic consumer goods than in 
production primarily for export. Thus the basic sources 
of national income were gradually dissociated from the 
external sector, which little by little lost some of its im-
portance as a motive force in Colombia's economy. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the gross product-export 
ratio, which was 30 per cent in 1937, fell to 18 per cent 
in recent years. The relative predominance of domestic 
factors in the dynamics of Colombia's economic develop-
ment at present, in combination with the rapid growth of 
internal income, the differing demand-elasticities of manu-
factured goods and foodstuffs, and the high import co-
efficient, mean that the emergence of adverse conditions 
in the external sector does not nowadays exert so strong 
an influence on the level of activity, employment and 
income, and on the demand for imports. In Colombia's new 
economic circumstances, everything seems to suggest that 
the evolution of the capacity to import—unfavourable over 
the short term—merely intensifies the pressure on the bal-
ance of payments, as in the special case of the year 1955. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that owing to the 
rise in export prices which began in 1949, and reached 
its peak in 1953 and the first half of 1954, the expansion 
of the capacity to import closely paralleled that of the 
internal economy, and facilitated a rapid rate of invest-
ment. In 1955, on the other hand, it did not keep pace with 
economic growth. If there were a long-term decline in the 
capacity to import—if, that is, it were to remain low for 
a lengthy period—the impossibility of importing enough 
capital goods to maintain the investment coefficient at suit-
able levels would inevitably hamper internal economic 
development. At all events, this is true as long as Colom-
bia is unable to develop domestic production of the neces-
sary capital goods which, at present, it has to purchase 
abroad. 
Moreover, with the adoption of certain official measures, 
the year 1955 witnessed the introduction of a new element, 
which in one way tended to aggravate the balance-of-pay-
ments situation, although other aims pursued by the meas-
ures in question were successfully achieved. A high rate 
of public expenditure and investment, the compensatory 
financing of coffee purchases, and monetary and fiscal 
policy in general, tended to counteract the deflationary 
influence of external conditions at a time when imports 
greatly exceeded exports, and helped to keep up the pur-
chasing power of the internal economy. To sum up, this 
maintenance of demand, to which official policy contrib-
uted, helped to exert continued pressure on the balance 
of payments, and the resulting situation constitutes one of 
the outstanding features of Colombia's economic develop-
ment in 1955. 
2 . T H E BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SITUATION IN 1 9 5 5 
Changes in Colombia's foreign trade had a decisive in-
fluence on the marked balance-of-payments disequilibrium 
registered in 1955. The volume of exports remained almost 
the same, but their average price was 10 per cent lower 
than in the preceding year, while the terms of trade de-
teriorated by 9 per cent in relation to 1954. This meant 
an equivalent reduction in the capacity of exports to 
finance imports. (See table 1.) 
The instability of the world coffee market in 1955 could 
not fail to leave its mark on the current value of Colom-
bian exports, in view of the heavy proportion of their total 
(about 80 per cent) represented by this product. During 
the first half of 1955, coffee exports were less than in the 
corresponding months of 1 9 5 3 and 1 9 5 4 , by 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 and 
9 0 0 , 0 0 0 bags respectively. From July onward, a recovery 
in coffee exports began, but although their volume was 
greater between July and November than during the same 
five months in 1954, it was still smaller than over the 
corresponding period in 1953. Prices, which sank to their 
lowest level in February 1955, recovered somewhat in the 
next few months, but even in September, when they were 
at their best, they remained 10 per cent below the 1954 
average. 
All these circumstances were reflected in the balance-
of-payments situation and in the reserves held by the 
Banco de la República. The foreign exchange accruing 
from coffee export earnings was 30 per cent less in the 
first half of 1955 than during the corresponding period 
in 1954, but, according to estimates, the difference was 
reduced to 6 per cent by the end of the year. (See table 
2.) 
Official foreign exchange resources brought in by other 
exports seem to have been 45 per cent less in 1955 than 
in the preceding year, mainly because the unrestricted sale 
of foreign exchange outside the official market was author-
ized by the measures adopted in May 1954. There were 
not, apparently, any substantial quantitative changes in the 
official supply from sources other than exports. (See again 
table 2.) In all, government foreign exchange assets de-
creased from 659 million dollars in 1954 to 571 million 
dollars in 1955, that is, by more than 13 per cent. 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: FOREIGN TRADE INDICES 
(1950=100) 
Exports Imports Terms Capacity of 
Quantum Prices Quantum Prices trade for imports 
1953 141 138 148 126 109 154 
1 9 5 4 » 124 173 178 126 138 170 
1955 « 125 155 187 124 125 155 
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Ut half 1952» 
Supply 
Coffee 5 2 3 . 6 2 9 0 . 8 2 0 2 . 4 4 9 0 . 0 
Other exports 3 0 . 5 1 6 . 7 1 3 . 4 1 6 . 0 
Capital 6 1 . 4 3 6 . 6 3 2 . 2 5 0 . 0 
Resources from the IMF 2 5 . 0 — — • — 
Other purchases 18 .5 8 . 6 8 . 5 1 5 . 0 
TOTAL 6 5 9 . 0 3 5 2 . 7 2 5 6 . 5 5 7 1 . 0 
Demand 
Imports 4 1 8 . 7 2 3 1 . 2 3 0 0 . 6 6 0 5 . 0 
Official services 2 7 . 0 13 .2 1 9 . 0 2 8 . 0 
Other sales 1 2 0 . 1 5 4 . 8 8 6 . 0 1 3 0 . 0 
TOTAL 5 6 5 . 8 2 9 9 . 2 4 0 5 . 6 7 6 3 . 0 
Balance 9 3 . 2 5 3 . 5 - 1 4 9 . 1 - 1 9 2 . 0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of official statistics. 
" ProvisionaL 
In contrast, the demand for foreign exchange to finance 
imports negotiated through the official exchange market 
increased in relation to 1954 by as much as 200 million 
dollars during the whole of the year. No important modi-
fications were recorded in the other debit items of the 
official foreign exchange balance. 
As a result of the discrepancies between supply and 
demand, the foreign exchange deficit at the end of 1955 
was estimated at 192 million dollars. Of this sum, 149 
millions corresponded to the period January-June, when 
the supply contracted sharply, to a figure 59 million dol-
lars below that recorded for the second half of the year, 
while demand attained its peak, rising to 47 millions more 
than in July-December. 
To cover this heavy deficit in Colombia's official ex-
change balance, the monetary reserves of the Banco de 
la República were drawn upon in 1955 to the amount of 
approximately 120 million dollars. As only 72 millions 
remained, a new increment in short-term trade debts may 
result, so that total arrears, including those carried over 
from the end of 1954, will presumably amount to 150 
million dollars. 
But the total balance-of-payments situation is not con-
stituted only by the transactions negotiated through the 
official market. It is also made up of all the movements of 
foreign exchange on the free market, legally established 
in May. Aggregate transactions on this market are esti-
mated to account for 20 per cent of the total external pay-
ments transactions in one complete year. 
Unfortunately, no statistics for this market are at present 
available. Everything would seem to suggest, however, that 
towards the end of the year the pressure of demand for 
foreign currency was almost as strong here as on the 
official market. It is highly probable that since October 
the sale of the foreign exchange accruing from the trans-
fer of various exports from the official to the free market, 
and the receipts derived from other external movements 
of funds, have been inadequate to cover those orders for 
imported machinery and equipment which are now nego-
tiated through the free market. 
3 . E X C H A N G E MEASURES T O STABILIZE T H E BALANCE OF 
P A Y M E N T S 
The modifications in the exchange system introduced 
during the course of 1955 were perhaps aimed at combat-
ing the problem of the balance-of-payments disequilibrium 
in two different ways: firstly, by encouraging specific 
exports and stimulating a greater inflow of foreign capital 
so as to increase total foreign exchange availabilities, and 
secondly, by reducing demand, mainly through the estab 
lishment of higher exchange rates for imports. The meas 
ures adopted therefore followed traditional lines, inas 
much as a limited system of multiple exchange rates was 
utilized in the application of a comparatively flexible eco-
nomic policy, principally aimed at the establishment of 
correctives for the most elastic debit and credit items in 
the balance of payments. On the other hand, no attempt 
was made to impose direct restrictions on the demand for 
foreign exchange through the arbitrary control and selec-
tion of imports by means of licences, quotas and em-
bargos, except in the case of the short list of banned im-
ports which was again brought into force in February. 
It was possible to transfer to the newly-created free 
exchange market the foreign exchange earnings on specific 
export transactions which had formerly been negotiated 
on the official market. This was virtually equivalent to a 
devaluation of the Colombian peso. Again, the exchange 
rate modifications represented a more obvious devalua-
tion in the case of coffee—for exports of which the dollar 
rate was changed from 2.38 to 2.50—and in that of the 
majority of imports to which a stamp duty was applied, 
varying in amount for each of the official exchange cate-
gories to which such foreign purchases were assigned.^ 
The exchange incentive granted to various products-
bananas, gold, platinum, tanned hides, sugar, tobacco and 
cotton textiles—in the form of authorization for the sale 
of foreign exchange on the free market, does not seem to 
' For the exchange measures adopted in February and May. see 
Economic Review of Latin America, special issue, August 1955, 
p. 40, "Impact of Coffee Exports on the Economies of Brazil and 
Colombia". 
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have produced any very considerable effects on the avail-
abilities of such currencies in 1955. In fact, too little time 
has elapsed since this step was taken for an appraisal of 
its results to be possible. The supply of the products con-
cerned, with the exception of textiles and hides, is, for the 
most part, relatively inelastic over the short term, and, 
furthermore, no clearly-defined policy to promote in-
vestment has hitherto been pursued. The raising of the 
coffee exchange rate is not really related to the policy for 
stabilizing the balance of payments; it is part of an en-
deavour to maintain the coffee sector's purchasing power 
and to make it possible for minimum internal prices to 
be fixed at a higher level than that prevailing on the world 
market. In contrast, under the 1955 reform the free ex-
change rate applicable to foreign capital entering Colom-
bia is intended as a stimulus to the inflow of external 
investment. In 1955, entrepreneurs outside the country dis-
played keen interest in investment prospects, the study of 
various projects was undertaken, and the implementation 
of some of these was actually begun with foreign capital. 
With respect to the demand for foreign currency— 
mainly to cover imports—the progressive stamp duty es-
tablished in February was also equivalent to a devalua-
tion of the peso, as the real rate of exchange varies from 
2.58 to 6.50 pesos to the dollar, according to the groups 
of commodities concerned.^ 
The barter system inaugurated in May was applied only 
within very narrow limits, as it was put into effect merely 
for those countries with whom Colombia had a trade defi-
cit. It induced Colombian importers to pay a premium on 
exports to the countries in question, thus raising the rate 
of exchange. 
The adoption of all these and other less important meas-
ures failed to fulfil one of the aims pursued, to judge by 
the marked disequilibrium in the balance of payments. 
As has already been shown, the deficit was mainly due to 
the pressure of demand for foreign exchange to finance 
imports effected through the official market, which in 1955 
amounted to 187 million dollars more than in 1954. 
Not only was the exchange reform aimed at restricting 
purchases abroad; it was also designed to promote, up to a 
point, a specific import structure. Endeavours to exercise 
some sort of selective control over imports by means of a 
system of multiple exchange rates, and at the same time 
to maintain their total volume at a lower level, imply the 
basic assumption that price-elasticity of demand for im-
ports is high, and that the various price-elasticities of the 
demand for each group of imported goods are adjusted 
to the relative positions of the different exchange rates to 
which they are subject. But in the case of Colombia, whose 
economy is in full process of accelerated development, the 
high income-elasticity of demand for certain import cate-
gories is apt to attenuate the possible price-elasticity. The 
income-elasticity coefficients of demand for non-durable 
and durable manufactured consumer goods^ are estimated 
to be about 1.7 and 1.8 respectively. Again, the demand 
for capital goods imports is closely related to the level of 
^ A large proportion of the commodities in the first group, which 
had the advantage of the oÉScial exchange rate and a stamp duty 
of only 10 per cent, were transferred in October to the second 
group, to which the free exchange rate and a 30-per-cent duty were 
applicable. In November, however, they were classified as a separate 
group, subject to a 10-per-cent duty and the free exchange rate. 
° Excluding foodstuffs, fuels, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and 
clothing. 
income, saving and investment. The investment coefficient 
fluctuated around 19 per cent, so that it played a vital 
part in determining the high volume of imports of pro-
ducer goods. At all events, in the specific case of rapidly-
expanding economies, it does not seem that the structure 
of imports can be adapted with precision to the long-term 
requirements of economic development as the mechanical 
and automatic consequence of a selective regime based only 
on the various exchange rates applicable within a multiple 
system. 
In 1955, the composition of imports was apparently 
quite well adjusted to the country's economic develop-
ment needs, at least, as far as can be judged from available 
statistics. This is indicated by the increase in the relative 
importance of capital goods and raw materials, and the 
smaller proportion represented by consumer goods, in 
1955 as compared with 1954. (See table 3.) 
Table 3 
COLOMBIA: IMPORT CATEGORIES 
(Percentages) 
1953 195i « 
Consumer goods 24.8 26.3 
Raw materials 19.9 19.2 
Fuels 5.8 5.3 
Capital goods 49.5 48.2 







Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, on the basis of 
official statistics. 
" Provisional. 
The structure of imports in 1955 cannot, however, be 
attributed solely to the interplay of the modifications 
undergone by the different exchange rate categories. The 
rapid growth of Colombia's economy, and the high invest-
ment coefficient registered in 1954, must have constituted 
a powerful expansionist force, the impact of which con-
tinued to be felt in 1955 and helped to account for the 
heavy capital goods imports. Again, the greater degree of 
protection afforded by the exchange reform to the pro-
duction of consumer goods, which have to compete with 
imports on the domestic market, must have provided a 
strong incentive to more energetic import replacement, 
especially in view of the high income-elasticity of demand 
to which allusion has already been made. This process 
called for increased imports of raw materials and capital 
goods, especially the former. 
4 . T H E RATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND ITS PRESSURE ON T H E 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
One of the factors determining the inefficacy of the ex-
change measures adopted in 1955 to correct the balance-
of-payments disequilibrium was the rapid rate of eco-
nomic development achieved by Colombia in recent years. 
The resultant structural changes in the economy seem to 
have increased the pressure of domestic demand on im-
ports and, consequently, on the balance of payments. 
However, as this accelerated economic growth was also 
accompanied by a considerable rise in the purchasing 
power of exports, in consequence of a favourable trend 
in the terms of trade, such pressure remained more or less 
unnoticeable during the period under review. It should 
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be taken into account that, given 1950 as a base year, the 
purchasing power in question increased from 53 in 
1940-44 to 73 in 1945-49, and attained 154 and 170 in 
1953 and 1954 respectively. Hence it was possible to im-
port more and more capital goods, until an investment co-
efficient fluctuating around 19 per cent was reached with-
out detriment to the balance-of-payments situation. Only 
in years like 1949 and 1955, when external purchasing 
power appreciably declined, did this pressure on the cur-
rent account become clearly apparent. If the radical 
changes in Colombia's economy are considered, it is easy 
to understand the nature of this factor of disequilibrium, 
constituted by differing trends in the internal economy and 
the purchasing power of exports. 
During 1945-53, there was a considerable increment in 
the per capita gross product, of which the annual average 
rate of growth was 4 per cent. An even higher increase 
of 6 per cent annually was to be observed in the gross 
income, this time in virtue of the satisfactory course fol-
lowed by the terms of trade. Simultaneously, important 
modifications in the country's economic structure took 
place. 
Occupational shifts from one sector of production to 
another were all in the direction of increased employment 
in industry, energy, transport and services, while the ag-
ricultural labour force declined. The efl^ ect of this de-
crease was extended to exports, which are included in 
table 4 under "Agriculture". A breakdown of the stock 
of capital by sectors reveals that the percentage gains of 
industry and the losses of agriculture were even more pro-
nounced. (See table 4.) Such changes in the composition of 
capital stock were due to the rechannelling of investment 
towards the high productivity sectors. This process gave 
rise to two circumstances which proved to be of great 
significance for Colombia's economy, and which were 
reflected in a rapid increase of the per capita gross product. 
The first was a striking modification in the structure of 
production by economic activities. The gross product from 
agriculture—including export commodities—accounted for 
a smaller share of the total in 1953 than in 1945, the con-
trast with previous periods, for example 1925, being 
greater still. On the other hand, the proportion represented 
by the production of manufacturing industries and the re-
maining economic activities increased considerably. The 
second important development was the rise in the product/ 
capital ratio, which was 0.32 in 1945 and 0.37 in 1953 
for the economy as a whole. During this period, the great-
est increase in productivity—from 0.53 to 0.58—was regis-
tered in industry, the figures for agriculture rising only 
from 0.40 to 0.42. 
These radical and far-reaching changes in Colombia's 
economy had two extremely important consequences: (a) 
the external sector was replaced as a dynamic factor by 
the economy's own internal forces, and (6) the structure 
of domestic demand and the income-elasticity of demand 
for each type of product were modified. 
When exports accounted for more than 30 per cent 
of the gross product (in 1937), the expansionist factor 
in the internal economy was the external sector. But the 
share of exports is now only 18 per cent, on account of the 
greater relative growth of production for home consump-
tion, and fluctuations in external conditions have ceased 
of late to exert much influence. In other words, it is now-
adays easier for the short-term efi'ects on domestic activity 
produced by a fall in exports to be neutralized by the 
motive forces within the Colombian economy itself. Thus, 
when the value of exports declined, as it did in 1955, the 
expansionist elements in the internal economy continued 
to operate as dynamic factors, and will probably maintain 
demand and, therefore, bring to light the latent pressure 
on the balance of payments. Whether the capacity to im-
port affects economic development over the long term will 
depend upon how far import replacement can be continued, 
so as to permit heavy capital goods imports. But within 
the short space of one year, its more immediate conse-
quence was an imbalance in the country's foreign current 
accounts. This came about the more readily because the 
process of development in Colombia led, through the 
growth of income and the change in the composition of 
employment, with the consequent rise in urban population, 
to a modification in the structure of demand. Income-
elasticity coefficients of demand show that every time in-
come rises there is a tendency for imports to exceed pur-
chases of domestically-produced goods. Thus, for food-
stuffs as a whole, the elasticity coefficient varied between 
0.5 and 0.6, though in the case of processed foodstuffs it 
reached the high figure of 0.9, and, in that of cereals and 
pulses, the very low levels of 0.2 and 0.3. For durable 
and non-durable consumer goods the elasticity coefficients 
were about 1.8 and 1.7 respectively. If these coefficients 
are compared with those for imported commodities, espe-
cially durable consumer goods, the conclusion is reached 
that the maintenance of activity and domestic consump-
tion, despite the Unfavourable evolution of the export 
trade, tends to keep the demand for imports higher than 
is justified by the limited capacity to import. Furthermore, 
such high income-elasticity coefficients of demand imply 
that consumer commodities, especially durable goods, 
compete actively with capital goods and raw materials 
for a larger share of the capacity to import. At times like 
this it is easier to see the need for establishing or con-
Table 4 
J I O L O M B I A : G R O S S P R O D U C T , A C T I V E P O P U L A T I O N A N D C A P I T A L S T O C K B Y S E C T O R S O F P R O D U C T I O N 
(Percentages) 
Sectors 
Gross product Active population Capital stock 
1925 Í945 1953 19K 1953 Í9//5 1953 
Agriculture 52.7 45.3 35.6 60.5 54.3 36.4 31.5 
Industry 7.1 12.6 16.4 5.2 6.4 9.4 15.2 
Others 40.2 42.1 48.0 34.3 39.3 54.2 53.3 
TOTAL 1 0 0 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, The economic development of Colombia, document E/CN. 12/365. 
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solidating a system of selection whereby the structure of 
imports may be suitably adjusted to the requirements of 
economic development, including the maintenance of a 
high investment coefficient. It has already been shown that 
in this direction the measures adopted in 1955 were to some 
extent successful. At the same time, Colombia's need to 
intensify the already considerable replacement of im-
ported consumer goods by those of domestic manufacture, 
to make room for capital goods, becomes even more 
pressing. 
5 . T H E 1 9 5 5 COMPENSATORY P O L I C Y AND T H E 
MAINTENANCE OF IMPORTS 
In view of the events of 1955, the Colombian Govern-
ment adopted a policy aimed at maintaining coffee pur-
chases from growers and neutralizing, by means of credit 
and public expenditure, the deflationary effects of the 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments. This policy was 
inaugurated in February, with the adoption of a twofold 
measure. When world prices for coffee were at their lowest 
level—54 cents per pound for Manizales No. 4—the au-
thorities imposed a minimum internal price higher than 
the world quotation. At the same time, they raised the 
coffee dollar differential exchange rate from 2.38 to 2.50. 
The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros made heavier pur-
chases on the domestic market—especially in the first half 
of 1955, when there was a severe contraction in exports-
drawing upon the Fondo Nacional del Café, which it ad-
ministers, and on credit from the Banco de la República. 
All this helped to maintain the purchasing power of coffee 
growers, while at the same time it prevented a reduction 
of the money supply by counteracting the deflationary 
effects of the contraction of foreign sales. In this last con-
nexion, increased credit was also granted by private banks, 
which resorted to considerable rediscounts in 1955. Be-
tween January and November, such rediscounts rose by 
154 million pesos. 
In the period December 1954—June 1955 the balance-
of-payments situation led to a decrease of 221.8 million 
pesos in the money supply, which was largely offset by 
expanding commercial bank credit to the amount of 164.2 
millions. By September the deficit in the balance of pay-
ments had brought about a reduction of 227.5 million 
pesos, in addition to that of 84.9 millions for which the 
Banco de la República was responsible. The net result, 
however, was a decrease in the money supply of only 37.6 
millions, since the private banking system granted up to 
that date a credit expansion of 274.8 millions. 
I The contraction in the money supply brought about by 
1 the Banco de la República had its origin in the liquida-
' tion of the debt contracted by the Federación Nacional de 
i Cafeteros during the first half of the year. With the pro-
I ceeds of its sales abroad, which rose sharply from June 
I onward, the Federación paid off this debt, and the portfolio 
' of the issuing bank was thus reduced from 270 million 
I pesos in August to only 60 millions in November. As the 
¡dollars accruing from the exports in question were used 
I to pay off foreign arrears, every sale of coffee meant a 
1 further decrease in the money supply. To offset this tend-
ency, the Government increased its own expenditure and 
public investment in the last quarter of the year. In this 
'connexion, a reduction of 37 per cent in official deposits 
in the Banco de la República was observable between 
^^ctober and December. 
According to estimates, the net result of these move-
ments was the maintenance both of the money supply and 
of domestic demand, the level of employment and prices. 
These last showed an apparent trend toward stabilization 
during 1955, but, as a matter of fact, there was a fairly 
wide difference between prices of foodstuffs, which de-
clined, especially in the case of meat, and those of manu-
factured goods, which increased. These disparities in price 
movements cancelled one another out, and so brought about 
a relative stabilization of the general price level. 
Thus the Government's compensatory policy appears to 
have been successful in maintaining the over-all level of 
internal economic activity. But, from another point of view, 
it led to a continued pressure of demand on the balance 
of payments, at a time when the country's capacity for 
external payments had decreased by 20 per cent. 
The events of 1955 raise a question by obvious practical 
interest for Colombia's future, that is, if the deterioration 
in the capacity to import persists. Furthermore, economic 
development depends upon a high rate of capital forma-
tion, and 40 per cent of the capital goods required must 
be imported. Again, economic policy and the effects of the 
development described, together with the growth of income 
and the structural changes in employment and demand, 
have forced certain consumer goods to compete with capi-
tal goods for a larger relative share in the capacity to 
import. The selective limitation of imports through a sys-
tem of multiple exchange rates does not seem capable, 
in itself alone, of producing the far-reaching results which 
would be desirable in this connexion in view of the magni-
tude and importance of the problem. 
THE MEAT PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA 
One of the most noticeable features of the evolution of 
agriculture in Latin America is the relative stagnation of 
livestock production in recent years. Although there were 
encouraging signs of recovery in Argentina during 1955, 
stock-breeding throughout most of the region has un-
doubtedly been passing through a crisis of no small di-
mensions. 
' The selective expansion of agricultural production in Latin 
America and its relation to economic development (document 
E/CN.12/378/Rev.l), presented jointly by FAO and ECLA to the 
Commission's sixth session at Bogotá. 
The point was made in a previous study^ that Latin 
American meat production during the post-war years has 
undergone an obvious decline, which is especially notice-
able if it is compared with demographic growth and the 
increase in private income. This situation, which contrasts 
with conditions prevailing in other regions, acquires spe-
cial significance for the following reasons: (a) meat figures 
largely in the exports of certain countries; (6) the part 
that this commodity plays—or should play—in the diet of 
the Latin American peoples is a vital one; and (c) stock-
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breeding occupies an important place in the agricultural 
and economic development of Latin America. 
Because livestock production is of such importance and 
because there has been a marked deterioration in its rela-
tive position, any analysis of the situation should delve 
deep into the causes underlying the relative stagnation 
of Latin American stock-breeding. Although an unequivo-
cal reply to the many questions involved can be obtained 
only after the problem has been subjected to thorough in-
vestigation, the intention of the present article^ is to 
summarize its main features, in order to provide some idea 
of the lines along which such research should be under-
taken.^ 
The importance of stock-breeding within total agricul-
tural production varies considerably from one country to 
another. For example, in Mexico this activity accounts 
for only 11 to 15 per cent of the gross product of the 
agricultural sector, while in Uruguay its share is more than 
65 per cent, and in Argentina and Chile, about 40 per 
cent. In Brazil, Cuba and Colombia, on the other hand, 
stock-breeding contributes approximately 20 per cent of 
the agricultural gross product. From the point of view of 
foreign trade, in the pre-war period stock-breeding brought 
in about 16.5 per cent of the total foreign exchange accru-
ing from Latin American exports. During 1952-53, how-
ever, this percentage fell to 9.4, for reasons which will 
be seen later. Nevertheless, if only the main exporters, like 
Argentina and Uruguay, are considered, it will be seen 
that the proportion of total exports represented by livestock 
products is much larger. Thus, in the case of Argentina it 
reached 47 per cent in 1954, while in that of Uruguay it 
was 88 per cent in 1953. 
CONSUMPTION 
With the exception of Argentina, Uruguay and Para-
guay, per capita meat consumption in Latin America is 
generally low. Despite the fact that the deficit countries 
have increased their imports, and that certain traditional 
exporters have become importers, the supply of meat for 
domestic consumption has not kept pace with the growth 
of population, and even less with the increase in income. 
Thus, notwithstanding the greater purchasing power, per 
capita consumption has fallen. What has brought about 
this situation? The underlying cause is certainly not a nega-
tive income-elasticity coefficient of demand. On the other 
hand, relative prices are undoubtedly playing a major role. 
In chart I it can be seen that in certain countries retail 
prices for meat have risen at a faster rate than the over-all 
index of the cost of living. In other words, meat has become 
relatively dearer, and consumption has therefore been cur-
tailed. 
The policy of subsidizing consumption by means of 
fixing retail prices at an artificially low level has had seri-
ous repercussions in Argentina and other countries. In 
Argentina, where per capita consumption is among the 
^ This paper will tackle only those problems connected with the 
production, marketing and consumption of meat, since limitations 
of space preclude a full coverage of livestock production. Up to a 
certain point, however, the meat situation reflects conditions in the 
livestock sector as a whole. 
^ In this connexion, it should be mentioned that, during its sixth 
session, held at Bogotá, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
instructed the secretariat to carry out a comprehensive survey, in 
collaboration with FAO, of the problems affecting the region's live-
stock development, such a study to be given high priority in the work 
programme of these two organizations. Preparations have just begun. 
highest in the world, the demand for meat, especially beef, 
has been stimulated at serious risk to export availabilities, 
as will be seen in a later section of this report. As chart II 
shows, Argentine beef consumption, which amounted to 
an annual 70 kilogrammes per capita just after the war, 
began to rise, until in 1949-51 it reached an average of 93 
kilogrammes, owing to the fact that during this period the 
real prices for meat declined appreciably.^ In the last four 
years per capita meat consumption has fallen to 84 kilo-
grammes. The decline began in 1952, when prices rose and 
the Argentine Government applied restrictions to the sale 
of the product. 
Although the trends to be observed in per capita meat 
consumption may be attributed to the evolution of relative 
prices, the absolute level of such consumption is closely 
linked to average purchasing power in the different Latin 
American countries (see chart III), although for an exact 
assessment of this relationship, the influence of relative 
prices would have to be eliminated. 
Figures for income and meat consumption in 1950 from 
many countries in different regions of the world show that 
where annual per capita income is lower than 300 dollars, 
yearly meat consumption is less than 30 kilogrammes per 
head. Such is the case in the majority of Latin American 
countries. 
This limitation of purchasing power, a condition which 
prevails throughout most of the region, is the only explana-
tion of the phenomenon occurring in certain countries, 
like several of the Central American republics, namely, 
that, side by side with an extraordinarily low level of 
per capita consumption, exportable surpluses of cattle 
are produced which find no place on the domestic market. 
Undoubtedly a complete picture of meat consumption 
in Latin America cannot be constructed solely on the basis 
of the economic factors described so far. A role of para-
mount importance is played by the dietary patterns of the 
region which, in turn, are governed by extra-economic 
elements. In many areas, particularly the tropical coun-
tries, the climate appears to exert a great influence on 
nutritional habits, which, in this instance, display a marked 
preference for vegetable proteins. It is clear that economic 
factors must be considered anew, since, in the final in-
stance, perhaps it is the relative price structure which de-
termines consumer preferences. At all events, a thorough 
examination must inevitably be made of the influence 
that both economic and non-economic factors exert on the 
dietary patterns of the Latin American peoples. 
The high price of meat in Latin America has been largely 
governed by deficiencies in the production process, to 
which detailed reference will be made at a later stage. 
These shortcomings have certainly been responsible for 
raising the costs of meat production, due recognition being 
given to the fact that inflation, which is wide-spread in the 
region, tends to distort the relative price structure. 
The expensiveness of meat may also be attributed to the 
faulty distribution mechanism. The majority of Latin 
American countries are clearly backward in the matter 
of transport; in addition, the methods of marketing and 
processing livestock products are primitive. Thus, along-
side the increase in the costs of distribution due to the 
" The redistribution of income in Argentina, which has noticeably 
benefited the lower-income groups, is another of the factors stimulat-
ing increased meat consumption. 
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BEEF CONSUMPTION 
1 
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" Index of current prices divided by over-all foodstuffs price index. 
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Chart III 
PER CAPITA INCOME AND MEAT CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950 
^Logarithmic scale) 
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high percentage of loss sustained during the process, a 
complicated system of intermediaries has grown up, which, 
apart from being inefficient, also prevents producers from 
reaping the benefit of a relative rise in prices. In Argen-
tina, for example, where the organization of the meat trade 
is at its best, in 1953 the producer received only 49 cen-
tavos for each peso spent on meat purchases, whereas in 
1943 his share had reached 64 centavos.'' This situation 
can be contrasted with conditions prevailing in other coun-
tries, like Australia, Canada, the United States and South 
Africa, where between 62 and 70 per cent of the final price 
paid by the consumer falls to the producer." 
This statement can be verified by reference to chart 
IV, where a comparison is made between fluctuations in 
retail prices for meat and for cattle on the hoof in various 
Latin American countries. It can be seen that the margins 
of distribution in the countries selected have risen progres-
sively. This contrasts with the situation in the United 
States, where marketing technique is at an advanced stage. 
In the latter country, the fluctuations in cattle prices have 
far less impact on retail meat prices, which, generally 
speaking, have been subject to much slighter fluctuations, 
so that the consumer market has acquired greater sta-
bility. 
Although meat and other livestock marketing in Latin 
America has not yet been thoroughly studied,'' there is 
much a priori evidence upon which to base a preliminary 
outline of the present situation. 
In many countries auction markets for livestock do not 
exist. The animals go through various stages of fattening 
prior to slaughtering—a process which generally entails 
their travelling over long distances with the consequent 
loss of weight and deterioration of quality. In by far the 
greater number of cases they are slaughtered in small 
establishments where neither the equipment nor the build-
ings themselves are satisfactory, apart from the appallingly 
insanitary conditions which prevail. With the exception 
of Argentina and Uruguay, the Latin American countries 
have very few modern cold-storage plants and these, for the 
° Sociedad Rural Argentina, Annual report 1954. 
" "Marketing Margins for Foodstuffs", FAO Monthly Bulletin, 
November 1954. Estimates for other Latin American countries show 
that the producers' share barely reaches 25 or 30 per cent of the 
prices paid by consumers. 
' In the study on livestock production to be undertaken jointly 
by ECLA and FAO (see note 3) , high priority has been accorded 
to the question of the marketing of animal products. 
most part, are inconveniently situated in areas remote from 
the centres of production. As a result, yields are very low, 
many valuable by-products are wasted, and, as a general 
rule, the quality of meat and hides is poorer than might 
be expected. In consequence, the cost of meat rises, and the 
resulting burden, in the final instance, falls on the con-
sumer. In this connexion, it should be mentioned that in 
Argentina most of the cold-storage plant profits accrue 
from the processing of by-products and not from the sale 
of the meat itself. 
Lack of transport facilities and poor communications 
hamper the incorporation of good potential pastures or 
the development of grazing lands at present inadequately 
exploited. In certain areas it is impossible to guarantee 
consumer centres regular supplies, either because the roads 
are impassable for mechanized transport, in which case 
the cattle must be driven on the hoof and lose much weight 
as a result, or because the railways—if indeed they exist 
—lack the necessary rolling stock. 
PRODUCTION 
In recent years, the production of meat in Latin America, 
which reached 6 million tons in 1949-51, has remained 
stationary at 5.8-5.9 millions, a figure which is barely 19 
per cent above the pre-war level. Meanwhile the popula-
tion of the region has grown by more than 40 per cent, 
and thus serious supply problems have arisen, particularly 
in the foreign trade sector. 
This low rate of expansion of meat production is in 
marked contrast with the situation obtaining in other areas, 
since world output—including that of Latin America-
increased by 34 per cent between the pre-war years and 
1954. Moreover, the region's crop and livestock produc-
tion followed very dissimilar trends. This is evidenced 
by the indices of total agricultural production, which rose 
by more than 30 per cent between 1952 and 1954, as 
compared with the 19 per cent mentioned above in the 
case of livestock production. (See table 2.) 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: INDICES OF MEAT PRODUCTION, 
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, POPULATION, 
AND WORLD MEAT PRODUCTION 
(1934-38=100) 
Total meat Total agricultural World meat 
production production Population production 
1949-51 121 120 133.6 « 116" 
1952 118 131 139.9 121 
1953 119 132 143.5 129 
1954 120 135 146.9 134 




Table 3 illustrates the marked disequilibrium which 
also exists between the growth of animal stocks and that 
of meat production, since in 1954 the former were 33 to 
44 per cent higher than the pre-war level, while the latter 
expanded by only 19 per cent. 
Production of the various kinds of meat has not de-
veloped homogeneously. The output of beef, which ac-
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Chart IV 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: INDICES OF ANIMAL STOCKS AND MEAT PRODUCTION, 
BY SPECIES 
(1934-38=100) 
Animal slocks Meal production 
Beef cattle Pigs Sheep Beef Mutton Pork 
1949-51 127 » 118» 123 « 120 105 129 
1952 130 128 127 114 111 135 
1953 133 141 130 115 116 137 
1954 134 144 133 116 116 142 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and Agriculture Organization. 
« 1950. 
counted for some 75 per cent of the total, exceeded the 
pre-war level by about 20 per cent in 1949-51, but dropped 
sharply in 1952. Although a recovery was later apparent, 
the 1949-51 level had not been regained by 1954. It is 
estimated that in 1955 the previous average has probably 
been surpassed, thanks to the remarkable expansion in 
Argentina. Mutton production has grown slowly but stead-
ily, while that of pork has expanded more rapidly, until 
in 1954 it was 42 per cent higher than in the pre-war 
period. 
An analysis of Latin American meat production reveals 
that as three countries of the region—Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay—together account for about 70 per cent of Latin 
America's total output, they have exerted a decisive in-
fluence on the over-all indices. Table 4 shows that the 
production of these three countries has grown at a much 
slower rate than that recorded for the rest of Latin America. 
(See table 4.) 
Apart from technical problems, some of which will be 
described later, one of the most important factors that 
impaired Argentina's livestock development was the pro-
longed drought which ravaged the country during 1948-51. 
In this period, the rate of slaughter rose to an extraordi-
nary degree, large numbers of cattle and other animals 
being killed, to the evident detriment of stocks. This had 
a serious effect on slaughtering in subsequent years, and 
by 1953 the lowest level for the whole decade was reached. 
Only in 1955, when the renewal of stocks was approach-
ing completion, did a fresh increase in slaughtering become 
apparent. 
The present crisis in Uruguayan meat production is 
mainly attributable to competition for the country's limited 
natural resources, not only between stock-breeding and 
crops, but also, within the livestock sector itself, between 
sheep and cattle. 
In connexion with the first aspect of this competition, 
it should be pointed out that the area sown to wheat has 
increased remarkably in the last two years, from 500,000 
hectares to 750,000. This expansion was achieved partly 
at the cost of pastureland, with the result that the resources 
available for grazing were reduced. As regards the second 
aspect, the boom in world wool prices meant that sheep 
increasingly supplanted cattle. While stocks of the former 
rose from 18 millions in the pre-war period to more than 
26 millions in 1954, cattle herds decreased from 8.3 to 
7.8 million head. Since, in the case of sheep, the ratio of 
slaughter to stocks did not rise, owing to the fact that 
Uruguayan demand showed a preference for beef, pro-
duction came to a relative standstill. (See again table 4.) 
T a b l e 4 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL MEAT PRODUCTION, BY COUNTRIES 
(Thousands of tons) 
^93^-38 Í9Í9-5Í 1952 1953 195i 
U) (B) (.A) (B) M) (B) (A) (B) U) (B) 
Latin America 4,916 100 5,990 100 5,834 100 5,890 100 5,917 100 
Argentina 1,929 39 2,310 38 2,117 36 2,113 36 2,117 36 
Brazil 1,325 27 1,494 25 1,494 26 1,555 27 1,575 26 
Uruguay 344 7 380 6 382 7 409 7 378 6 
Mexico 353 7 478 8 524 9 497 8 529 9 
Other countries 965 20 1,328 23 1,317 22 1,316 22 1,318 23 
INDICES 
Latin America 100 121 118 119 120 
Argentina 100 120 109 109 109 
Brazil 100 113 113 117 119 
Uruguay 100 110 110 119 110 
Mexico 100 135 148 141 150 
Other countries 100 138 136 136 136 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and Agriculture Organization. Figures for Argentina were supplied by the 
Instituto Nacional de Carnes. 
Note: (A) = Volume 
(B) = Percentage. 
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In Brazil where production has expanded by only 19 
per cent in almost twenty years, a similar phenomenon 
has been observed. Sheep stocks increased substantially, 
while the rate of slaughter rose more slowly and the situa-
tion was further aggravated by the marked decline in the 
average yield per animal. 
Conversely, Mexico was able to achieve great progress 
in the production of meat—particularly pork—and by 1954 
output was about 50 per cent above that of the pre-war 
period. The remaining countries, taken as a whole, regis-
tered a fairly substantial increment, although the expan-
sion did not keep pace with demographic growth. 
The reasons why meat production has progressed so 
slowly vary from one country to another, but generally 
speaking the principal cause is the low level of productivity 
in the livestock industry. The large areas covered by the 
majority of Latin American cattle farms; the lack of 
modern techniques for livestock management; the low 
level of investment in this activity; shortcomings in the 
marketing and transport of livestock products; and, finally, 
the absence of a consistent development policy, have all 
conspired to bring about this result. 
Table 5 




and Canada Europe Latin America 
Beef 66.6 48.3 25.9 
Pork 87.1 69.0 18.1 
Mutton 10.4 6.7 3.5 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
» Calculated by dividing meat production by stocks. 
Table 5, which compares the meat yield per animal in 
the United States, Canada, Europe and Latin America, 
offers proof of the technological backwardness of live-
stock farming in the region. Even on the assumption of a 
large margin of error, the differences are so great that 
any modification of the basic data would not invalidate 
the conclusions to be drawn from the table. The figures 
show that, in 1953, the average meat yield per head of 
cattle in Latin America, the statistics for which are, more-
over, the most reliable, was barely 40 per cent of that 
obtained in North America and little more than 50 per 
cent of the European figure. The differences are still more 
marked in the case of mutton and pork production. It 
should, however, be stressed that the relevant estimates 
may be somewhat conservative, owing to the large pro-
portion of animals slaughtered in situ, a percentage which 
is not registered in the statistics of many countries. 
If the previous comparison is indicative of the average 
level of productivity in Latin America, table 6 provides 
still clearer evidence of the prevailing situation, by show-
ing the productivity of individual countries. The figures 
refer only to beef, since it plays such an important role 
in total output, and production statistics are more reliable 
than for the other types of meat. The table shows the enor-
mous discrepancy between the productivity of some coun-
tries, like Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, where the yields 
are almost at the European level, and that of others, for 
example, Honduras, Venezuela and Nicaragua, where they 
are frankly negligible, as is probably also the case in those 
countries which are not listed in the table because the rele-
vant data is incomplete. 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE BEEF YIELDS PER HEAD 
OF CATTLE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1952 
( Kilogrammes) 









43.1 Brazil 20.0 
42.7 Ecuador 19.2 
37.0 Paraguay 16.9 
28.2 El Salvador 16.8 
25.3 Costa Rica 14.4 
22.8 Venezuela 13.7 
20.4 Honduras 12.9 
20.0 Nicaragua 9.1 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
" The figure for Colombia was taken from the relevant ECLA 
study (document E/CN.12/365). 
The figures in table 6 are a direct consequence of the 
low rate of slaughter prevailing in the majority of Latin 
American countries. As is shown in table 7, the rate of 
cattle slaughter in many countries of the region is below 
15 per cent of stocks. This implies that the average age at 
slaughter is seven years or more. Such is clearly the case 
in Brazil, for example. Here, as has been pointed out 
before, stocks have expanded sharply while production 
has remained at virtually the same level. The result of 
this development has been a gradual increase in the aver-
age age at slaughter, which is now about nine years. Apart 
from the deterioration in the quality of the meat, the fact 
that slaughter is so long delayed indicates an extremely 
unsatisfactory utilization of available resources, since the 
same grazing land could carry a greater number of ani-
mals during the same period. It is clear that this situation 
is largely attributable to the quality of the pasture. In 
most countries, the animals graze on natural grasslands 
of a very low nutritive value, so that a longer time must 
elapse before they are fat enough for slaughter. Moreover, 
the lack of abattoirs and processing plants in the appro-
priate places prevents the slaughter of animals at the right 
age, not to mention that weight is lost during transport 
on the hoof from one pasture ground to another and thence 
to the slaughterhouse. 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE RATE OF CATTLE 
SLAUGHTER IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(As a percentage of stocks) 
Country Year Percentage rate 
Argentina 1952 23.0 
Chile 1951 21.0 
Uruguay 1951 16.0 
Guatemala • 1952 15.0 
Honduras 1952 13.0 
El Salvador 1952 12.2 
Mexico 1951 11.9 
Colombia • 1953 11.1 
Brazil 1952 10.7 
Costa Rica 1952 10.7 
Nicaragua 1952 9.3 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and 
Agriculture Organization. 
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The problem of feeding constitutes one of the most 
serious obstacles to Latin American livestock development. 
The failure to apply methods of forage preservation, and 
the almost complete disregard of food concentrates as 
supplements to diet, have resulted in many deaths and 
much loss of weight in times of drought, or—in the case 
of the southern countries—during rigorous winters. In 
Central America, for instance, it is estimated that 50 per 
cent of the fodder is wasted through lack of storage facili-
ties. During the rainy season, grass and fodder crops grow 
rapidly and soon outstrip the animals' consumption capac-
ity; if the surplus is not harvested and stored in haystacks 
or silos most of it is lost, since it has very little nutritive 
value if left standing too long. Not only is there the prob-
lem of quantity during certain seasons of the year, but 
the majority of countries have to face difficulties with 
regard to the quality of the forage. Artificial pastures 
form only a very small part of the total grazing area, 
yet it is well known that they are a decisive factor in speed-
ing up fattening so that animals are ready for slaughter 
at an earlier age and yield more meat. In this connexion, 
it should be stressed that practically no experiments on 
forage have been carried out in Latin America, and that 
the desire of farmers to improve their grazing-lands is 
often frustrated by a total lack of knowledge of the most 
suitable types of fodder crops. 
The size of the meadows, and the water supply, are also 
important factors in determining herd yields. In Latin 
America, the grazing-lands are usually too extensive, and 
since water is generally to be found at some distance from 
the pasture, the animals are obliged to walk long stretches 
before they find it, losing much weight in the process. 
The health standard of the herds is poor as a rule, high 
morbidity and mortality rates being registered. The various 
diseases attacking the stock, whether epidemic or endemic, 
help to bring about the decline in herd yields, by causing 
a high death rate in young animals and a loss of weight 
in adult specimens. Although it is true that Governments 
have recently been trying to raise the standard of health, 
it appears that, save for isolated cases, the progress 
achieved has been negligible. 
The quality of the breeds, which are mainly indigenous, 
with great powers of resistance and adaptation to the 
environment, but low-yielding and slow to mature, is an-
other important determinant of the low productivity. Ex-
cept in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and perhaps one or two 
other countries, where livestock farming, despite the vast 
extent of the grazing-lands and the existence of many of 
the other problems discussed in this article, has achieved 
the status of an organized industry, the absence of any 
choice of breeds is also largely responsible for the un-
satisfactory situation described. 
A careful enumeration and analysis of all the tech-
nical factors in each country which have helped to reduce 
productivity to such a low level falls outside the scope 
of this study. However, the broad indications already 
given suffice to illustrate the magnitude of the task which 
lies ahead, if standards of livestock production are to be 
improved. An immense burden of responsibility thus falls 
on national authorities and individual farmers alike, and 
only if the nature of the task is properly understood 
can success crown the endeavours to improve livestock 
production in which all the Latin American countries are 
engaged. 
In addition to strictly technical factors, many other 
elements have, to some extent, slowed up the expansion 
of livestock production. Since there is no room here for a 
detailed analysis covering the whole region, attention will 
be concentrated on the price policies of certain countries, 
on the inflation from which many economies are suffering 
and, generally speaking, on the failure of individual coun-
tries to adopt consistent and well-balanced development 
programmes. 
FOREIGN TRADE IN MEAT 
In recent years, the world trade in meat has reached 
the highest level ever recorded, despite the increasing self-
sufficiency of importing countries. Latin America is the 
sole exception to this trend, since its meat exports have 
declined steadily, until in 1952-54 their volume was less 
than half that registered before the war. Thus, Latin 
America's share in total world exports dropped from 41 
per cent in the pre-war years to 17 per cent in 1954. (See 
table 8.) 
This sharp decline in Latin American exports is basically 
a reflection of developments in Argentina, the region's 
main exporting country. Of the 480,000 tons' decrease 
in the region's total, 368,000 corresponded to the reduc-
tion in Argentine exports. Other important elements which 
helped to form this pattern were the withdrawal of Brazil 
from the meat export market and the drastic contraction 
of Uruguayan sales abroad. While 1955 witnessed a vig-
orous recovery of Argentina's exports, this development 
Table 8 
WORLD MEAT EXPORTS'" COMPARED WITH THOSE OF LATIN AMERICA 










(B) to (A) 
Average 1934-48 2 ,160 890 1 , 2 7 0 41 7 0 
Average 194.9-51 2 ,050 625 1 ,425 30 4 4 
1952 2 ,020 441 1 ,579 22 2 8 
1953 2 ,240 389 1 ,851 17 2 1 
1954 2 , 3 9 0 410'= 1 , 9 8 0 17 2 1 
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and Agriculture Organization. 




LATIN AMERICA: MEAT EXPORTS, BY COUNTRIES 
(Thousands of tons) 
Average Average 
Í93Í-38 191,9-51 1952 1953 
Meat^ 
Argentina 6 7 4 " 445 327 295 
Uruguay 130 98 70 71 
Brazil 72 25 5 5 
Mexico — 40 34 12 
Other countries 14 15 3 5 
TOTAL 8 9 0 6 2 5 4 4 1 3 8 9 
Livestock " 
Argentina 19.0 30.0 24.0 15.0 
Mexico 40.0 — 25.0 27.0 
Honduras 2.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
El Salvador — 3.0 4.0 6.0 
Nicaragua — 3.0 4.0 4.0 
Other countries 22.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 










Sources: For Argentina, Instituto Nacional de Carnes; for Urugu^, Suplemento Estadístico de la 
Revista Económica, Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, and lood and Agriculture Organiza-
tion; for Brazil, Food and Agriculture Organization; for Mexico, Economic Commission for Latin 
America. 
" Preliminary figures. 
Including chilled and frozen beef, pork and mutton, processed and tinned meat. Expressed in 
terms of carcases, excluding oiFal. 
" 1935-39. 
Estimates. 
" Beef cattle, sheep and pigs. 
has probably been offset to a large extent by the decline 
in those of Uruguay, which, during the course of the year 
in question, are estimated to have totalled not more than 
10,000 tons. (See table 9.) 
The United Kingdom is still the main purchaser of meat 
from Latin America. More than 80 per cent of Argentina's 
exports of chilled beef were absorbed by this market. In 
the course of 1955, as a result of the abolition of ration-
ing in Britain during the preceding year, a change in con-
sumer demand led to a marked increase in imports of 
chilled meat, which rose to 115,000 tons. On the other hand, 
as regards corned beef, the United Kingdom has continued 
to buy large shipments, but the United States is now the 
most important purchaser, absorbing about 50 per cent 
of total exports. 
Recently Latin America has begun to trade with the 
USSR, a development which has significantly affected 
exports to other countries. In fact, Argentina shipped more 
than 34,000 tons of meat to the Soviet Union in 1954, as 
against less than 6,000 in 1953. This export trade did 
not exist in previous years. Argentina has thus been able 
to offset the fall in United States purchases from a maxi-
mum of 63,000 tons in 1951 to only 29,000 in 1954. 
As has already been explained, the contraction of 
Argentina's exports is a result of the combination of two 
forces, apparently in opposition. While production has 
grown slowly—about 18 per cent in the last twenty years 
—domestic consumption has risen by some 58 per cent, 
so that exportable surpluses have diminished. Although 
in 1955 there was a remarkable reversal of this trend, 
since production increased by more than 200,000 tons, of 
which not less than 170,000 were probably available for 
export, pre-war exportable surpluses are not likely to have 
been exceeded. 
Uruguay's meat export trade faced a serious crisis in 
1955. Although, until 1954, exports were almost invariably 
about 30 per cent lower than during the pre-war period 
(see table 9 ) , 1955 witnessed a spectacular drop. It is 
estimated that during the first half of the year not more 
than 3,200 tons were exported, so that numerous cold-
storage plants had to operate below capacity and many 
of their workers were thrown out of employment. In order 
to stimulate exports, the Uruguayan Government has es-
tablished substantial exchange rate subsidies amounting to 
50 per cent of the unit value in the case of chilled and 
frozen meat and 200 per cent in that of tinned meat. Despite 
this subsidy, however, it seems that Uruguay's total ex-
ports in 1955 did not exceed 10,000 tons. The funda-
mental cause of this decline in exportable surpluses lies 
in the exceptional expansion of domestic demand. The 
serious nature of Uruguay's meat crisis is thrown into 
relief by the recent decision to import 60,000 head of cattle 
from Argentina to cover the growing needs of domestic 
consumption. 
Exports of meat from Mexico, which hold third place 
among exporting countries, have undergone a number 
of vicissitudes in recent years. During the pre-war period, 
exports to the United States rose to almost 300,000 head 
of cattle, and in 1940-44 the annual average reached nearly 
450,000 head. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 
1947 led to the closing of the frontier until 1952. The 
disease broke out again in 1953, so that once again the 
frontier was closed and exports of cattle on the hoof were 
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discontinued. This time, however, the epidemic took a 
milder form, and trade in livestock was resumed in De-
cember 1954. As a means of compensating for its sus-
pension, Mexico had begun to increase exports of frozen 
beef during the post-war years, until in 1951 and 1952 
they exceeded 30,000 tons. Exports of chilled meat under-
went a marked decline in 1953 and 1954, dropping to 
12,000 and 13,500 tons respectively; but in 1955 Mexico's 
exports of meat and livestock to the United States prob-
ably expanded once more, and are estimated at not less 
than 200,000 head, despite the fact that the latter country 
is reducing its meat purchases. 
Brazil's exports of meat were at one time considerable. 
In the pre-war period they approached 80,000 tons, ap-
proximately one fourth of which was tinned meat. Peak 
volumes of 65,000 tons of tinned and 94,000 tons of 
chilled and frozen meat were registered in 1940. After that 
date, the combination of an increase in domestic demand 
with the stagnation of production led to a gradual decline 
in the exportable surpluses, which by 1954 were prac-
tically non-existent. Moreover, to meet demand it was essen-
tial to step up imports—mainly of live weight from Uruguay 
—so that the figures for 1953 and 1954 exceeded 6,000 
tons. Brazil's short-term prospects for a recovery of its 
share in the meat export trade are not very promising, 
although it is estimated that over the long term this coun-
try may become an important exporter of beef. 
Meat is also exported by some of the Central American 
countries. Most of their trade is in cattle on the hoof and 
is carried on within that area, though in recent years a 
tendency to seek new markets has become apparent. Thus, 
while Honduras and El Salvador mainly supply Guate-
mala, Nicaragua has dispatched large shipments to Peru 
and Venezuela. After a long embargo on cattle exports, 
Costa Rica entered this trade in 1954, its chief market 
being Colombia. Total exports from Central America are 
estimated at some 80,000 head of cattle, of which more 
than 50 per cent is absorbed within the area itself. 
Imports of meat have increased substantially since the 
pre-war period, and in recent years have reached an an-
nual volume of about 75,000 tons, as compared with the 
54,000 imported before the war. The principal importer 
countries are Chile, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba, 
which in the aggregate absorb some 75 per cent of the 
region's total purchases. 
Imports of meat mainly take the form of cattle on the 
hoof, although in recent years there has been a progres-
sive expansion of the import trade in chilled and frozen 
as well as in tinned and other processed meat. Thus, 
whereas in the pre-war period the proportion of the total 
volume of Latin America's meat imports represented by 
livestock was 80 per cent, it reached an average of only 
50 per cent in 1949-53. 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE EXPORTS AND PRICES OF SOME PRODUCTS 
1. C A C A O 
Of all the commodities exported by Latin America, it 
is perhaps cacao that has experienced the most violent 
price fluctuations during the post-war years, and that 
consequently offers one of the best examples of the need 
for some kind of stabilizing mechanism. The rise and fall 
in prices have been much steeper than might have been 
expected from the relative movements of supply and de-
mand. In the three-year period 1953-55, for instance, cacao 
prices completed a full cycle. Thus, in July 1954 they 
were twice as high as in March 1953, but by August 1955 
they had declined to their previous level of 31 to 33 cents 
per pound, around which they have since fluctuated. More-
over, a very similar movement had already been apparent 
during 1947-49. Prices almost doubled between January 
and November of the former year, only to fall below that 
level throughout most of 1949. 
Post-war cacao prices have, however, fluctuated at a 
much higher level than that prevailing before and during 
the war. Quotations in the range of 11 and 19 cents^ during 
the years 1910-19, fell to between 8 and 16 cents in the 
1920's. Moreover, with the exception of the late 1920's, 
the period marked by the end of the First World War and 
the close of the 1930's was characterized by a generally 
'Annual averages: spot New York; Accra; f.o.b.; cents per 
pound. 
^ The fact that Brazilian and West African production continued 
to expand during the low-price decade of the 1930's was due to 
output from trees planted in previous periods when prices were more 
remunerative. In Brazil, moreover, there was the influence of a shift 
in production centres away from the more unfavourable northern 
areas towards the fertile cacao-producing zones in Bahía. 
declining trend in prices. The latter decade, which was 
notable in that its high level of production^ substantially 
exceeded effective world demand, witnessed the lowest 
level of prices in over fifty years, ranging between only 
4 and 8 cents per pound. Because of the stocks accumu-
lated during the 1930's, and the introduction of rationing 
and price controls, prices during the Second World War 
remained at 7-9 cents per pound thus marking a dividing 
line between the pre-war decade of over-supply and low 
prices, and the post-war decade of production shortages 
and generally high prices, particularly in relation to other 
food prices. 
1 . T H E INSTABILITY OF T H E POST-WAR CACAO MARKET 
The instability of the post-war cacao market, which is 
reflected very clearly in charts I and II, has been due to 
two basic causes. Firstly, as in the case of coffee, the post-
war revival in the demand for cacao was faced with a 
relatively low level of production resulting from surpluses 
, of many years' standing which curtailed new plantings. 
Thus output could not be increased over the short run, 
owing to a lag of about five years between the time of 
planting and the first harvest. A further complicating 
factor has been the prevalence of numerous plant diseases 
and inclement weather, both of which have tended to retard 
the expansion in output expected after 1950. Secondly, 
post-war cacao stocks—unlike those of coffee—were soon 
reduced to such a low level that they afforded no buffer be-
tween current production and consumption requirements. 
Chart I shows that, as world production exceeded con-
sumption in only two of the post-war years (1949 and 
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Chart I 
CACAO: WORLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION^ 
(Natural scale) 
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" Production during the international cacao year (from 1 November to 31 October) is compared with consumption 
during the calendar year in which the harvest ends, on the assumption that most of the crop is shipped during this 
year. Figures for Brazilian production have been adjusted on an international cacao crop-year basis. 
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Chart II 
CACAO: SPOT PRICES AND STOCKS IN NEW YORK WAREHOUSES 
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1951), there has been no opportunity to replenish cacao 
inventories. Since the end of the war, visible stocks in 
New York warehouses have never exceeded 50 per cent of 
the pre-war average and at times have fallen as low as 5 
per cent of this average. (See chart 11.)^ 
Under these circumstances, even moderate changes in 
supply and demand, some of which have been due to the 
lack of information upon which to base a forecast, have 
had an extraordinary impact on a generally nervous and 
apparently thin market. Cacao prices have been extremely 
sensitive even to such factors as the timing of announce-
ments regarding the sale of new harvests, defaults of cacao 
merchants and single purchases made by manufacturers. 
In any free commodity market, price variations greater 
than those required to balance supply and demand are to 
be expected, as a result of the momentum of speculation, 
inventory adjustments, short-selling, etc. But in the case 
of cacao, at least two economic factors have made a 
special contribution to price instability, apart from pos-
sible defects in the marketing of this commodity.^ Firstly, 
price fluctuations have shown a high inverse correlation 
to changes in visible stocks in New York warehouses. (See 
again chart II.) Since information is lacking on manu-
facturers' inventories, which apparently represent the bulk 
of total cacao stocks in the United States, price quotations 
have been related to visible warehouse stocks, which owing 
to their marginal nature, are highly volatile. Secondly, 
consumer demand has been very slow to adjust to price 
changes, because confectionary manufacturers have en-
deavoured to prevent higher cacao prices from expressing 
themselves at the retail level. They have been able to do 
this mainly by drawing on inventories of finished products, 
by changing the composition of their production so as to 
place more emphasis on lines of manufacture containing 
less chocolate, and by using more of the lower-priced in-
gredients such as milk and sugar in fillings.® Thus, over 
the short run, demand has tended to respond very slowly 
to changed supply conditions as reflected in price varia-
tions. 
It is not surprising, then, that after the Second World 
War, when trade and price controls were removed in the 
United States, cacao prices were almost six times greater 
at the end of 1947 than in September 1946. After this, 
there was a reaction against this artificially high price 
level and prices were forced down to less than half the peak 
attained, a development which was aided by the good 
1948-49 harvest. It again became obvious that the price 
change had been exaggerated, and quotations levelled off 
at between 30 and 40 cents per pound, from the time when 
' United States manufacturers' inventories, however, are currently 
estimated as being several times greater than visible warehouse 
stocks in New York. It is therefore possible that the decline in total 
stocks is overstated in chart II and that manufacturers now hold 
a larger proportion of total cacao stocks than before the war. 
* In this article, no effort will be made to analyse the organiza-
tion of the cacao trade; in a future issue of the Bulletin it is intended 
to include a general study of trading in primary commodities. In the 
cacao market, however, various defects have on occasions been 
pointed out, such as the control of supplies by a relatively small 
number of marketing agencies and the concentration of demand in 
only a few consuming centres. 
" The hesitation to pass on higher prices to consumers is prob-
ably motivated by the great competitiveness of the confectionery 
industry in the United States. In Europe, on the other hand, con-
sumption continued to rise in face of higher retail prices due mainly 
perhaps to a pent-up demand for sweets after many years of ration-
ing and shortages. 
the first efl'ects of the Korean War began to diminish until 
the last three months of 1953. This relative stability of 
prices was maintained, in spite of the surplus production 
in 1951 and the large cacao deficit in the following year. 
(See again chart I.) At this point, as has been seen, there 
was a repetition of the 1947-49 experience. The factors 
which contributed to the recent price instability are worthy 
of analysis in some detail, for changes in supply and de-
mand at this time were much smaller than during the 
previous period of relative price stability. 
The sharp price rise in the last quarter of 1953 was 
motivated by two main factors. Firstly, the market began 
to become aware of the fact that consumption was running 
at a much higher rate than previously estimated, princi-
pally as a result of the rise in European demand due to the 
abolition of rationing in the United Kingdom and to the 
large expansion in German imports. Secondly, the gradual 
upward revisions of the rate of consumption coincided 
with pessimistic forecasts regarding the African crop for 
1953/54. At this time nothing was known of the Brazilian 
mid-crop in 1954, which turned out to be an all-time 
record and to a great extent offset the decline in African 
output, which had also been underestimated. Accurate in-
formation as to the Brazilian crop was not forthcoming 
until well after the middle of 1954, even though harvesting 
begins in May. In the intermediate period, estimates that 
the gap between the rate of consumption and 1954 output 
might be as large as 100,000 tons, whereas stocks had been 
worked down to the lowest level in many years, resulted in 
a near panic in cacao trading. At this point, speculation 
and defaults aided the price upsurge, so that in July 1954 
spot quotations fluctuated around a level as high as 80 cents 
per pound. 
The first price break occurred between July and Sep-
tember, when the real size of the 1953/54 cacao crop, 
bolstered by the bumper Brazilian harvest, became known. 
The 20-per-cent devaluation of the cruzeiro at this time had 
a further demoralizing effect on the market and resulted 
in heavy speculation in New York and London, short-
selling of futures and actuals over a wide range of prices, 
and the subsequent disposal of about 6,000 tons of African 
cacao stocks. Toward the end of 1954 prices again became 
firmer at a little under 50 cents per pound on the basis of 
forecasts which again proved false. As late as February 
1955, the 1954 rate of consumption was being compared 
with a 1954/55 crop, forecast to be less than that of the 
previous year, although it finally worked out at over 40,000 
tons greater. In March it became apparent that higher 
retail prices were restricting demand in both the United 
States and Europe and that the rate of consumption had 
been overestimated. Although prices weakened consider-
ably, falling to between 37 and 40 cents per pound, it was 
still maintained that production and consumption were in 
balance at prevailing prices and that no margin was avail-
able for the creation of buffer stocks. Information as to the 
substantial underestimation of the 1954/55 harvest, mainly 
in Africa, and to a lesser extent in Brazil, was not forth-
coming until July or August of 1955. With this news, prices 
slumped to the early 1953 level, around which they have 
fluctuated ever since. This, then, is the background for 
the anomalous rise in cacao prices in 1954, in spite of the 
fact that world production exceeded absorption both in 
that year and in 1955, and that visible stocks in New York 
warehouses, after some fluctuations, have been built up to 
the highest level in five years. 
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2 . I M P A C T O F P R I C E INCREASES ON T H E 
CONSUMPTION OF CACAO® 
The post-war rise in cacao prices has obviously been of 
only short-term benefit to producing countries. Although 
the volume of United States imports has not risen over the 
immediate pre-war average, the value of cacao purchases 
has increased by about eight times, reaching over 250 
million dollars in 1954; and the increase in the value of 
European imports, where import volumes have risen above 
pre-war levels, has been substantially greater. However, it 
is doubtful whether a significantly greater volume of cacao 
can be consumed at the high prices at present prevailing, 
and the post-war period of price instability has forced 
manufacturers to invest considerable sums in the search for 
synthetic substitutes and to change the composition of their 
production, placing more emphasis on those lines of manu-
facture which require smaller amounts of cacao. This may 
be a process which is not easily reversible even if cacao 
prices are rendered more comparable with other food 
prices. Furthermore, the market has become so accustomed 
to a tight supply situation that surplus output sufficient to 
build up a normal level of buffer stocks may have a very 
adverse effect on future cacao quotations. 
Since the end of the war, world cacao exports have 
fluctuated around the level prevailing immediately before 
the war, although some significant changes have recently 
occurred in the direction of this trade. (See chart III.) 
According to the statistics of exporting countries, between 
1950 and 1954 United States imports declined by over 
40 per cent, while European imports (notably from Ger-
many and more recently from the United Kingdom) and 
those of other countries (principally the Soviet Union) 
have expanded considerably. The shift of exports to Europe 
has been due in part to the abolition of sweet rationing, the 
relaxation of trade controls and a wore favourable balance-
of-payments situation; but to a considerable extent this 
shift does not reflect a change in the world distribution of 
final consumption. What has occurred is that in recent 
years the United States has received large supplies of cacao 
re-exports from Europe and has also increased purchases 
of processed cacao products from this source. In table 1, 
" In this section a disproportionate amount of attention is devoted 
to United States consumption, owing to the lack of detailed informa-
tion on other consuming countries. However, tendencies in the 
United States market may be taken as indicative of those elsewhere. 
which attempts to quantify these trends, it can be seen 
that the United States absorption of cacao has declined 
only moderately since 1950. 
Larger re-exports of cacao beans and exports of cacao 
products to the United States, motivated by high prevailing 
prices, have been contrary to the interests of exporting 
countries. Re-exports have mainly consisted of Brazilian 
cacao, purchased at a discount in the first instance with 
trade account cruzeiros from Brazil's commercial debt, 
principally to the United Kingdom and Germany. As a 
result of the discount and in some cases of dollar bonuses 
paid for exports to hard currency countries, Europe has 
been able to under-sell direct Brazilian shipments of cacao 
to the United States. Consequently, although Brazil has 
not lost its share of the United States market,' it has suf-
fered a reduction in scarce current dollar income. 
The rise in European exports of cacao products is re-
lated to the effort in the United States to replace cocoa 
butter with other products manufactured by mixing cacao 
solids with coconut oil, palm-kernel oil or other edible fats. 
These fats are relatively cheap compared with cocoa butter, 
and are being used to an increasing extent. Cacao powder 
and cake, the main sources of cacao solids employed in 
these mixtures, have been among the principal components 
of increased European re-exports of cacao products, which 
now exceed 20 per cent of total United States cacao con-
sumption, as compared with only 2 per cent in 1948. If 
these mixtures find favour among consumers, then the post-
war period of high cacao prices may have a permanent 
impact upon future cacao consumption, although it must 
be admitted that some doubt exists as to how much cacao 
is saved by this process.® 
' Although the share of Brazilian cacao in total United States 
imports of this commodity fell sharply between 1950 and 1952 as a 
result of the reduction in total Brazilian exports, by 1954 the post-
war average of about 25 per cent had been restored. Most of the 
other producers have maintained or even increased exports to the 
United States, except in the case of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, 
the two largest African producers, which have chiefly supplied the 
increasing needs of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union. 
® The doubt as to the net saving of cacao beans which results 
from the use of these compound mixtures arises from the fact that 
the latter have been found in some instances to contain even more 
cacao solids than ordinary chocolate coatings, although their com-
position varies greatly. 
Table 1 
UNITED STATES: NET IMPORTS OF CACAO AND CACAO PRODUCTS 
(Millions of pounds of cacao or equivalent) 
1950 195Í 1952 
Direct exports of cacao 660.7 574.3 532.3 
Apparent re-exports » —1.6 31.9 40.1 
Imports of cacao products 56.3 57.1 59.0 
TOTAL 7 1 5 . 4 6 6 8 . 3 6 3 1 . 4 
Re-exports of cacao beans and cacao products 47.5 64.7 58.6 














Source: The Cocoa Situation, Business Information Service, published by the United States Trade Department; selected issues. 
» Difference between direct exports to the United States, by exporter countries and U.S. imports of cacao beans. The former are registered 
according to the first country of destination and the latter according to the country of origin. These figures also reflect the time lag between 
the date of embarkation and the arrival of the exports, but the discrepancy tends eventually to disappear. Moreover, it is unlikely that this 
constitutes an important factor in the high figure for 1954, since United States imports declined during the first half of 1955. 
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Chart III 
DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD EXPORTS OF CACAO BEANS 
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Perhaps the main saving of cacao beans in the United 
States has been accomplished by the change in the com-
position of confectionery sales. Between 1953 and 1954, 
for example, the total volume of such sales fell by only 1.2 
per cent, but the sales volume of products containing a 
relatively large amount of cacao, such as moulded choco-
late bars and solid chocolate and chocolate-covered bulk 
goods, declined by between 13 and 25 per cent. Sales of 
other bulk goods and packaged products retailing under 
one dollar, on the other hand, increased slightly during the 
same period. The cause of this tendency has of course been 
the extraordinary increase in the price of cacao as com-
pared with the costs of other confectionery ingredients. 
(See table 2.) In 1953 and 1954, cacao products accounted 
for between 45 and 50 per cent of total confectionery in-
gredient costs, in contrast with only 26 per cent in 1944. 
Table 2 
UNITED STATES: INDICES OF THE PRICES OF THE 




CACAO BEANS: WORLD PRODUCTION BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE WAR 
(Millions of pounds) 
Year Cacao beans Milk b Sugar ' Corn syrupd Peanuts « 
1947 393 134 150 150 114 
1950 361 114 144 145 123 
1953 417 129 159 184 138 
1954 648 117 159 184 144 
Source: Official publications of the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
• Accra; f.o.b. New York. 
*> Wholesale price for manufacturers. 
° Refined cane sugar, wholesale price, New York. 
'' Confectionery manufacturers, crystal 42, wholesale price. 
' Unshelled, Spanish 1, wholesale price. 
Although the exceptional increase in relative cacao 
prices and efforts towards substitution have brought about 
only a moderate reduction in total United States cacao 
absorption in recent years, on a per capita basis the decline 
has been quite pronounced. (See chart IV.) Between 1950 
and 1954, per capita cacao consumption fell by approxi-
mately 22 per cent, reaching the lowest level since the early 
depression years. As can be seen in chart IV, this decline 
has been the result of the rapid increase in per capita 
expenditure on cacao, which in recent years has far ex-
ceeded any previous level in over three decades. And the 
striking growth in per capita expenditure on cacao has 
been due exclusively to the rise in relative cacao prices, 
since per capita consumption has been stagnant or de-
clining since 1935-39. 
3 . TENDENCIES IN T H E PRODUCTION OF CACAO 
The post-war period has witnessed the reversal of the 
two major long-run trends in world cacao production. From 
1900 until the beginning of the Second World War, world 
output is estimated to have expanded impressively by more 
than 800 per cent. Although the recovery in world pro-
duction of cacao since the end of the war has been irregular 
the post-war average is approximately equal to that of 
the years 1935/36-1939/40. (See table 3.) The main rea-
son for this lag in output has already been mentioned, 
namely, the existence of chronic world over-production 
before and during the war, which discouraged further 






Latin America 464 512 496 528 
1,054 1,034 994 1,074 
Total world production. . . 1,581 1,587 1,525 1,648 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul-
ture Circular; selected issues. 
Note: The Brazilian harvest has not been adjusted to the inter-
national cacao year, which ends on 31 October; the production 
statistics in the table are therefore not comparable with those of 
chart I. The figures are averages for the periods shown. 
The other long-run production trend which has been 
reversed during the post-war period concerns the relative 
shares of the two main producing areas. At the turn of the 
century, Latin America provided about four-fifths of the 
world cacao crop, Ecuador being the most important world 
producer. By 1940, Latin America's share had fallen to 
less than 30 per cent (less than 3 per cent for Ecuador) 
and Africa accounted for about two-thirds of world out-
put. In effect, Africa contributed most of the long-run 
increase in over-all world cacao production to which refer-
ence was made in the preceding paragraph. During the 
last few years, however, the share of Latin America has 
risen to more than 35 per cent of the world total, reflecting 
an expansion in output of quite a few of the major and 
minor producing countries of the region. In Africa, the 
decline in the crops of the two largest producers, the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria, was not offset by the almost twofold 
expansion in the output of the other producing countries 
of that continent since 1935-39. The main explanation for 
this trend seems to be the withdrawal from production of 
old trees at a rate exceeding new plantings, and the serious 
damage caused by several plagues, especially the swollen-
shoot and black-pod diseases. 
The rise in Latin America's share of total cacao produc-
tion, however, has not permitted an increase in the region's 
share of world exports of this commodity. It appears that 
the absorption of cacao within the area has increased 
appreciably since the end of the war, especially in Mexico, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic and, more recently, 
Brazil, after the exchange devaluation. Thus, the region's 
share of the world cacao trade has continued to fluctuate 
around the immediate pre-war average of about 27 per 
cent, with about two-thirds of the trade still corresponding 
to Africa, in spite of the decline in that continent's share of 
total production to 60 per cent. As Latin America's per 
capita income rises, it will be interesting to see whether 
advances in domestic consumption will continue to make 
inroads into export availabilities. 
4 . CONCLUSIONS 
The basic difficulty in the post-war cacao situation has 
been the shortage of supplies and the lag in the expansion 
of output. As a result of current efforts to accelerate pro-
duction, to improve plant selection and to combat diseases 
more effectively, a substantial expansion in world supplies 
can probably be expected over the course of the next few 
years. The problem that must now be faced is whether 
larger prospective supplies will have to be sold at steadily 
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Chart IV 
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1939-iO 19Í5-W 19'i6-i7 Í9i7-á8 19Í8-Í9 19Í9-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-5't 
Preliminary 
estimates 
Total Latin America 210,479 192,663 247,552 202,576 218,885 263,002 247,274 205,997 214,006 239,993 290,286 290,259 Brazil 119,741 111,132 153,317 99,792 125,352 161,935 136,261 104,725 96,901 123,139 168,901 157,989 
Colombia 11,340 7,500 11,000 11,204 13,499 11,000 14,550 14,550 15,000 15,000 16,000 16,330 Ecuador 19,220 16,936 15,876 15,960 19,822 21,619 28,123 22,680 25,305 29,906 25,305 32,206 
Venezuela 16,753 15,001 17,237 23,791 14,202 14,502 16,874 17,917 16,411 17,000 16,800 17,736 Total South America 167,055 152,805 197,429 150,747 172,876 209,055 195,809 159,873 153,617 185,045 227,006 224,260 
Costa Rica 6,512 4,586 3,810 6,600 6,291 4,395 2,903 3,200 5,500 6,100 7,000 7,258 Cuba 3,175 2,268 2,722 2,991 2,948 3,266 2,495 2,722 2,495 3,402 2,530 2,767 Dominican Republic 24,517 24,993 31,525 28,001 23,800 33,113 32,300 26,600 38,000 29,715 38,113 38,556 Haiti 1,519 1,361 1,814 1,996 1,560 1,864 2,204 1,847 1,964 2,268 1,134 2,268 Mexico 1,134 1,134 5,443 7,031 6,500 6,623 8,609 8,609 9,119 9,500 10,350 10,886 Panama 4,725 4,726 2,948 2,987 2,980 2,858 1,043 1,032 1,361 1,814 1,928 2,041 
Others 1,841 1,814 1,860 2,223 1,928 1,828 1,986 2,116 1,950 2,148 2,224 2,223 
Total Mexico and Central America 43,424 39,858 50,123 51,828 46,009 53,947 51,540 46,124 60,389 54,948 63,280 65,999 
Total Africa 478,230 422,757 407,945 401,427 519,463 501,541 518,979 458,644 512,197 466,873 479,330 495,082 Ivory Coast 49,867 35,999 36,000 36,288 50,622 55,430 61,380 47,380 61,001 53,000 65,855 65,772 
Gold Coast 276,407 212,738 195,048 212,103 282,661 259,459 267,624 217,728 250,950 219,077 232,207 232,243 
Nigeria 98,122 103,874 111,586 77,112 109,726 103,421 112,500 109,622 110,722 98,993 82,762 91,446 Other African countries 53,833 70,144 65,312 75,924 76,454 83,231 77,475 83,913 89,524 95,802 98,506 105,621 
Other countries, total 28,306 13,417 15,148 17,820 17,053 18,285 19,947 19,522 22,595 20,070 22,140 24,181 
GRAND TOTAL 717,015 628,837 670,645 621,823 755,400 782,827 786,275 684,162 748,797 726,935 791,757 809,068 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Circular; selected issues. 
lower prices as a result of changes in the structure of de-
mand arising from many years of scarcity and price in-
stability. Manufacturers have invested large sums in the 
development of synthetic substitutes and compound mix-
tures using less cacao, and consumers are becoming more 
accustomed to non-chocolate confectionery. It may not be 
easy to reverse this process, even if cacao prices are 
brought more into line with other food prices, unless 
manufacturers can be assured of adequate supplies of cacao 
at reasonable and more stable prices over an extended 
period of time. The existing cacao market mechanism— 
highly sensitive and handicapped by the lack of reasonably 
accurate information on current stocks, rates of consump-
tion and production—has actually tended to exaggerate 
the instability of cacao prices, which on numerous occa-
sions during the post-war period have suffered fluctuations 
much greater than were justified by changes in supply and 
demand. It would appear that what is needed is a more 
orderly marketing of cacao, not only to assure a healthy 
growth in demand, but also to protect the terms of trade 
of exporting countries from the adverse efl'ects of surplus 
production. 
I I . W H E A T 
The total volume of Latin American wheat production 
in 1955 was close on 12 million tons, the highest recorded 
since the peak reached in 1939.^ This level was nearly 19 
per cent above that of the previous year, in striking con-
trast with the 6 per cent expansion in the rest of the world. 
Thus, in 1955 Latin American production accounted for 
5.9 per cent of the world total; this represented an increase 
over its share in the immediately preceding years, and a 
still greater improvement on its position before the war. 
Table 5 
WORLD AND LATIN AMERICAN WHEAT PRODUCTION 
(Thousands of tons) 
Year World Latin America 
Lalin America 
{Percentages) 
1935-39 165,609 8,036 3.9 
1945-49 160,574 7,580 4.7 
1953 202,092 10,890 5.3 
1954 187,215 10,047 5.4 
1955 200,493 11,895 5.9 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Of this increase in the Latin American harvest, 80 per 
cent was due to the increment in Argentina's production, 
which rose from 6.2 to 7.7 million tons between 1954 and 
1955. In the latter year Uruguay maintained its high 1954 
output, more than doubling that of previous years. The 
remaining countries, traditionally importers of wheat, con-
tinued their eff'orts to expand production and succeeded 
in raising it more than 10 per cent above their 1954 level. 
Within this group, Brazil, Chile and Mexico achieved the 
greatest increases. 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: WHEAT PRODUCTION 
(Thousands of tons) 
Year Argentina Uruguay 
Rest of Latin 
America 
1934-38 6,128 361 1,580 
1952 2,100 478 2,456 
1953 7,634 426 2,830 
1954 6,200 819 3,028 
1955 7,690 854 3,351 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
' In 1939, Latin America's total production approached 12.5 mil-
lion tons, thanks to exceptional harvests in Argentina. 
In the rest of the world some important variations were 
observable during 1955. While production in the United 
States was reduced by 5.5 per cent and totalled a little 
under 25 million tons, Canada regained a high level with 
a harvest of 13.6 million tons, which was, however, smaller 
than that of 1953 (16.7 million tons). Australia also sub-
stantially increased its output, which amounted to 5.5 
million tons, and was thus 20 per cent larger than in 1954. 
The Soviet Union and the Asiatic countries registered fairly 
considerable increments, while in some parts of Africa a 
serious falling-off was noted. 
Although in Europe as a whole rather more wheat was 
produced than in the previous year, the situation varied 
greatly from country to country. France, Italy, Western 
Germany and Yugoslavia, for instance, obtained better 
harvests in 1954/55 than in the preceding season, whereas 
in Portugal, the Scandinavian countries, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, severe setbacks were experienced in the 
course of 1955. 
Wheat surpluses, most of which are held by the United 
States and Canada, slightly increased during 1955, al-
though more slowly than in previous years. On 1 October 
1955, the export availabilities and surpluses in these two 
countries, together with those of Argentina and Australia, 
totalled 60.7 million tons, as against 57.3 and 53.3 millions 
on the same date in 1954 and 1953 respectively. Of the 
45 million tons which made up these four countries' stocks 
at the beginning of the last season,^" 27.8 millions (62 
per cent) were held by the United States, 13.1 millions by 
Canada, 2.5 millions by Australia and the remaining 1.6 
millions by Argentina. 
The substantial accumulation of surpluses in the United 
States began in 1953 (see table 7) , and resulted from the 
combination of two excellent harvests, in 1952 and 1953, 
with a considerable decline both in domestic consumption 
and in exports. In consequence of these two contrasting 
developments, stocks began to pile up to an immoderate 
extent, until in 1955 they were four times larger than in 
1952. Despite reductions in the area sown to wheat (which 
was 25.1 million hectares in 1954 and 22.3 millions in 
1955, as compared with 31.6 million hectares in 1953) and 
in the prices received by producers,^^ the greatly increased 
yields in 1955 prevented United States production from 
decreasing by more than about 3 per cent. 
1 July in the United States; 1 August in Canada; 1 December 
in Argentina and Australia. 
^^  The price received by farmers was 2.03 dollars per bushel in 
the third quarter of 1954, but fell to 1.93 dollars during the same 
period in 1955. 
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Table 10 
UNITED STATES: WHEAT CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS 
(Thousands of tons) 
Years Slocks Total 
beginning on New Total domestic 
1 July i July harvest supply consumption 
O) (2) (3) w 
194 5 7,593 30,155 37,749 24,331 
194 6 2,722 31,353 34,074 20,847 
194 7 2,286 36,987 39,273 20,603 
194 8 5,334 35,245 40,579 18,452 
194 9 8,355 29,883 38,238 18,480 
195 0 11,567 27,733 39,300 18,888 
195 1 10,778 26,699 37,476 18,452 
195 2 6,967 35,354 42,321 18,942 
195 3 15,295 31,816 47,111 16,819 
195 4 24,549 26,400 50,948 15,812 
1955 » 27,788 25,529 53,316 16,956 
1956 • 28,985 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, 31 October 1955. 
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It can be seen that almost the whole of the United States' 
wheat surpluses are held by the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration (CCC). This gradual enlargement of the stocks 
handled by the CCC was due not only to the favourable 
weather conditions that fostered the abundant harvests of 
1952 and 1953, but also to the fact that this same organiza-
tion's price policy encouraged the large-scale production 
of poor quality wheat, since hitherto the established CCC 
prices have varied according to quality by only very small 
amounts. It has been announced, however, that as from 
1956 there will be a discount of 20 cents per bushel on 
twenty-four strains of wheat specified as undesirable. Up 
lo now, this problem of the quality of United States wheat 
has, to some extent, affected the country's exports, by in-
directly favouring those of its competitors. Some buyers, 
especially among the Latin American countries, have 
lodged complaints as to the quality of the wheat pur-
chased.^^ 
For almost the whole of its exports of wheat and flour, 
the United States draws upon the stocks held by the CCC, 
which subsidizes them at rates fluctuating around 30 per 
cent of the guarantee prices. The last agricultural year 
witnessed the conclusion of barter agreements involving 
exports of about 1.25 million tons, or 17 per cent of total 
sales abroad, while a still larger quantity—approximately 
1.45 million tons—was sold against payment in the national 
currency of the buyer countries, in accordance with the 
provisions of Public Act 480. An agreement was recently 
signed with Brazil for the sale of 500,000 tons of wheat, of 
whose value 70 per cent will be payable in cruzeiros. 
This system, whereby part of the sales value is covered 
with national currency, the sums in question being in their 
turn loaned to the purchasers for development purposes, 
has been criticized in Canada and other countries as an 
unjustifiable interference with normal trade movements. 
In view of this situation, Australia and Canada have 
also begun to consider the possibility of exporting wheat 
on a basis of loans or credits to importing countries. 
The general outlook, as far as surpluses are concerned. 
United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural 
Circular, 26 January 1955, p. 10. 
is obscured by the fact that Europe's imports have sharply 
declined in the last few years, owing to the marked ex-
pansion of its own production. According to the Economic 
Survey of Europe 2954, the total European output of grain 
suitable for bread rose from 40 million tons yearly over 
the period 1948-50 to 50.7 millions in 1953, and during 
the same interval net imports fell from 15 to 9.8 million 
tons. This decrease took place despite the fact that Europe's 
wheat imports from Latin America and other regions 
actually rose, so that the lower figures were entirely due 
to the abrupt curtailment of purchases from the United 
States and, up to a point, from Canada. 
The continuous piling-up of surpluses in the United 
States raises a serious problem in connexion with the 
standard of the wheat. Since some of these stocks have 
remained in the warehouses for over two years, it may 
well be asked how far their quality is likely to have deteri-
orated, and whether a considerable volume may not have 
become unfit for human consumption. Little is, in fact, 
known on this point, but merely to touch upon it is enough 
to give a clearer idea of the pressure that surpluses are 
exerting on the world market. 
Argentina's position in the international wheat trade 
has been strengthened in the last two years, after having 
been exceptionally weak throughout 1952 and 1953. In 
fact, as table 4 shows, in 1954 Argentina's exports totalled 
a little over 3.5 million tons, that is, almost 14 per cent of 
total world exports. This rate of increase was maintained 
in the second half of 1955, during the first ten months of 
which year the volume exported amounted to almost 3 
million tons, as against 2.4 millions over the corresponding 
period in 1954. It is estimated that Argentina will not have 
difficulty in placing its exportable surpluses, as a consider-
able proportion of these has already been sold or con-
tracted. Moreover, the 1955/56 crop is likely to be smaller 
than the preceding year's, as the area under seed is assessed 
at not more than 5.2 million hectares, of which only about 
4.4-4.5 millions are likely to be harvested. Thus, on the 
assumption that yields will probably be lower than in 
previous years, the output, according to estimates, will be 
some 5 million tons, or approximately 35 per cent, less 
than that of 1954/55. The effects of the new prices fixed 
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Table 8 
WORLD EXPORTS OF WHEAT AND FLOURS (WHEAT EQUIVALENT) 
(Thousands of tons J 
United States Canada Australia Argentina 
Year (A) (B) (A) ~Tb) (A) (B) (B) 
Average 
1945-49 . 11,499.8 48.1 6,678.0 28.0 2,264.0 9.5 2,054.1 8.6 
1950/51 10,187.9 40.0 5,778.2 22.7 3,465.4 13.6 2,813.8 11.0 
1951/52 13,061.6 45.0 9,313.1 32.1 2,698.5 9.3 816.0 2.8 
1952/53 8,818.1 32.8 10,487.4 39.0 2,706.4 10.1 796.9 3.0 
1953/54 5,985.3 25.0 7,744.2 32.4 1,932.2 8.1 3,004.6 12.6 
1954/55 7,348.3 28.6 6,940.1 27.0 2,449.4 9.5 3,538.1 13.8 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Circular, September 1955. 
Note: (A) = Total 
(B) = Percentage. 
' Trade year beginning 1 July and ending 30 June. 






















for Argentine wheat—70 Argentine pesos instead of 50 per 
100 kilogrammes—will not be felt until the harvest from 
the 1954 sowing reaches the market. However, the decline 
in production will not greatly affect exports, since, as has 
already been noted, the existing surplus is substantially 
larger than in previous years. It should be pointed out in 
this connexion that during the last two years Argentina has 
managed to maintain the export price of wheat at about 
68 dollars per ton. 
Uruguay, which formerly exported small quantities of 
wheat, mainly as flour, has, in the last two years, increased 
its sales abroad, as a result of the substantial improvement 
in its production. The area under wheat, which used nor-
mally to be about 500,000 hectares, was extended in 
1953/54 and 1954/55 to about 750,000, by the exploita-
tion of land which became available through a decline in 
the cultivation of linseed, or which had formerly been used 
for pasture.^ ® 
Throughout the whole of 1954, Uruguay exported 
340,000 tons of wheat, while about 337,000 tons, of which 
approximately 70,000 corresponded to surpluses carried 
over from the previous agricultural year, had already 
been shipped abroad in the first seven months of 1955. 
Only 21 per cent of these exports, however, took the form 
of flour, as compared with more than 50 per cent in 1954 
and 100 per cent in 1953. 
Nevertheless, certain difficulties attended the sale of 
Uruguay's exportable wheat surpluses. As the basic ex-
change rate of 1.51 pesos to the dollar proved inadequate, 
the Uruguayan Government was obliged to establish a 
preferential rate of 3.50 pesos to the dollar, to enable 
some 300,000 tons to be exported. Owing to the Govern-
ment's having to bear such a heavy burden of subsidies, 
guarantee prices for the 1955/56 crop were reduced from 
the 16.50 pesos per 100 kilogrammes of wheat formerly 
established,^'' to 14 pesos. 
Brazil is the most important purchaser of Uruguayan 
wheat. In fact, of the 337,000 tons exported by Uruguay 
up to 31 July 1955, Brazil bought about 250,000 tons as 
grain and 40,000 in the form of flour. With an estimated 
exportable balance from the 1955 harvest of about 460,000 
tons, and, on 1 January of the same year, a surplus of 
approximately 206,000 tons, the amount still available 
for export on 1 August 1955 was probably in the neigh-
bourhood of 330,000 tons. 
III. T I N 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The importance of tin mining for Bolivia equals or 
exceeds that of copper mining for Chile. Large-scale ex-
ploitation of Bolivia's tin deposits began in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, production having fluctuated 
between 1880 and 1890 around 750 tons yearly (1.3 per 
cent of the world output). In 1929 it reached its peak level 
of 47,080 tons (24 per cent of world production). But in 
the 1930's, as a result of the depression, and, to an even 
greater degree, of the Chaco War, which considerably 
reduced the labour force, tin production decreased, until 
in the closing years of the decade it amounted to some* 
26,000 tons yearly (about 15 per cent of the world total). 
After the outbreak of war in Europe, although demand 
remained at the annual level of 150,000 tons attained 
towards the end of the previous decade, the producer 
countries increased their output so that in 1940 and 1941 
" See "The Latin American Meat Problem", page 58. 
a yearly average of 240,000 tons was reached, and produc-
tion outstripped consumption by almost 60 per cent. 
Japan's entry into the war, at the end of 1941, abruptly 
curtailed production in the Far East and rendered this 
region inaccessible to the Allied Powers. From then until 
the end of the war, Bolivia, the Belgian Congo and Nigeria, 
with annual outputs of 40,000, 16,000 and 12,000 tons 
respectively, constituted almost the sole sources of supply 
open to the United States and the other allied countries. 
No sooner was the war over than Asian producers made 
as speedy a recovery as possible, raising world produc-
tion to 170,000 tons in 1951-52 and 175,000 in 1953-54. 
This figure is estimated to have decreased to 168,000 tons 
in 1955, on account of a falling-ofl' in production in 
Bolivia and Indonesia, although slight increases were re-
corded elsewhere. 
" This price was one of the most powerful of the incentives which 
helped to promote the expansion of the area under wheat mentioned 
previously. 
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2 . T H E DEMAND F O R TIN 
Traditionally, the world's largest tin market has always 
been the United States. During the period 1927-29 this 
country consumed, on an average, 77,000 tons yearly, 
which represented 46 per cent of total world demand. 
After declining during the depression, demand partially 
recovered; from 1937 to 1940 it stood at an annual aver-
age of 65,000 tons—40 per cent of world consumption— 
and in 1941 reached the record level of 103,000 tons. 
As from 1942, the United States, simultaneously con-
fronted with the impossibility of obtaining tin from the 
Far East and the imperative need to meet war require-
ments, made a concentrated effort to reduce its consump-
tion, replacing tin wherever possible by other metals or 
substitute products. The application of tin coatings by 
electrodeposition in the manufacture of tin-plate, a sys-
tem which requires from 33 to 50 per cent less tin than the 
old immersion process it replaced, was the innovation 
that produced the most far-reaching effects. Knowledge 
of the new technique has spread reasonably quickly, and 
even in countries like Brazil and Mexico, which are only 
small-scale producers, electrolysis is already being used in 
coating steel plates for the manufacture of tin-plate. 
These innovations, designed to curtail tin consumption 
and adopted as emergency measures during the war, have 
not been discarded with the return of more normal condi-
tions. Thus tin is one of the few metals that have not 
benefited by the strikingly intensive post-war expansion 
of industrial activity in the United States. From 1950 to 
1954, average annual consumption amounted to 52,000 
tons, a figure 20 per cent lower than that recorded fifteen 
years earlier. 
Among the limited uses of tin for which the United 
States is purchasing considerably larger quantities is the 
manufacture of certain alloys. While in 1935-39 the aver-
age consumption of tin in alloys was 7,000 tons, it has 
risen to some 20,000 in the post-war period. It should 
be noted, however, that this special demand includes a 
high percentage of recovered tin, the share of which in 
total consumption has been almost uninterruptedly in-
creasing ever since the beginning of the century. Never-
theless, in recent years there has been a tendency towards 
stabilization and even reduction of the proportion of sec-
ondary tin used. This is perhaps attributable to the fact 
that the quantities involved in the manufacture of tin-
plate by electrodeposition are so small that recovery is 
hardly worth while. Probably the new electrolytic process, 
which over the short term seems to have a negative effect 
on tin consumption, will in the long run prove advan-
tageous as regards primary tin, since it means that the 
metal used is destroyed once and for all. 
In Europe, there has been no great change in the annual 
average for the aggregate consumption of fourteen coun-
tries^'' between 1926-29, when it amounted to 45,000 tons, 
and 1951-54, when the corresponding figure was 45,907 
tons. On the other hand, as world consumption declined 
over the same period from 162,000 to 136,200 tons, the 
European countries' share in this demand rose from 27.8 
to 33.7 per cent. Thanks to the new metal-saving tech-
niques, any substantial increase in European tin consump-
tion is unlikely over the short term. 
Prevailing trends can be more clearly seen in table 9, 
which refers to tin-plate, the most important of the prod-
ducts for which tin is used. 
The above statistics show how, in the course of the four-
year period under review, the consumption of tin per ton 
of tin-plate was stabilized in the United States, and reduced 
in the other industrialized countries of the world, by the 
adoption of processes involving smaller quantities of metal. 
In other words, whereas world production of tin-plate ex-
panded by 11.7 per cent between 1951 and 1954, the 
consumption of tin for tin-plate rose by only 5.6 per cent; 
and the discrepancy between the corresponding percent-
ages in the near future will probably be even wider.^^ 
To sum up, the current trend is towards increased con-
sumption of products containing tin, and, at the same time, 
towards a reduction of their tin content. It may be as-
sumed that in consequence of these clearly contradictory 
tendencies, the expansion of demand will be slow in the 
next few years. In view of the world's present production 
capacity, an accumulation of surpluses is to be expected. 
Hitherto, an outlet for such surpluses has been provided 
by the purchases of the United States Government for its 
strategic reserve. Although the present volume of this 
stockpile is unknown, it has repeatedly been stated that the 
target proposed has been exceeded, and therefore further 
stocks will probably be unnecessary. 
3 . P R I C E S 
Apart from that of aluminium, the prices of the other 
non-ferrous metals in heavy demand—copper, lead, zinc 
" Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. 
" During the first seven months of 1955, world production of 
tin-plate increased by 19 per cent, while consumption of tin for 
tin-plate, and specific consumption of tin per ton of tin-plate, de-
creased by 5 and almost 15 per cent respectively. 
Table 9 
PRODUCTION OF TIN-PLATE AND CONSUMPTION OF TIN INVOLVED 
Production of 
tin-plale 
(Thousands of ions) 
Consumption of tin 
in manufacture of 
tin-plate 
(Thousands of tons) 
Consumption of 
tin per ton of 
tin-plate 
(Kilogrammes) 
1951 195á 1951 195i 1951 195'! 
United States 
Rest of the world 
4 , 0 2 8 
1 , 7 0 7 
4 , 3 7 4 
2 , 0 3 2 
3 1 . 0 
2 7 . 0 
3 3 . 5 
2 7 . 1 
7 . 6 
1 5 . 6 
7 . 6 
13 .1 
TOTAL 5 , 7 3 5 6 , 4 0 6 5 8 . 0 6 0 . 6 9 . 5 ' 9 . 3 » 
Source: International Tin Study Group, Statistical Supplement 1955, p. 15. 
' Weighted average. 
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Chart V 
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(Cents per pound) 
(Semi-logarithmic scale) 
and tin have undergone very similar fluctuations. (See 
chart V.) The trends for lead, zinc and tin resemble one 
another particularly closely, as the prices of these three 
metals have tended to fall since 1952, while that of cop-
per has been rising. In 1955 there was a recovery in lead 
and zinc quotations, while that of tin remained almost 
stationary, because production, for the reasons described, 
outstripped demand. 
4 . T H E ROLE OF TIN IN BOLIVIA 'S FOREIGN TRADE 
The share of tin in Bolivia's foreign trade has declined 
a little in recent years, but is still of considerable magni-
tude, as it represents two-thirds of the total value of ex-
ports. The perils of so great a degree of dependence upon 
a single product can be more clearly realized if it is borne 
in mind that a major proportion of Bolivia's remaining 
exports is made up of other metals, such as tungsten, lead 
and zinc, of which only the first shows signs of making 
a steadily increasing contribution to the total value of ex-
ports (15 per cent in 1953 and 18 per cent in 1954). Al-
though in the last two years a remarkable expansion has 
also been recorded for petroleum—another product of the 
mining industry—tin is still the most potent factor in 
Bolivia's economy, and the principal determinant of the 
country's foreign payments capacity. 
Modifications in the volume of tin exported, and fluctua-
tions in the prices it can fetch on world markets, must 
therefore be regarded as two essential elements in the 
economic life of Bolivia. During the last ten years exports 
have shown a clearly-defined tendency to decrease, partly 
as a result of world market conditions, and partly in con-
sequence of the country's own economic situation. The low 
grade of Bolivian ores means that the production of tin 
is a costly process. In addition, the effect of the exchange 
policy must be taken into account. The export rate of 
exchange has been kept abnormally low in relation to the 
internal devaluation of the currency, as a way of pre-
venting the higher cost of imports from intensifying the 
existing inflation. But if this policy has successfully averted 
the risk of a sharp rise in the price of imported goods, 
it has also had a discouraging effect on the mining indus-
try, as is made particularly manifest by the insignificance 
of the resources devoted to prospecting and the marked 
decline observable in the output of small- and medium-
scale mining.^^ 
During the first seven months of 1955, Bolivian tin was 
exported at a slightly lower rate than in 1954, when sales 
abroad had already fallen 17.4 per cent below their 1953 
level. This further decline of exports in 1955 took place 
at a time when there was in reality no serious difficulty 
in selling tin on the principal foreign markets, as the 
United States continued to buy up production surpluses 
for its strategic reserve, and Bolivia itself renewed a con-
tract with a British firm whereby the latter guarantees 
to purchase 50 per cent of the country's output of tin 
at world market prices. 
The rise in the prices of tin as from the close of 1950 
perceptibly improved Bolivia's terms of trade, which, until 
that year, had remained below the 1945 level, although 
in 1948 and 1949 world quotations were higher than in 
the three preceding years. This deterioration between 1946 
and 1950 was mainly due to the relatively larger increase 
in import prices. Although in 1951 the terms of trade at-
tained their peak, they were still only 18 per cent more 
favourable than in 1945; and from 1952 onwards they 
once again declined, as a result of the fall in the price 
of tin on the world market, until by 1954 they were about 
5 per cent lower than in 1953 and only 7 per cent higher 
than in 1945. 
Tin-mining in Bolivia is faced with the same problem of 
the slow expansion of demand that confronts all the pro-
ducers of this metal, and, in addition, is in a state of un-
certainty as to the future attitude of the United States 
Government with respect to the Texas smelter. This is the 
only plant currently treating the low-grade Bolivian ores, 
absorbing approximately 50 per cent of the country's 
output.^ ® In view of this situation, Bolivia has no alterna-
tive but to raise as much as possible the productivity of 
its mining industry, in which costs are higher than in that 
of most of the other producer countries, and to carry 
out a programme of technical improvements designed to 
secure a better reception for its exports on the world mar-
ket. These improvements will take the following forms: 
(a) higher ore concentration to reduce the costs of land 
and sea transport to the smelter; (6) the breaking down 
of some of the complex ores into simple ores, to facilitate 
the smelting process; and (c) the establishment of a 
smelter in Bolivia which will handle, if not all the coun-
try's ores, at least those that are the most difficult to treat.^" 
" Tlie share of small- and medium-scale mining in tlie production 
of tin fell from 26.8 per cent in 1951 to 13.5 per cent in 1954. 
" Tfie Texas smelter can treat this low-grade ore only in com-
bination witfi riclier ore, which generally comes from Malaya. 
The reduction of some of these ores is so difficult a process 
that they can be treated only in combination with richer ores. The 
latter Bolivia produces in limited quantities that are at present 
mainly exported to the United Kingdom. 
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